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ABSTRACT 
 
Over his philosophical career, David Wiggins has produced a body of work that, though 
varied and wide-ranging, stands as a coherent and carefully integrated whole. Its parts 
cannot be studied in isolation, and a central aim of this thesis is to examine how three 
vital elements of his systematic metaphysics interconnect: his conceptualist-realism, his sortal 
theory ‘D’, and his account of personal identity – his human being theory. 
 Yet critics murder to dissect, and Wiggins’ project is often unfairly decomposed 
into its parts. Thus, this study aims both to introduce his thoughts without neglecting 
the relations between them, and to rectify the various misinterpretations of them by – 
among others – Paul Snowdon, Eric Olson and Lynne Rudder Baker. 
 In clarifying and exploring these connections another sunken, yet central, vein is 
revealed. It is argued that Wiggins’ metaphysics bears on, and is borne upon, by various 
discussions in the philosophy of biology. This is a connection that he himself adverts to, but 
which commentators have rarely investigated. Attending to it, one finds in his analyses 
of natural substances a novel form of biological anti-reductionism, which stands as a 
productive alternative to emergentism. 
 Closer attention to his construal of substances – specifically organisms – also 
reveals a worry. At the core of Wiggins’ account of personal identity is the consilience 
he sees between the concept of a person and the concept of a natural substance (a 
human being). It is argued below that organ transplantation disturbs the Aristotelian 
distinction between natural substance and biological artefact, and thus tests the heart-string 
of his human being theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In an autobiographical aside in Identity, Truth and Value, David Wiggins tells us that his 
earliest intellectual impulse was not towards philosophy, but to painting.1 And on more 
than one occasion while writing this thesis I have wondered – perhaps somewhat 
wistfully – whether his thoughts would have been better captured in that less restrictive 
medium. For whatever his written work is – beautifully crafted, subtle, ingenious – 
nobody would ever say it is easy to read. 
 Wiggins himself laments the fact that his texts can be found obscure;2 and a 
cursory glance at the numerous reviews of his books, Sameness and Substance and Sameness 
and Substance Renewed, suggests the view is widely held.3 His prose is elegant, but it is a 
baroque elegance: dense, and rich, with intricate and finely wrought digressions, and 
sentences that are, as Adrian Moore remarks, almost beyond parody in length.4 There is 
an added – and not unimportant – difficulty for younger scholars approaching his work, 
following as it does a trajectory marked out more than forty years ago in his Identity and 
Spatio-Temporal Continuity;5 the trends in Anglophone philosophy have changed, and each 
new rendering of his theory is laden with references to older debates, while 
simultaneously incorporating responses to more recent ones.6 
 Yet the difficulties found in Wiggins’ work are also indicators of its strength; the 
precision that makes him so hard to pin down7 is a symptom of the meticulous care that 
has gone into the construction of his theory. Thus we find the view, voiced by Peter 
Strawson,8 and echoed elsewhere,9 that patience with Wiggins will be rewarded; his work 
in philosophy is so delicately shaped and extensively tested that its insights are both 
powerful and sustainable. Additionally, his forest of articles and books are valuable as 
historical markers: having been developed over so many decades they allow one to get a 
clear sense of the fluctuations of a particular moment in Anglophone philosophy. Every 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Wiggins 1996: 222 
2 Wiggins 2012 
3 ‘[One] has to struggle with convoluted sentences and a certain elusiveness of argumentative structure’ 
(Lowe 2003: 816), ‘[It is] set down in a rather haphazard organization of main text, subsidiary text, 
footnotes, and further notes’ (Baldwin 1982: 270) ‘Sameness and Substance is a difficult book; Wiggins’ 
avowed effort to be understood will be lost on those who are not prepared to follow the intricacy of his 
response to criticism and to look for the relevance of papers written since 1967 and listed in the preface.’ 
(Cartwright 1982: 597) See also Noonan 1981. 
4 Moore 1996: 165 
5 See Lowe 2003: 816 (and Cartwright 1982: 597) 
6 Bakhurst (in his 2005) offers a short review of some of the changes. 
7 Moore 1996: 165 
8 Strawson 1981: 603 
9 E.g. Noonan 1981: 261, Cartwright 1982: 597, Lowe 2003: 816, Snowdon 2009: 254 
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sentence carries marks of a myriad of past debates, in the form of footnotes, 
parenthetical comments, and appendices. 
  Complex, confusing, rich and revealing: it is because of these features that his 
work merits closer attention, and one aim of this dissertation is to offer an introduction 
to it – albeit a partial one. Some aspects of the reading that follows may seem surprising 
(the phenomenological rendering of his conceptualist-realism, for instance) while others 
will exhibit certain inadequacies; that my survey is partial may well worry those like 
David Bakhurst who emphasize the systemic nature of Wiggins’ philosophy.10 The focus 
here is on Wiggins’ metaphysics, specifically his theory of individuation, his 
conceptualist-realism, and his account of personal identity. His essentialism will be 
mentioned, but not analysed in depth.11 His work in moral theory, formal logic, 
semantics, aesthetics, and ancient philosophy will be discussed only briefly.12 It is an 
unfortunate consequence of space constraints that real and significant links between the 
various areas of his work will be neglected. 
 Yet, where some are neglected, other connections will be unearthed. The aim of 
the second half of this study is to trace the subterranean strands that link Wiggins’ 
metaphysics to discussions in biology and the philosophy of biology. These links are 
equally real, and equally significant. It is no accident that in the short preface to Identity 
and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, Wiggins writes compellingly about the centrality of biology 
to metaphysical investigation: 
 
It gradually became evident to me in constructing this work that for the 
future of metaphysics no single part of the philosophy of science was in 
more urgent need of development than the philosophy of biology.13 
 
It is a forceful pronouncement – one completely ignored by Wiggins’ various critics and 
commentators. This is an oversight, which the present work attempts to address. It is 
argued below that a considerable amount of overlap exists between Wiggins’ 
metaphysical themes, and issues of biological individuality and anti-reductionism. How 
these biological issues bear on his ‘human being theory’ and the ‘personal identity 
debate’ more generally, is examined in detail in the following chapters. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bakhurst 2005. See also Lovibond and Williams 1996: Preface 
11 For a closer study of this I recommend Nick Jones’ ‘Individuation to Essentialism’ (forthcoming) 
12 And, sadly, a language barrier prevents proper engagement with those works he has produced in 
French. 
13 Wiggins 1967: vii 
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 Before embarking on this project, however, some scene-setting is required, and 
in the remainder of this introduction a brief overview will be given of the so-called 
‘personal identity’ debate, and the ambit of ‘philosophy of biology’ will be drawn, 
alongside a prospectus of the thesis as a whole, and a short literature review. 
 
Personal identity 
 
Questions about what we are, and what it takes for us to persist, are found in various forms, 
in multifarious philosophical traditions, from Buddhist perspectives on the self (or the 
lack thereof),14 to conceptions of personhood in Yoruba thought.15 On the whole, the 
present work examines these questions as they appear in Anglophone philosophy. More 
specifically, the ‘personal identity debate’ is taken here, to refer to the body of discourse 
that has its historical roots in John Locke’s discussion in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.16 At times, the following analysis moves beyond this local setting (the 
discussion of Balinese conceptions of ‘person’ in §2.3.a. is an example), but in general, 
talk of ‘personal identity’ is organized in relation to that text. Artificial as this limit is, 
explicit reference to Locke is taken as a good indication of engagement in particular 
attitudes towards these questions. 
 Locke’s well-known treatment appears in chapter 27 of Book II of his Essay: it is 
there that he claims we are fundamentally persons, where a person is ‘a thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same 
thinking thing, in different times and places’.17 This definition is the core of his account 
of ‘personal identity’ – it allows him to state what it takes for persons at earlier and later 
times to be identical and, consequently, to say what constitutes a person’s persistence 
over time. For Locke, an earlier individual is the same person as a later individual if they 
are linked by the same continued consciousness, a psychological connection evidenced by 
experiential memory.  
 It is along these lines that Locke responds to the array of puzzle cases, which 
have come to characterize the personal identity literature: stories of character 
transmigration (the ‘prince and the cobbler’ narrative),18 of physical disassembly and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Ganeri’s 2012 for an interesting attempt to nurture dialogue between the questions as they feature 
in the Buddhist and Anglophone spheres. 
15 E.g. Adeofe 2004 
16 Locke 1690/1975 
17 Ibid: II, xxvii, §9 
18 Ibid: II, xxvii, §15 
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reassembly (as in Christological accounts of bodily resurrection),19 and – more 
prosaically, but no less importantly – of memory-loss (exemplified in Locke’s 
examinations of the ‘drunkard’).20 In recent years there have been some notable (and 
notably peculiar) additions to the canon – tales of teletransportation21 and fission22 
abound. Perhaps the most notorious of these additions is Sydney Shoemaker’s ‘brain 
transplantation’ narrative23 in which Shoemaker describes the misfortunes of the sorry 
patient, Brown, who has his brain accidentally transferred into another patient’s body. 
Asking whether or not Brown survives the transplantation, Shoemaker finds in Locke 
an affirmative answer. Neo-Lockeans24 contend that Brown does survive, since his 
consciousness continues (so that the recipient of the brain donation can remember the 
past life of the donor, displays his personality, thoughts, and so forth). This ‘thought 
experiment’ is the main focus of the discussion in chapter 4. 
There are, of course, those who reject the Lockean analysis,25 and neo-Lockeans, 
or ‘psychological theorists’, are often contrasted with ‘biological theorists’ or 
‘animalists’.26 Animalists – like Eric Olson – deny that we are fundamentally persons. 
They hold instead that we are fundamentally ‘human animals’, and that our persistence 
conditions are those of the human animals that we are.27 Whether or not we survive 
depends, not on a psychological relation, but on the continuation of biological life. Thus, 
for example, the animalist denies the patient survives the transplantation (or at least, 
denies they go with their cerebrum).28 Brain transplantation does not constitute the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is discussed in depth in chapter 4. 
20 Locke 1690/1975: II, xxvii, §21 and §23 
21 E.g. Parfit 1984 
22 E.g. Shoemaker 2004a 
23 Shoemaker 1963: 23–24 
24 There have been considerable refinements to the Lockean position in recent years. Neo-Lockean 
revisions – like Shoemaker’s (e.g. 1963, 2004a), and Parfit’s (e.g. 1971, 1984) – attempt to re-describe the 
psychological relation without putting Locke’s (problematic) emphasis on memory-links. For discussions 
of the problems in Locke, see e.g. Reid 1785 (Essay III, especially chapters 3 and 4) (for a more recent 
survey, Noonan 1989). Neo-Lockeans also typically endorse some form of materialism; consciousness is 
inextricably tied to some material substrate – i.e. the human brain. 
25 One reason is its failure to match the everyday intuitions we have about e.g. foetuses – which we 
believe we once were. 
26 A distinction found in e.g. Noonan 1998, and Olson 1997 
27 For a classic statement of this position see Olson’s 1997.  Besides Olson, the term ‘animalism’ has been 
used to describe the view of W.R. Carter (1989), Michael Ayers (1991), Trenton Merricks (2001a), Paul 
Snowdon (1990), and Rory Madden (draft). 
28 A distinction is drawn – and should be mentioned here – between brain transplants and cerebrum 
transplants. As Olson points out, the cerebrum is ‘the organ that is most directly responsible for higher 
mental capacities’ (Olson 1997: 9). Thus the transposition of the cerebrum would cover the transfer of 
psychological features like experiential memory. The cerebrum, however, does not include the brain stem; 
‘the organ that is chiefly responsible for directing your life sustaining functions’ (1997: 140) (e.g. 
respiratory, digestive, metabolic processes). For the sake of the arguments to follow, the focus here is on 
brain transplantation, where both cerebrum and brain stem are supposed to be transposed (for reasons 
which will become evident in chapters 3 and 4). 
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transferral of Brown into another body any more than transplants of his liver or kidney 
would. 
There are those, however, who do not fit so easily into this binary between 
‘biological’ and ‘psychological’ theorists – and David Wiggins is one. His considered 
view is that we are both fundamentally persons and fundamentally animals (or ‘human 
beings’),29 and that the terms ‘person’ and ‘human being’ are ‘conceptually concordant’. 
Our understanding of one concept intimately involves our understanding of the other. 
In claiming this, his position can be read as ‘psychological’ in a much older sense of that 
word. Following the derivation of the term it can be attributed with a meaning 
relevantly different from Locke’s. Aristotle’s notion of psuche or psyche is that of the form 
of the living human being (empsuchon), which encapsulates both its biological and 
cognitive nature. In many ways, some of which are laid out below, Wiggins’ account 
rehabilitates some of the insights of this Aristotelian picture. Exposition of his original 
and innovative application of Aristotle to questions of personal identity is another 
central aim of this dissertation.  
 
Philosophy of biology 
 
While ‘person’ stands as a somewhat slippery term, everyone seems to have a ready 
grasp of what an animal is and where the spatio-temporal boundaries of such things 
lie.30 This, at least, is the consensus among those who discuss personal identity – animals 
are easy to track. This consensus, however, is not found beyond the confines of the 
personal identity debate; turning to philosophy of biology one finds these thoughts 
achieve a more controversial status. 
A wide array of topics is now31 addressed under the heading of ‘philosophy of 
biology’; conceptual puzzles within biological science are subjected to philosophical 
analysis, and biological claims are brought to bear on traditional philosophical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Wiggins 2001: 193. The difference between ‘human being’ and ‘human animal’ is set out in chapter 2. 
30 Wiggins 2001: 193 
31 Philosophers of biology often say that their field is a relatively young sub-discipline of philosophy. In 
their influential introductions to the subject both Michael Ruse and David Hull claim that philosophical 
analyses of biological concepts are scarce in the early half of the twentieth century (Ruse 1973 and Hull 
1974), and – as Alexander Rosenberg notes – any thoughts about biology by philosophers were included 
primarily as ‘an afterthought to discussions of physics’. (Rosenberg 1985: 6–7) The quotation above, from 
Wiggins’ ISTC, attests to a growing demand for philosophical development in that area – but what Ruse, 
Hull and Rosenberg’s surveys occlude is the important, though sidelined, research that was produced prior 
to 1960. (For an overview of these issues see Nicholson and Gawne 2013). One figure that escapes their 
articulation of the subject is J.H. Woodger – and an ancillary aim in chapter 3 is to emphasize the 
influence Woodger’s work has had over Wiggins (in line with Nicholson and Gawne 2013). 
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questions.32 The concepts of biological fitness and function are the subject of considerable 
debate,33 as is the status of so-called ‘natural kinds’.34 The focus here is particularly upon 
discussions of biological individuality, and metaphysical anti-reductionism. 
 Biological individuality is the first, clearest point of contact between debates in 
‘personal identity’ and philosophy of biology. Both Wiggins and animalists of Olson’s ilk 
rely on there being some suitably precise scientific method for picking out – 
‘individuating’ – humans. That there is such a method is exactly what those 
philosophers working within the field of ‘biological individuality’ find to be 
contentious.35 While organisms, like humans, register clearly at the phenomenal level, 
the organismic divisions of the natural world are not obviously borne out at the more 
precise levels of biological theory. Phenomenal individuation, which seems to function 
relatively well with higher vertebrates – is ineffectual when it comes to individuating e.g. 
fungi and slime moulds.36 Functional integration, which has been a popular model for 
determining organismal boundaries since Kant, has been criticized for its vagueness, and 
for relying too heavily on our everyday assumptions about functional boundaries.37 
Genetic definitions are similarly confounded by colonial creatures and by clonal units.38 
A variety of alternative accounts – phenomenal, genetic, functional, and 
immunological (and more) – are on offer, but what is relevant here is that Wiggins’ 
project (and the animalists’) relies on there being a workable theory of organismic 
individuation, by which the human organisms of everyday experience can be picked out, 
and tracked.39 Whether or not there is such a theory is examined in §3.1. 
 There is another relevant point of contact between the philosophers of biology 
and the personal identity theorists: both are interested in the existence, or ‘reality’, of 
organisms. Wiggins, like Aristotle, holds that organisms – humans not least – exemplify 
the category of substance (the same is true for animalists like Olson),40 but metaphysical 
(if not epistemic) reductionism is the majority view in philosophy of biology, where 
organisms are often taken to be ‘nothing more’ than the fundamental particles that 
constitute them.41 It will be proposed, in what follows, that the philosophers of biology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Griffiths 2011 for a good overview 
33 See Hull and Ruse 1998 (1ff) for an introduction to these issues. 
34 See, e.g. Dupré 1993 
35 E.g. Wilson 1999, Pradeu 2010, Clarke 2012 
36 See Hull 1992 
37 Pradeu 2010 
38 Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 71 
39 This point is made in Wilson 1999 
40 Following van Inwagen 1990 (see Olson 2007) 
41 See e.g. Hull 1992 
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will do well to precisify their discussion of metaphysical reductionism, and inquire 
within which metaphysical tradition these questions about the existence of organisms are 
being asked. Here is an instance in which philosophers of biology (if not biologists 
themselves) will benefit, as personal identity theorists surely do, from dialogue between 
these two spheres. 
 
Prospectus 
 
Chapter 1: D 
 
The aim of chapter 1 is largely exegetical. It starts with some methodological points that 
set out, in general terms, Wiggins’ overall approach to philosophical investigation. He is 
situated within a Strawsonian ‘descriptive’ tradition, where metaphysical inquiry is 
guided by investigation of our pre-theoretical thoughts. His work is characterized by an 
emphasis on elucidation42 (rather than reductive analysis of our everyday thinking) and by 
careful examination of the way our concepts develop reciprocally.43 Some issues with this 
‘descriptive’ approach are voiced – most importantly, its association with conceptualism. 
Wiggins’ response to these objections – realized in his ‘conceptualist-realism’ – is 
outlined. 
 With these methodological foundations in place, discussion is turned to Wiggins’ 
D theory, which encapsulates his interrelated claims about identity and individuation. 
Wiggins’ position is a ‘sortalist’ one; he claims that identity judgments can only be made 
once it is specified what the items under investigation are (this is his sortal theory of 
identity). Being able to pick out and re-identify items similarly depends on picking them 
out as a sort of thing, with a specifiable mode of being or principle of activity (this is his sortal 
theory of individuation). The exposition of D presented here is developed in response to 
Paul Snowdon’s reading; it corrects some of the problems with Snowdon’s treatment by 
putting due emphasis on the reciprocity between our concept of identity and our 
everyday individuative practices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This aspect of his work is drawn out by Williams in his 2006. 
43 ‘…Indeed reciprocity – or two-way flow, as I used to call it in internal dialogue with myself – was part 
of a more general thought… It seemed integral to the proper understanding of Meno’s dilemma… It 
seemed indispensable to the proper understanding of what we achieve when we come to know what a 
thing is. It was integral, in a way still too little-heeded or thought through by the philosophy of science, to 
our understanding of thing-kind words like ‘horse’ or ‘human being’. And not only that. It was a further 
generalization of the reciprocity point that helped to make it possible to contemplate new possibilities in 
connection with questions of value.’ Wiggins 1996: 228 
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 The final section of this chapter focuses on the natural /artefactual distinction as it 
figures in Wiggins’ system. Some commentators – Massimiliano Carrara, Pieter 
Vermaas, Michael Losonsky and Lynne Rudder Baker – claim that Wiggins understands 
artefacts to have an impoverished ontological status in comparison to natural items. 
These interpretations are found to be wanting, resulting as they do from terminological 
confusions. An alternative reading is suggested, whereby artefacts are construed as 
metaphysically distinct from (natural) substances, without being in anyway inferior. 
 
Chapter 2: Personal identity 
 
Chapter 2 presents an exposition and critique of Wiggins’ account of personal identity. 
Though interpreted by some (e.g. Olson) as neo-Lockean and as animalist by others (e.g. 
Peter Unger), Wiggins’ work resists these readings and the first section of this chapter is 
focussed on exactly how it straddles the ‘psychological/biological’ division. According 
to his human being theory we are fundamentally both animate beings and psychological ones. 
 The thought that sits at the heart of this neo-Aristotelian picture is that the 
concepts person and human being are in some way, non-accidentally concordant. As such, 
they assign the same underlying mode of being, or ‘principle of activity’. In §2.2., 
Wiggins’ attempts to elucidate this conceptual consilience are drawn out: the connection 
is seen to be formed of three interwoven strands: the strawsonian argument, the semantic 
argument, and the argument from interpretation. While Wiggins has never aspired to lay down 
a transcendental argument for the conceptual concordance of person and human being 
these elucidations show why the connection between them may be non-accidental and 
strong. 
 The aim in §2.3 is to test the strength of the connection – and it is suggested 
that a genealogical analysis of our notion of ‘a person’ undermines Wiggins’ semantic 
argument. With this strand severed, the other two are weakened as well, and the 
conclusion reached is that the connection between person and human being is not as fast as 
Wiggins supposes. 
 
Chapter 3: The biology of persons 
 
The discussions in the first two chapters are situated, in the third, in relation to issues in 
the philosophy of biology. Wiggins advises us to examine our principle of activity 
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through biological inquiry, and the aim of the first section is to identify the controversy 
around organismic individuation and to demonstrate that, in order to bypass it, Wiggins 
can turn to Thomas Pradeu’s immunological-physiological account of biological individuation. 
 Having shown how the parameters for a biological inquiry into the human being 
principle may be set, attention is turned to Wiggins’ claim that human beings – among 
other organisms – exemplify the category of substance. This is contrasted with the 
metaphysical reductionist’s claim that organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and are in 
some way metaphysically less robust than the physical stuff that makes them up. In §3.2, 
the debate between reductionists and emergentists – like John Dupré – is laid out. An 
emergentist reading of Wiggins is assayed but ultimately rejected in favour of a neo-
Aristotelian one. Where reductionists and emergentists focus on causal dependence, 
Wiggins focuses on ontological dependence; organisms are just as real as the stuff that 
makes them up because, in conceiving of them, we cannot but understand them as 
genuine unities. They are ontologically prior to their parts. This reading of Wiggins is 
presented in conjunction with an analysis of Aristotle’s anti-reductionism, and an 
articulation of the metaphysical pluralism that sustains Wiggins’ position. 
 
Chapter 4: Brain transplantation 
 
The fourth and final chapter revolves around Shoemaker’s brain transplantation story 
and Wiggins’ responses to this peculiar narrative. The chapter starts with a survey of his 
shifting attitudes towards it, and describes how, despite numerous concerns, his 
assessment of the story remains ambiguous. The aim is to draw on the arguments in the 
previous chapters to demonstrate why the narrative resists Wiggins’ analysis. It is 
contended that it is underpinned by a mechanistic logic, and that it thus shifts one’s 
metaphysical focus from organisms – natural substances that are prior to their parts – to 
‘living something-or-others’ – entities whose parts can be conceived as separable from 
the whole. The diagnosis of Shoemaker’s ‘thought experiment’ as mechanistic is 
supported by reference to Ian Hacking’s analysis of transplantation, and to a speculative 
historical study (in §4.3.) which links the Lockean position with mechanistic 
corpuscularianism. 
 These thoughts are further developed by reference to the discussion in chapter 1 
about the metaphysical character of artefacts. The notion of a ‘living something-or-other’ 
is precisified, and the brain transplantation story is seen to describe the adventures of a 
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biological artefact (not an organism). In concluding, the implications for Wiggins’ human 
being theory are discussed, and the critique offered in chapter 2 is reiterated and 
reinforced. 
 
Overview of texts 
 
Some remarks on Wiggins’ texts and the secondary literature should be entered. The 
primary source for this research is Sameness and Substance Renewed (2001) (hereafter 
‘S&SR’).44 This book – which contains his metaphysical accounts of substance, identity 
and personhood – is a modified and expanded form of Sameness and Substance (1980) 
(‘S&S’),45 which itself is a (considerable) development of Identity and Spatio-Temporal 
Continuity (1967) (‘ISTC’).46 In S&SR Wiggins aimed to respond to the issues raised by 
the first two books (and intervening articles) – the result, as noted, is a complex and 
often digressive work.47 It has been succeeded by a spate of papers, including a helpful 
series of responses to a forum in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2005, and a 
fiery discussion with Shoemaker in The Monist in 2004.48 Also of interest is the festschrift 
compiled for Wiggins’ 60th birthday (and to mark his accession to the Wykeham chair of 
Logic): Identity, Truth and Value (1996) (‘ITV’).49 Edited by Sabina Lovibond and S.G. 
Williams, it includes a series of papers on Wiggins’ contributions, and his replies, and his 
‘personal-cum-academic’ memoir. More recently, and perhaps most usefully, Wiggins’ 
2012 Mark Sack’s lecture: ‘Identity, Individuation and Substance’ has been published in 
the European Journal of Philosophy50 – in this, he recognises the need to restate his 
metaphysical position (for a new generation), and goes some way towards achieving this. 
While I will be focussing primarily on S&SR, my reading is informed no less by S&S, 
the clearer of the two texts, and the later papers, which iron out some inconsistencies. 
 The reading presented herein is greatly dependent on three other texts, not 
authored by Wiggins. The first is Aristotle’s Metaphysics (and, to lesser degrees, his Physics 
and De Anima). Throughout his academic career, Wiggins has explicitly stated the 
centrality of Aristotelian thought to his metaphysical and ethical positions, and an 
understanding of Aristotle is crucial to the interpretation assayed in chapter 3. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Wiggins 2001 
45 Wiggins 1980 
46 Wiggins 1967 
47 Wiggins 2001: ix 
48 See Wiggins 2004a and 2004b, and Shoemaker 2004a and 2004b. 
49 Lovibond and Williams 1996 
50 Wiggins 2012 
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second text is Peter Strawson’s Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.51 Strawson 
is more of a silent partner in Wiggins’ project than Aristotle; he is mentioned 
infrequently – yet the influence of his particular ‘descriptive’ approach to metaphysics 
pervades Wiggins’ work. The intellectual debt owed here is examined in depth in §1.1. 
There is a third text that should be included alongside these – Gottfried Leibniz’s New 
Essays on Human Understanding,52 which exerts its influence both in relation to Wiggins’ 
formal logic, and to his discussion of ‘modes of being’. Analysis of this will be minimal 
– though Wiggins’ distinctively Leibnizian account of identity is presented in chapter 1. 
 With respect to secondary literature, I have been helped by Paul Snowdon’s 
papers: ‘Persons and Personal Identity’,53 and ‘On the Sortal Dependency of 
Individuation Thesis’.54 Jonathan Lowe’s discussion of Wiggins’ ‘conceptualist-realism’ 
in the Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forum, has also been particularly instructive, 
as has Bakhurst’s contribution to the same.55 S.G. Williams’ entry in the Continuum 
Encyclopedia of British Philosophy is noteworthy for emphasizing, appropriately, the 
modesty of Wiggins’ philosophical approach, how he aims, not for conceptual analysis, 
but for the elucidation of central, human concepts.56 It is unfortunate that despite the 
numerous reviews and articles about Wiggins’ work there is still no sustained exposition 
of his theories other than his own – and this is another oversight that the present work 
hopes to address. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Strawson 1959 
52 Leibniz 1765/1981 
53 Snowdon 1996 
54 Snowdon 2009 
55 Lowe 2005, Bakhurst 2005. Stephen Yablo’s review of S&SR for the TLS (2002) is also commendable 
for its clarity and brevity. 
56 Williams 2006 
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‘D’ 
 
There are inevitable difficulties in trying to compass succinctly that which has taken 
Wiggins’ himself three substantial books and innumerable articles to set out. 
Nevertheless, the aim of this first chapter is exposition and exegesis of his thesis ‘D’. 
The following overview involves a fair amount of glossing, liberal use of (typically 
lengthy) quotations, and a rather staccato presentation – but it should at least outline 
some of the rich concepts of substance, sortals, individuation and identity, as they stand 
in Wiggins’ distinctive philosophical system. 
 The chapter is split into three parts. The first provides some necessary 
methodological background to Wiggins’ metaphysics. His project falls within the 
descriptivist tradition, and doing so exemplifies a particular method of inquiry that 
emphasizes how our ordinary everyday thoughts may be used to guide our metaphysical 
investigations. There is a general concern with this descriptivist approach – its apparent 
commitment to conceptualism – and Wiggins’ response to this, his ‘conceptualist-
realism’, is presented in §1.1.a. 
 With this methodological groundwork completed, attention is turned to 
Wiggins’ thesis D. D is the collection of his interrelated theories of identity and 
individuation, his elucidations of our everyday concept of sameness.57 It is a web of 
claims, and the aim in the second part of this chapter is to draw out the different strands 
within this web, and show the points of contact between them. In doing this, and in 
showing how the various elements develop reciprocally, this reading resists a line of 
interpretation offered by Paul Snowdon that attempts to separate out Wiggins’ D into 
discrete and disconnected claims. 
 §1.3 delves further into the details of Wiggins’ theory. Wiggins states that our 
everyday thoughts about sameness are sortalist: a cannot be understood to be the same as 
b without a and b being understood to be the same sort of thing. Relatedly, he holds that 
our pre-theoretical ability to track items through time and space (i.e. our ability to judge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 There is a helpful, and helpfully brief, characterization of some of the thoughts contained in D in 
Wiggins 2012 (page 1). In discussing the problematic question of how best to understand our thoughts 
about  identity and individuation, he writes: 
It is contended that the key to this problem rests at the level of metaphysics and 
epistemology alike with a sortalist position. Sortalism is the position which insists that, if 
the question is whether a and b are the same, it has to be asked what are they? Any 
sufficiently specific answer to that question will bring with it a principle of activity or 
functioning and a mode of behaviour characteristic of some particular kind of thing by 
reference to which questions of persistence or non-persistence through change can be 
adjudicated. 
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an earlier item a the same as a later item b) involves picking them out as specific sorts of 
things, with specific principles of activity. But while some sortal terms have profound 
nomological grounding – putatively natural kinds – others, like artefactual terms, are 
nomologically shallow. Wiggins questions whether or not artefacts realize genuine 
principles of activity. The aim in this final section is to assess Wiggins’ elucidation of the 
substance concept, and to examine whether he takes artefacts to be substances. Baker, 
Carrara, Vermaas and Losonsky deny that he does. Their readings are examined, found 
to be wanting, and an alternative line of interpretation developed. 
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§1.1. Methodological preliminaries: descriptivism and conceptualist-realism 
 
There are particular puzzles in the Anglophone tradition about our identity over time. 
Cases of transplantation, fission, amnesia, and vegetative states provoke questions about 
our persistence conditions, and encourage us to ask what exactly makes us the same 
individuals we once were and will become. On one level the project of the personal 
identity theorist is to develop a theory to answer such questions. 
Wiggins’ method in constructing such a theory is at first blush simple and 
persuasive. We are, in our everyday lives, constantly confronted with identity questions, 
he says, and in practice we find it straightforward to answer them.58 We have no trouble 
picking objects out – children, say – and observing their various exploits and 
adventures. There are everyday procedures we all engage in, when we single out dogs, or 
tea-cups, and which a child engages in when, for example, she learns that this cat is her 
cat, that it is the same cat as the kitten she was given, and so on. We already have at our 
disposal a way of ruling on identity; and so, he suggests, to answer the more puzzling 
questions – those offered up by the personal identity debate – we can turn to this pre-
theoretical method of navigating the world, and ground our answers in that.59 
Methodologically, then, Wiggins’ approach grows out of the descriptive 
metaphysical tradition, and here, as elsewhere, he follows in the wake of Peter Strawson. 
As Strawson sets it out, in his Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, the 
descriptivist is a philosopher who aims to extrapolate the structure of reality by looking 
to our actual thoughts about the world. Like Aristotle and Kant, descriptivists aim to 
expose the structure that is latent in our ‘conceptual scheme’.60 (Such a philosopher 
might say, for example, that for us to function in the world in the way that we do, our 
conceptual scheme must capture e.g. material continuants.)61 
  Strawson contrasts the descriptivist’s approach with that of the revisionary 
metaphysician. The revisionary metaphysician, or revisionist, aims to outline a better 
structure, one that is not rooted in a seemingly limited, human perspective. For the 
revisionist, the system that emerges from our conceptual scheme should be revised as 
we learn more about the physical nature of reality, through, e.g. the advances of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Wiggins 2001: 56 
59 Ibid: 2 
60 Strawson 1959: 9–11 
61 It is indicative of the self-isolating tendencies of analytic philosophy that the links between this kind of 
Strawsonian descriptivism and the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Hegel, Sartre and Heidegger, 
are not more widely discussed. This is a connection that will become clearer in the pages that follow. 
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sciences. On Strawson’s model, Descartes and Leibniz would be revisionist in this sense, 
as would the process philosophy of A.N. Whitehead, the four-dimensionalism of David 
Lewis, and most broadly Quinean metaphysics. (Quine, writing in his From a Logical Point 
of View, exemplifies the view when he writes that ‘ontological questions are on a par 
with questions of natural science’.62) While the revisionary metaphysicians agree that the 
world appears to us to be a collection of medium-sized material continuants (chairs, 
tables, cats, dogs…), in reality – they might say – all of these things are bundles of 
reactions connected by physical laws. As Ernst Mach put it, in a revisionary vein, this ‘is 
the critically purified concept of substance which scientifically ought to replace the 
vulgar one.’63 That is, this is what reality is really like. 
 Wiggins then, is methodologically a descriptivist of Strawson’s ilk. The 
metaphysical system he describes is drawn from our commonplace activities; he thinks 
that answers to the more complex identity questions (like ‘is Brownson the same patient 
as Brown?’) should issue from our everyday understanding of identity, substance, and 
individuation. We find this methodological programme succinctly put at the start of 
Sameness and Substance Renewed: 
 
Let the philosopher elucidate same, identical, substance, change, persist, etc., 
directly and from within the same practices as those that an ordinary 
untheoretical human being is initiated into.64 
 
Yet this kind of descriptivist method is not without its difficulties. Among these is a 
reliance on ‘conceptual invariance’. The descriptivist turns to her own conceptual 
scheme in order to articulate her metaphysical system; but is it obvious that there is only 
one ‘conceptual scheme’? And if there is more than one, which one is ‘ours’? And how 
could we say that it truly latches on to reality?65 Strawson himself notes that most 
concepts are culture-bound and temporary, and these, surely, cannot be the basis for a 
metaphysical inquiry, which aims to describe reality in non-local terms. He, and those who 
follow him, must also hold that ‘there is a… central core of human thinking which has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Quine 1980: 45 
63 Mach 1905: 148 
64 Wiggins 2001: 2 
65 In addition to these questions there is, of course, the vexed issue of the ‘scheme-content’ distinction. 
For Donald Davidson (and many who followed), the ‘dualism of scheme and content, of organizing 
system and something waiting to be organized’ is unintelligible (Davidson 1974: 189). His claim is that 
there is no such thing as ‘uninterpreted content’ (1989: 69). And, as is discussed below, this is a position 
with which Wiggins agrees (there is no neutral substratum, nor self-differentiating objects) – indeed, it is 
the force of his conceptualist-realism. Await the discussion in 1.1.a and at the end of chapter 3. 
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no history… there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental 
character, change not at all.’66 
 It is, as Susan Haack points out, somewhat unfortunate that Strawson does not 
tell us which concepts have ‘no history’,67 and a number of philosophers have objected to 
his claim that central conceptual structures do not vary over different cultures 
(‘conceptual invariance’). By analyzing Chinese and Native American traditions, for 
example, Burtt68 and Mei69 both independently argue that the human ‘conceptual 
scheme’ that Strawson seeks to reify is local and temporary; the grammar of subject and 
predicate that pervades Latinate languages and Greek, and which Strawson takes to 
represent a central element of the human conceptual framework, is found to be absent 
in certain non-Latinate languages (notably some Sino-Tibetan languages, and Quechua). 
Thus, Burtt and Mei claim, such analyses cannot provide a suitable foundation for 
metaphysical inquiry (and we find foreshadowing of this line of critique in Whitehead’s 
Concept of Nature70).71 In chapter 2 of this thesis, a suspicion is raised that Wiggins too, is 
susceptible to such objections, specifically with respect to his concept of personhood (a 
being in whom we recognize a mutual reciprocity). 
 
§1.1.a. Conceptualist-realism 
 
Let us assume for the time being the viability of the conceptual invariance thesis (as 
Wiggins does).72 The descriptivist is faced with other challenges. A related worry is its 
association with the much-maligned metaphysical thesis of conceptualism.73 This is a 
central concern for Wiggins, and one he has addressed at length.74 
 Roughly speaking, the conceptualist holds that the macroscopic order we find in 
the world is a product of human cognition. We look around, and see all manner of stuff; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Strawson 1959: 10 
67 Haack 1978: 365 
68 Burtt 1953 
69 Mei 1961. See also Hacking 1968 
70 Whitehead 1919 (see Haack 1978 for commentary) 
71 Though it is outside the ambit of this paper, let us note that these critiques emphasize how analytic 
metaphysics can function as a site of (unconscious?) political activity; if conceptual invariance fails to 
hold, the descriptivist is guilty of a form of metaphysical imperialism (see Haslanger 2000, on the hidden 
politics of metaphysics). 
72 See, for example, his reply to Fei Xu in his 1997a 
73 Indeed, it seems in recent years, that the terms ‘descriptivism’ and ‘revisionism’ are falling from the 
idiolect – the debates, particularly in relation to Wiggins, are articulated exclusively in terms of 
‘conceptualism’ and ‘realism’. I feel it necessary, however, to recognize the historical roots of Wiggins’ 
position, in order to clarify exactly what it is. 
74 See e.g. Wiggins 1980: Chapter 5, 2001: chapter 5 
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lumps of metal and wood, and flesh and bone; and we take this stuff to constitute 
mountains and chairs, and dogs and cats. For the conceptualist, there are such things is 
because we conceptualize them as units.75 I.e. the order that we find in the world is 
produced, in some way, by our conceptual scheme. The (worrying) idealist extremes of the 
position are illustrated, as Wiggins notes, in Leszek Kolakowski's Towards a Marxist 
Humanism: 
 
The picture of reality sketched by everyday perception and by scientific 
thinking is a kind of human creation (not imitation) since both the 
linguistic and the scientific divisions of the world into particular objects 
arise from man’s practical needs. In this sense the world’s products must 
be considered artificial. In this world the sun and stars exist because man is 
able to make them his objects, differentiated in material and conceived as 
‘corporeal individuals’. In abstract, nothing prevents us from dissecting 
surrounding material into fragments constructed in a manner completely 
different from what we are used to. Thus, speaking more simply we could 
build a world where there would be no such objects as ‘horse’, ‘leaf’, ‘star’, 
and others allegedly devised by nature. Instead, there might be, for 
example, such objects as ‘half a horse and a piece of river’, ‘my ear and the 
moon’, and other similar products of a surrealist imagination.76 
 
Certainly, if one is a conceptualist, it is likely one will also be a descriptivist in method – 
because how else will the conceptualist find answers to puzzles of continuant identity, 
except by turning to the everyday practices and pre-theoretical schema of which those 
continuants are products? But is the converse also true? Is the descriptivist necessarily 
committed to a form of conceptualism? Briefly put, Wiggins’ answer is no. He claims 
that the metaphysician should turn to everyday practices and their underlying conceptual 
frameworks; but one of the particular innovations of his project is to detach this 
method from Kolakowski’s form of idealism. The key here is Wiggins’ so-called 
‘conceptualist-realism’, a form of realism that states that our conceptual scheme maps 
reality, not because it constructs it, but because it develops in reciprocity with it.  
 There are a number of objections that can be raised against the kind of 
conceptualism we find in Kolakowski’s work – many of them are articulated by Wiggins 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Yablo has a helpful overview of this and the realist position, in his 2003. 
76 Kolakowski 1968: 47–48 (quoted in Wiggins 2001: 149) 
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himself:77 Conceptualism is committed to bare substrata,78 Wiggins says, and the unlovely 
notion of haecceity.79 It is inimical to any worthwhile essentialist programme.80 And, more 
fundamentally, in its idealist leanings it is profoundly at odds with the powerful and 
persuasive realist thought that the objects we find around us – people, trees, lakes, and 
so on – exist quite independent of how human beings conceive of them.81 Ultimately, it 
is this thought – that the macro-order we divine around us exists in its own right82 – that 
characterizes Wiggins’ (realist) metaphysical position.83 
 Importantly, however, Wiggins also seeks to hold onto certain elements of the 
approach we find in Kolakowski’s work. For while he sees dangers in a view that veers 
so close to idealism, he is simultaneously impressed by the notion that reality does not 
separate itself out for us. We contribute something; we bring structure to the table, so to 
speak, the table does not simply bring structure to itself. Wiggins writes in S&SR: 
 
For someone to single out a leaf or a horse or a sun or a star, or whatever it 
is, that which he singles out must have the right principle of individuation 
for a leaf or a horse or a sun or a star… For to single out one of these things 
he must single it out. Such truisms would scarcely be worth writing down if 
philosophy were not driven from side to side here of the almost 
unnegotiable strait that divides the realist myth of the self-differentiating object 
(the object which announce itself as the very object it is to any mind, 
however passive or of whatever orientation) from the substratum myth that is 
the recurrent temptation of bad conceptualism. It is easy to scoff at 
substratum. It is less easy to escape the insidious idea that there can be the 
singling out in a place of a merely determinable space-occupier awaiting 
incongruent or discordant substantial determinations (individuatively 
inconsistent answers to the question of what it is). But no substance has been 
singled out at all until something makes it determinate which entity has been 
singled out; and for this to be determinate, there must be something in the 
singling out that makes it determinate which principle is the principle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See particularly Wiggins 1980: chapter 5 and 2001: chapter 5 
78 Underlying, property-less items – see e.g Robinson 2014 for an overview. 
79 ‘Haecceity’ is the medieval concept of thisness – that metaphysical quality which makes some object the 
specific object that it is. See e.g. Wiggins 1980: 136–142 
80 Wiggins 2001: 146ff 
81 E.g. Wiggins 1980: 131, 2001: 141 
82 Yablo 2003: 1 
83 Wiggins 2001: 142 
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individuation for the entity and under what family of individuatively 
concordant sortal concepts it is to be subsumed.84 
 
There are a number of technical terms here that will be introduced in due course. At 
this point, however, the quotation is simply intended to give an indication of Wiggins’ 
conceptualist sympathies, and to show how, contra what he sees to be the prevailing 
orthodoxy,85 he takes conceptualism and realism to be, to some extent, compatible. 
Though he denies that the mind constructs reality – in the ‘bad’ conceptualist sense – he 
argues that it does still construe it in a certain way. This conceptualist-realism86 is caught, 
neatly, in his analogy of the net (adapted from Arthur Eddington’s):87 
 
Our claim was only that what sortal concepts we bring to bear upon 
experience determines what we can find there – just as the size and mesh of 
a net determine, not what fish are in the sea, but which ones we shall catch.88 
 
So, Wiggins states, our conceptual scheme is ‘open to the world’.89 To think that our 
pre-theoretical world-view is a ‘human creation (not imitation)’ ignores, so Wiggins says, 
how it has developed through a reciprocal engagement with the world we inhabit.90 
Certainly, when we pick out items in our environment, we conceive of them in specific 
ways, bound as we are by our human natures, with our particular perceptual abilities; but 
we also interact with reality, and interacting, discover more about it, and modulate our 
conception of it to match more closely with how it must actually be. Our expectations 
about objects are either met or they are not.91 This is a process we are always engaging 
in (one Wiggins sees to be most obvious in childhood development).92  
 
…even though horses, leaves, sun and stars are not inventions or artefacts, 
still, if such things as horses, leaves, sun and stars were to be singled out in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Wiggins 2001: 150–151 
85 See e.g. Wiggins discussion in 2001: 140ff, see also Wiggins 2001: xii 
86 See specifically Wiggins 2001, ch. 5 
87 Eddington 1958 
88 Wiggins 2001: 152 
89 Ibid: 153 
90 See particularly Wiggins 2001: ch.3 (and the following section), and e.g. page 160 
91 See, for example, what befell ‘phlogiston’ (Wiggins 2001: 80) 
92 ‘The child who is learning to find for himself the persisting substances in the world, to think the 
thoughts that involve them and recognize the same ones again, grasps a skill and a subject matter at one 
and the same time.’ Wiggins 2001: 2. See also Wiggins 1997: 24 ‘Infants are creatures who are en route by 
exploration, trial and error, by probation, by attunement, to the full human conceptual system.’ 
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experience at all so as to become the objects of thought, then some scheme 
had to be fashioned or formed, in the back and forth process between 
recurrent traits in nature and would-be cognitive conceptions of these traits, 
that made it possible for them to be picked out.93 
 
Recognition of this reciprocity, between what Quine calls the ontological and the 
ideological,94 is central to Wiggins’ methodological programme. It is considered in greater 
depth below. For now, however, it will do to have seen the general lines along which 
Wiggins aims to substantiate his descriptive approach. While his project is, as he admits, 
‘anthropocentric’,95 it is not too narrowly so, and does not fall into the snares of 
conceptualism.96 Crudely put, we can attend to the conceptual scheme that underlies our 
everyday practices, and it will give us a guide to how reality is structured because it was 
brokered in response to reality, not enforced upon it, or irrelevant to it. This 
‘conceptualist-realism’ is one of Wiggins’ key contributions to contemporary 
metaphysics (and one which is growing in influence).97 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Wiggins 2001: 152 
94 See Wiggins 2001: xii 
95 Wiggins 2001: 153 
96 See Lowe 2003 and 2005 for discussion 
97 Not least in the work of Helen Steward (see e.g. her 2012) 
	   26	  
§1.2. Wiggins’ ‘D’ thesis 
 
Having run through these methodological preliminaries we are in a position to examine 
Wiggins’ project more fully and, simultaneously, to assess interpretations commentators 
have offered of it. In this section, the discussion is structured around Paul Snowdon’s 
remarks in his ‘On the Sortal Dependency of Individuation Thesis’.98 §1.2.a. examines, 
in general terms, whether or not Wiggins intends to present a metaphysical or a psychological 
thesis, and addresses the importance of ‘connective analysis’ in his account (this stands 
as a transition from the more methodological issues in §1.1). In §1.2.b., it is shown how 
Wiggins’ work exemplifies this Strawsonian approach to metaphysical questions about 
identity and individuation. §1.2.c. represents a digression into Wiggins’ response to 
relativism. In §1.2.d., these respective strands are drawn together, and the exposition of 
Wiggins’ D will be completed. 
  
§1.2.a. Is D a metaphysical or a psychological thesis? 
 
In his paper, ‘On the Sortal Dependency of Individuation Thesis’, Paul Snowdon 
remarks on an apparent, and central, confusing element in S&SR; an equivocation: 
 
At the centre of this web [of metaphysical ideas] is a thesis which Wiggins 
calls the thesis of the sortal dependency of individuation (2001, 5), 
though at times he seems prepared to call it the sortal dependency of 
identity (2001, 23), and which he usually refers to as D.99 
 
The aim of Snowdon’s paper is to try to disentangle this web, to determine what 
Wiggins’ claim is, and whether we should accept it. Snowdon discerns two main theses – 
a theory about individuation, and a theory about identity – and assesses each in turn. 
Ultimately, he finds the claims about identity to be strong (subject to slight 
modifications), but the claims about individuation to be on shakier ground. In clarifying 
the terms, ‘identity’ and ‘individuation’ he relies on Wiggins’ own definitions, found in 
the introduction to S&SR: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Snowdon 2009 
99 Ibid: 254 
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By identity I mean being the same as. By individuation I mean something 
done by a thinker.100 
 
For the moment this can be cashed out in a very general way: Identity is a metaphysical 
relation, the formal properties of which we can examine with logic. Individuation, by 
contrast, is a cognitive, or psychological act or process in which a thinker picks out 
objects in her environment.101  
Snowdon is interested, therefore, in whether Wiggins is presenting a metaphysical 
theory (relating to identity), or a psychological one (relating to individuation).102 He claims 
that Wiggins makes claims about both, and that the – psychological – theory of 
individuation is deeply problematic.103 The aim here is to show why this reading falters, 
and to present an alternative interpretation of Wiggins’ text. 
Snowdon takes the apparent equivocation of ‘sortal dependency of 
individuation’ and ‘sortal dependency of identity’ to be a confusion in Wiggins’ work. 
However, given what has been said about Wiggins’ method in the previous section, the 
subsumption of the ‘sortal dependency of individuation’ and the ‘sortal dependency of 
identity’ under a single title can be read as an important aspect of his account – that the 
identity thesis, and the individuation thesis are not, for Wiggins, separable from each 
other. 
 In §1.1, an outline was given of Wiggins’ conceptualist-realism: the conceptual 
scheme – which underpins our everyday practices – is, he claims, open to the world 
(though it is anthropocentric to a degree). As he sees it, this fully legitimates his 
descriptive method, freeing it from any idealist commitments. We can turn to our 
conceptual scheme as a litmus in metaphysical inquiry. So whatever else we may say 
about Wiggins’ claims of identity and individuation, they are grounded in the pre-
theoretical framework that underpins our everyday practice, and they are elaborated 
from that distinctly human conceptual scheme. 
 This tenders an, albeit rather general, objection to Snowdon’s separation of the 
metaphysical from the psychological. Because of the descriptivist method we can say 
that any metaphysical thesis will not be exclusively ‘metaphysical’ (insofar as that 
precludes anthropocentrism); it will be necessarily attuned to human cognition, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Wiggins 2012: 1 
101 Wiggins 2001: 6 
102 Snowdon 2009: 255 
103 Ibid: 255 
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human conceptions.104 We might similarly say on these grounds that a psychological 
thesis can stretch beyond the purely cognitive. As Wiggins puts it, in Quinean parlance, 
he rejects this ‘sharp division of questions of ontology from questions of ideology’.105 
 This is a somewhat vaguely expressed concern with Snowdon’s critique, and it 
might be thought that it does not quite latch on to his particular use of ‘metaphysical’ 
and ‘psychological’. However, the worry takes more precise form when we turn to the 
nuances of Wiggins’ descriptivism. In Wiggins’ work it is repeatedly emphasized exactly 
how complex our pre-theoretical scheme actually is, how inextricably bound up the 
concept of identity is with our individuative practices, and how, in order to get a 
tangible grasp of identity, we need also grasp how things, continuants, are picked out 
and traced through time.  
 
These things belong together – or the grasp of each requires the grasp of 
the other.106 
 
What we have to confront is a whole skein of connected practices. These 
practices are intertwined with one another. Their relations can indeed be 
set out in all sorts of true equivalences. But it does not follow they can be 
set out in a developing sequence… It is much more likely that the basic forms 
and devices have to be learned together. Just as the keystone of an arch 
and the adjoining bricks can be placed together, but only if somehow 
they are placed simultaneously or they are put into position with the help 
of a temporary external support, so each primitive device is learned 
simultaneously and in reciprocity with each of the others.107 
 
Indeed, this is one of the most attractive aspects of Wiggins’ account; he recognizes the 
complexity and interconnectedness of our use of concepts, and how subtly interlaced, 
and mutually dependent our thoughts actually are. This kind of systematic approach is 
another example of Strawson’s influence. As Strawson set it out, ‘connective analysis’108 
of this kind seeks to elucidate concepts by drawing out their connections and the way in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See, e.g. Wiggins 1995: 244 (discussed in §1.3 below) 
105 Wiggins 2001: xii 
106 Ibid: 19 
107 Ibid: 19–20 
108 Strawson 1992: 21 
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which they imply, presuppose, and sometimes exclude one another.109 Therefore the 
equivocation that Snowdon identifies in S&SR (and its prequels) is not a confusion: it is 
a central element of Wiggins’ project. The two elements of D are intended to develop 
reciprocally; roughly, the identity thesis, and the individuation thesis are supposed to refine 
and modulate each other. As Wiggins construes it, they must develop in concert. (A 
more detailed exposition of this development is given in §1.2.b.) 
 Encouraged by the methodological thoughts voiced in the previous section one 
might wonder why Snowdon interprets Wiggins as he does. There are two points that 
can be made here: the first relates to the distinction between ‘piecemeal’ and ‘systematic’ 
philosophical methods. The second is a more particular exegetical concern about the 
interpretation of ‘individuation’. 
Firstly, in a speculative mode, one may wonder whether Snowdon’s 
interpretation is being drawn along by a particular undertow in Anglophone 
metaphysics. Specifically, one may think that it represents, knowingly or not, the so-
called ‘piecemeal’ attitude, symptomatic of the high analytic tradition.110 (This suggestion 
is returned to in §2.2) The ‘piecemeal approach’ is articulated perhaps most explicitly in 
Russell’s Mysticism and Logic, where he writes: ‘A scientific philosophy such as I wish to 
recommend will be piecemeal and tentative like other sciences.’ 
 
To build up systems of the world, like Heine’s German professors who 
knit together fragments of life and made an intelligible system out of 
them, is not, I believe, any more feasible than the discovery of the 
philosopher’s stone. What is feasible is the understanding of general 
forms, and the division of traditional problems into a number of separate 
and less baffling questions. ‘Divide and conquer’ is the maxim of success 
here as elsewhere.111 
 
This ‘scientific’ method, of separating out philosophical issues into ‘manageable chunks’ 
remains, as Hans-Johann Glock writes, a prominent trend in Anglophone philosophy.112 
And while, again, this is a gestural suggestion it seems that Snowdon’s disassembly of 
Wiggins’ interconnected theories is symptomatic of this piecemeal approach, clearly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Joll 2010: §iii 
110 Scott Soames identifies the ‘piecemeal approach’ as one of the distinctive features of analytic 
philosophy. Soames 2003: xiv–vi 
111 Russell 1925: 109 
112 Glock 2008: 165 
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countervailing the connective analysis that we find in Strawson and Wiggins.113 In his 
Analysis and Metaphysics, Strawson directly opposes the Russellian ‘reductive’ method;114 
he argues against what he sees to be the ‘reductive or atomistic model’ that underlies 
much of the practice of analytic philosophy115 – that is, the dismantling form of analysis 
which strives towards ‘a clear grasp of complex meanings by reducing them, without 
remainder’, to isolated elements of meaning.116 He argues instead for precisely the kind 
of connective analysis that is so intricately woven by Wiggins, and writes: 
 
Let us abandon the notion of perfect [atomistic] simplicity in concepts; 
let us abandon the notion that analysis must always be in the direction of 
greater simplicity. Let us imagine, instead, the model of an elaborate 
network, a system of connected items, concepts, such that the function of 
each item, each concept, could, from the philosophical point of view, be 
properly understood only by grasping its connections with others.117 
 
Wiggins’ work has, as mentioned, been accused of obscurity – and it is dense, and the 
grain of his argument is sometimes hard to find. But perhaps this complexity is a 
necessary corollary of this kind of connective of analysis? (And, one might hazard, it 
might also be that this kind of philosophical approach is found to be particularly 
obscure in an intellectual climate shaped, as the Anglophone climate is, by the Russellian 
scientific ‘piecemeal’ methodology.)118 Whatever the case, this might well be one reason 
for Snowdon’s misreading. 
A second reason why the interconnectedness of identity and individuation does 
not register in Snowdon’s treatment, is that he has a particular – and arguably divergent 
– reading of Wiggins’ use of ‘individuation’. In his paper, Snowdon interprets 
‘individuation’ as something like the detection, by seeing, hearing, smelling (etc.), of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See e.g. Glock 2008: 165 (where he also identifies Stuart Hampshire – another important influence on 
Wiggins (e.g. 2001: 195 n.3) – as a ‘systematic’ philosopher, rather than a piecemeal one). 
114 Strawson 1992. For a clear articulation of Strawson’s position, see Byrne 2001 
115 Strawson 1992: 19, 21 
116 Ibid: 17 
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118 This, indeed, is Strawson’s own analysis of Wiggins’ project. In his critical notice of S&S, Strawson 
writes (1981: 603): 
Much of the value of the book stems from its author's explicit recognition of ‘how 
much can be achieved in philosophy by means of elucidations which use a concept 
without attempting to reduce it, and, in using the concept, exhibit [its] connexions’ with 
other ‘established and . . . collateral’ concepts (p. 4). It is such a procedure of 
connective, rather than reductive, analysis which fruitfully governs his treatment of the 
central concepts of identity, individuation, substance, sort, natural kind and essence…  
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object in our environment. He calls this ‘perception-based object-directed thought’.119 
Correspondingly, he interprets Wiggins’ ‘thesis of the sortal dependency of 
individuation’ as claiming that to focus on an object in this way (that is, to pick it out 
perceptually) depends on picking it out under a (medium-level120) sortal.121 
 As noted, while Snowdon finds elements of Wiggins’ sortal dependency of 
identity (or his interpretation of it) persuasive, he finds the theory of sortal dependency 
of individuation to be problematic. His objections stem, in large part, from a series of 
counter-examples, which exemplify further his particular understanding of 
‘individuation’: 
 
There seem to be lots of examples where people can think of an object in 
ignorance of its sortal type.122 
 
…someone could point at a creature flying in the air and ask ‘what is that?’123 
 
Science fiction films provide examples where an object falls to earth, and 
the scientists ask ‘what is it?’124 
 
I hear a rustle and wonder ‘What is that?’, where the focus of the thought 
is the noise maker. This kind of perceptual contact does not enable me to 
determine what basic sort the item belongs to, but it does enable me to 
think about it.125 
 
As Snowdon understands individuation, it can, as a cognitive act, take place before the 
sortal question (‘what is it?’) can be asked: 
  
I wake up in a darkened room in need of a drink, so want to locate my 
glass of water… I can, as we say, make out objects close by, and wonder 
of one of them whether it is my glass. Now, here my thought is not 
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120 Ibid: 265 
121 Ibid: 262 
122 Ibid: 265 
123 Ibid: 265 
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125 Ibid: 266 
	   32	  
directed onto the object by any sortal conviction. The targeting, rather, 
enables the sortal question to be raised about a particular item.126 
 
It is on these grounds that Snowdon argues against the so-called ‘psychological’ thesis. 
However, while these comments are not obviously wrong, their critical force lies in 
Snowdon’s reading of ‘individuation’ – and that reading contrasts with the 
understanding of ‘individuation’ that Wiggins articulates in S&SR.127 Wiggins writes: 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘individuate’ in terms of ‘single out’ 
or ‘pick out’, and this definition is well suited to the purposes of this 
book… To single x out is to isolate x in experience; to determine or fix 
upon x in particular by drawing its spatio-temporal boundaries and 
distinguishing it in its environment from other things of like and unlike 
kinds (at this, that and the other times during its life history); hence to 
articulate or segment reality in such a way as to discover x there.128 
 
For Wiggins, individuation involves picking an object out in such a way that it can be 
distinguished in its environment from other things of like and unlike kinds. This is at 
odds with the use of individuation in the example of the glass in the darkened room. In 
Snowdon’s scenario he does not have enough information about the particular to be 
able to e.g. distinguish it from other similar sized objects. Crucially, Wiggins also holds 
that individuation involves picking an object out in such a way that it can be re-identified 
at a later stage; this is the content of the reference to ‘spatio-temporal boundaries’ 
above. Contrast this with, for example, Snowdon’s case of the mysterious rustler in the 
bushes. One may turn one’s attention to the rustling in the hedgerow, and even, 
perhaps, claim to identify some single thing that rustles there (rather than, e.g. a nest of 
sparrow chicks) – but can one then claim to be able to reliably re-identify the ‘noise-
maker’? If it ceases and begins again? It seems not. Consider too the case of the statue 
and the clay lump. One may turn one’s attention to the particular region in space that 
they jointly inhabit, but until it is decided which of the two things is under inspection, 
answers to identity questions will remain elusive (since the lump may, for example, 
survive squashing where the statue does not). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Snowdon 2009: 266 
127 There are, of course, other, more dramatically divergent understandings of ‘individuation’ (see Lowe 
2003, and Wiggins 2001: 6 n.4) 
128 Wiggins 2001: 6 
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 It might be that Snowdon’s reading diverges because he attributes too much 
importance to Wiggins’ remark that individuation is an act ‘at a time’: 
 
Wiggins explains that he wishes to advance a characterization of ‘what it 
amounts to, practically and cognitively, for a thinker to single a thing out 
at a time’…129 
 
But while the cognitive act of singling out is undoubtedly at a time, Wiggins’ 
interpretation of ‘individuation’ also involves the ability ‘later to single out that same 
thing as the same thing’.130  The difference here is brought out by Wiggins’ comment 
that ‘one may well refer to x… without in our primary sense singling x out 
[individuating x]’.131 For Snowdon, ‘individuation’ may be a cognitive act of isolating an 
object in experience; for Wiggins ‘individuation’ provides for the inquirer’s re-identification 
of that object – it involves the ability to trace it through time. And consequently, as 
Wiggins writes, ‘the singling something out at t cannot help but look, as I say, both 
backwards and forwards to times before and after t’.132 
This understanding of individuation as an act that allows for re-identification is 
nowhere present in Snowdon’s discussion.133  And, of course, failing to register this 
understanding of ‘individuation’ will mean that one fails to register the reciprocal 
development of theories of identity and individuation; for what part of Snowdon’s analysis 
of individuation involves identity, or assessment of identity claims? Individuation 
involves being able to say whether or not an earlier item is the same as a later item. 
Having got a clearer idea of what Wiggins means by ‘individuation’, and having 
understood the method by which his project is supposed to proceed, the next section 
deals in greater depth with his synchronised explication of our everyday individuative 
practices and the concept of identity. 
 
§1.2.b. The reciprocal elucidation of identity and individuation 
 
Consider again, Snowdon’s concerns with Wiggins’ project: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Snowdon 2009: 261–262 
130 Wiggins 2001: 1 
131 Ibid: 6 
132 Ibid: 6 
133 It is worthwhile noting, in connection with this, that Wiggins claims that to single out an x distinctly in 
one’s environment necessarily involves being able to re-identify it, and trace it through time. See his 1963: 
189–90, and 2001: 71, 72 
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When Wiggins states D for the first time in a relatively full way, in 
Chapter 2 of Sameness and Substance Renewed, it is formulated as follows: 
 
a=b if and only if there exists a sortal concept f such that 
 
(1) a and b fall under f; 
 
(2) to say that x falls under f or that x is an f is to say what x is (in the sense 
Aristotle isolated); 
 
(3) a is the same f as b, that is coincides with b under f in the manner of 
coincidence required for members of f, hence congruently… 
 
(Wiggins 2001, 56) 
 
 Taking this formulation of D as the guide to its general character as a 
claim, it is natural to comment on its significance as follows. D advances 
a claim about the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of any 
identity proposition or claim. As it stands, D is, strictly speaking, an 
unmodalized biconditional, but we can, surely, take it that Wiggins is 
really advancing it as a necessary truth about identity. Now one thing that 
stands out about D as formulated is that it says nothing about our 
procedures for establishing identities, nor does it say anything about our 
ability to grasp or understand identity propositions. Hence, if ‘individuation’ 
stands for something cognitive or psychological that we do, or maybe, 
achieve, as I claim that it in fact does, then it seems that D actually says 
nothing about individuation at all. So there is some inclination to register at 
least mild surprise about the name Wiggins assigns to it. Rather, I think, 
D says something about the conditions for the obtaining of an identity 
and so qualifies as what I would be inclined to call a ‘metaphysical thesis’ 
about identity.134 
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Snowdon is right that this formulation stands as a claim about the metaphysical relation 
of identity. And while he is tentative in describing it as the ‘sortal dependency of 
identity’,135 this is precisely how it is presented in S&S136 (though this appellation is 
unhelpfully removed in S&SR). He is also right that, as it stands, this formulation does 
not obviously claim anything about individuative practices, the procedures, or our ability to 
grasp identity propositions. Yet he is wrong to take this formulation as the guide to the 
general character of D. D is the collection of interrelated claims about identity and 
individuation (and substance, and persistence…), and this formulation represents only a 
partial, and incomplete stage in the project. Furthermore, while it does not explicitly 
state anything about individuation, it is developed in concert with analyses of those 
procedures, and presupposes them. My contention here is that the passage Snowdon 
takes to capture D is not, in fact, a guide to Wiggins’ overall project, and is not, by itself, 
intended to claim anything about individuation. 
This becomes clearer when we turn to how Wiggins actually develops his 
project.137 For Wiggins, the concepts of identity and individuation cannot be discussed in 
isolation. They are, he says like adjoining bricks at the tip of an arch; each supports the 
other. Thus, a necessary part of his analysis of these concepts is to show how they rely 
on each other. In the following exposition, it will be shown how he builds up these 
interconnected theses, and the pressures that hold them together will be identified. In 
very rough outline: Wiggins claims that we can develop a limited account of identity 
from the basic properties that are contained in our pre-theoretical grasp of it – but while 
such an account provides necessary conditions, it does not furnish a sufficient condition. 
Wiggins proposes to fill this lacuna by turning to our individuative practices. These 
practices reveal an underlying sortalism and, Wiggins states, the importance of this 
sortalism is that it directs us to the individual principles of activity that substances realize, 
and by which we assess persistence. Here, he claims, we find a sufficient condition for 
identity. Simultaneously, he recognizes that our individuative practices need to be 
shored up against the strict logic of the identity relation, and to this end, he deploys his 
D-principles, which set out the requirements for a substance sortal concept.138 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Snowdon 2009: 254 n.1 
136 Wiggins 1980: 51 
137 In understanding this, I have had considerable help from Wiggins 2012 (which was denied Snowdon in 
his 2009). 
138 It should also be noted, before starting, that though it is a necessary feature of his connective analysis 
that neither identity or individuation (or substance) concepts are prior, he writes that, given that the 
investigation must start somewhere, he begins by turning to identity. (Wiggins 2001: 18–20) This 
expository section will do the same.  
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In the descriptivist spirit, Wiggins turns first to our pre-theoretical idea of 
identity.139 It is this primitive concept, so fundamental to our conceptual scheme, which 
he aims to elucidate.140 Identity is one of the core concepts that all human inquirers are 
supposed to possess (another demonstration of his commitment to the thesis of 
conceptual invariance): 
 
The notion of sameness or identity that we are to elucidate is… a notion 
as primitive as predication… No reduction of the identity relation has 
ever succeeded.141 
 
Wiggins starts his inquiry with the self-evident properties of the primitive notion: the 
reflexivity of identity (‘the obvious truth where everybody begins’142) and Leibniz’s 
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (‘akin to the rock of ages’143). These aspects of 
our primitive notion are the foundation for further analysis.144 From the combination of 
these two principles he reaches – via a series of logical proofs – the transitivity and 
symmetry of identity, and then, following these, the necessity, the absolute determinacy, and the 
permanence of identity (the specifics of these principles are set out below, where 
necessary). For Wiggins, this extrapolation from the primitive notion produces identity’s 
bare logic, its central formal properties.145 
Yet, as he duly notes,146 this analysis provides only the necessary conditions – it 
does not clearly provide a sufficient condition for this relation to hold. (And – note – it is 
the sufficient condition that the personal identity theorist is interested in, needing a 
workable condition on which to ground her judgements of identity.) This ‘deficit’ 
Wiggins writes, ‘is often overlooked because it will appear that we can safely add to 
Leibniz’s Law the Leibnizian converse, namely the Identity of Indiscernibles.’147 That is, 
the Identity of Indiscernibles is taken to flow from the logic of identity, and stand as a 
sufficient condition for it. That principle states that if the two objects under scrutiny (x 
and y) have all their properties in common, then x is y. However, as Wiggins rightly 
points out, the complete community of properties that some take to establish identity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Wiggins 2001: 2 
140 Ibid: 1 
141 Ibid: 5 
142 Wiggins 2012: 3 
143 Wiggins 1996: 227 
144 See Wiggins 2012 for a very clear presentation of these proofs. 
145 For issues with these proofs see e.g. Geach 1962 and Noonan 1976, and Gale 1984 
146 Wiggins 2012: §5 
147 Wiggins 2005a: 443. See also Wiggins 1967: 1, 2001: 56, 2012: 5 
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flows from it, and cannot therefore, be taken to rule for or against it.148 It is a sufficient 
condition, but one 
 
…whose satisfaction can appear or be verified only at the conclusion of 
explorations and labours conducted on the basis of a workable 
sufficient condition based in some thought other than the Identity of 
Indiscernibles.149 
 
Being the mortal beings we are, we cannot establish identity between objects by 
examining all of their properties, making sure they correspond. 150 Thus, Wiggins states, 
our use of the identity concept must appeal to another principle, one that can be applied 
by an enquirer in adjudicating persistence questions.  
Here, we begin to see the effects of the connective analysis. Given that the 
identity of indiscernibles will not – for Wiggins – bear the weight commonly assigned to 
it, he directs us to a conceptual correlate to help us fix upon some ‘other’ principle. He 
writes that: 
 
[T]he metaphysics of identity has no alternative but to reconstruct the 
thoughts that organize the epistemology of the relation and to 
reconstruct what thinkers actually do when they single out an object in 
experience, at once observing the thing’s behaviour, speculating what it 
does when out of view and searching for distinguishing marks (if any) 
by which this one may be distinguished from other members of its kind 
and (however fallibly) reidentified as one and the same.151 
 
We must turn, that is, to our individuative practices – for that is what he means by the 
‘epistemology of the relation’. Individuation is the cognitive act of a thinker. More 
precisely, for Wiggins, it is the act of singling out or picking out an object in a thinker’s 
environment, and picking them out as objects with spatio-temporal limits, that is, as 
continuants.152 This is the procedure by which we navigate the world around us.153 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Wiggins 2001: 56–57 
149 Wiggins 2012: 6 
150 Stephen Williams offers a helpful gloss on Wiggins’ critical position here in his 2006 (1124). 
151 Wiggins 2012: 7 
152 ‘It will be everywhere insisted, moreover, that the singling out at time t of the substance x must look 
backwards and forwards to times before and after t.’ (2001: 7) 
153 Wiggins 2001: 6 
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What, he asks, do we do when we pick out objects? He subjects our 
individuative actions to closer scrutiny, and finds a question constantly recurring in 
these contexts. When directing attention to objects in our environment and assessing 
their coincidence, we find ourselves asking: what is it?154 What kind of thing is x?155 These 
questions, he suggests, give us clues as to what organizes our efforts when we identify 
and re-identify objects. He sees us constantly called upon to ask what the objects under 
investigation are. 
 
[I]t seems certain… that, for each thing that satisfies a predicate such as 
‘moves’, ‘runs’, or ‘white’, there must exist some known or unknown, 
named or nameable, kind to which the item belongs and by reference to 
which the ‘what is it’ question could be answered.156 
 
Wiggins takes the recurrence of this question to suggest that matters of sameness 
revolve in some fashion, on the sorts, or sortals, under which the objects fall (which is 
why ‘natural languages furnish so many locutions in the quasi-attributive form: “a is the 
same what as b?”, “the same donkey, same man, same electrician, same…”’157). 
But why, exactly, do we proceed in this manner? To answer this, and to gauge 
the importance of this sortalism, he refers again to the common tests and methods we 
use when we adjudicate identity questions: 
 
Suppose I ask: Is a, the man sitting on the left at the back of the 
restaurant, the same person as b, the boy who won the drawing prize at 
the school I was still a pupil at early in the year 1951? To answer this 
sort of question is surprisingly straightforward in practice, however 
intricate a business it would be to spell out the full justification of the 
method we employ. Roughly, though, what organizes our actual method is the 
idea of a particular kind of continuous path in space and time the man would have 
had to have followed in order to end up here in the restaurant… Once we have 
dispelled any doubt whether there is a path in space and time along which that 
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What is it …?’ Indeed, this is a question that must always be asked (see Wiggins 1967: 1) 
155 Wiggins 2012: 8 
156 Wiggins 2001: 21 
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schoolboy might have been traced and we have concluded that the human being who 
was that schoolboy coincides with the person/human being at the back of the 
restaurant, this identity is settled.158 
 
And following this comes the essential point that: 
 
The continuity or coincidence in question here is that which brought 
into consideration by what it is to be a human being.159 
 
‘In practice’, our answers to identity questions are organized by the idea of spatio-temporal 
continuity. Spatio-temporal continuity is what matters – not total agreement of properties 
and relations.160 And crucially, the thought underpinning our practical reasoning is that 
spatio-temporal boundaries are different for different kinds of things: spatio-temporal 
continuity is not, as we find in experience, bare continuity,161 but the specific kind of 
continuity that relates to the sort of thing that the objects are. When we draw spatio-
temporal boundaries, we look to what a thing is (and again: ‘Bare continuity supplies no 
principle, no rhyme or reason’162). 
So here, stemming from the connective, descriptive analysis, we are encouraged 
to incorporate a form of sortalism into our theory of identity. This is the point Wiggins 
reaches when he setting out, on page 56 of S&SR, the construal of D, as the theory of 
sortal dependency of identity, which Snowdon focuses on. He incorporates this 
sortalism because it provides a sufficient condition for identity. 
Snowdon holds that the passage on page 56 is a good guide to the general 
character of Wiggins D. This reading is the foundation of his subsequent criticisms. But 
it is mistaken. The passage is intended only as a partial rendering of a doctrine that 
encompasses both epistemological and metaphysical claims. Snowdon’s mistake appears 
even more starkly when the precise context of the quoted passage is considered. 
Wiggins writes: 
  
When D is clearly disassociated from R, that which remains is this: 
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159 Ibid: 57 
160 See, e.g. Wiggins 2001: 56, and 1967: 1 
161 Wiggins 2001: xii, 2012: 8 
162 Wiggins 2012: 9 
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D: a = b if and only if… [etc.]163 
 
The principle is labelled D but Wiggins is engaged in a dialetic here; specifically, he aims 
to exhibit the elements of D that contrast with R. Both D and R are sortal theories of 
identity – in the same way that Catholicism and Anglicanism are both forms of 
Christianity, and certain elements need to be showcased for the distinction between the 
two to be drawn out. And just as a claim about deference to the Pope fails to capture 
the general character of Catholicism, so too does this emphasis on the metaphysics of 
identity fail to capture the general character of D.164 Snowdon’s attempt to capture the 
general character of D abstracts important, but not isolable, elements of that thesis. 
Wiggins’ reciprocal development of identity and individuation is analysed further in 
§1.2.d. – but in advance of that it will be helpful to engage in a brief digression into the 
possible problems facing a sortal theory of identity. 
 
§1.2.c. Sortal identity and relative identity 
 
There is an issue here: The kind of sortalism Wiggins describes is often taken to lead 
towards a commitment to relative identity. It is clearly the case that we can pick out the 
same object as different sorts of things – e.g. man, soldier, greybeard, Greek, philosopher, 
official of the state, the chairman for day d, 406 B.C., etc… And surely, we may say, it makes 
all the difference to claims of identity which of these concepts one subsumes the 
something under.165 An individual a might be the same man as individual b, but not the 
same official of the state (if, say, a lost his title). So this relativism ushers us inexorably 
towards the kind of anti-realist conceptualism described above,166 where identity is seen 
to be relative to us, and not answerable to the world. 
As has been noted, Wiggins intends his treatment of sameness to accommodate 
both the insights of realism and those of conceptualism. The sortalism that emerges 
from our everyday practices, must be answerable to the ‘metaphysics of identity’, by 
which he means the logic of the relation. And prime among the formal properties of 
that relation is Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (the ‘rock of ages’), 
which states that if x is the same thing as y, then x and y have all the same properties. 
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164 Many thanks to Jennifer Hornsby for helping me precisify this point. 
165 Wiggins 2001: 23 
166 See also Wiggins 2001: 140, and 1996 ‘Replies’: 227 
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The relativity of identity – as advanced by Peter Geach and Harold Noonan167 – marks 
the contravention of this principle.168 Consequently, the focus of the first chapter of 
S&SR is to reconcile Wiggins’ sortalism with strict Leibnizian identity. While it is not 
necessary to go into the details of his argument here, it will be useful to outline his 
explanations of apparently relativistic identity claims – specifically his appeal to phase 
sortals, and the ‘is’ of constitution. 
In general terms, a sortal is a sort or kind. Sortal terms take numerical modifiers 
– we use them to count items (e.g. ‘cat’ rather than ‘air’). We pick individuals out ‘under’ 
sortals. Sortal concepts are the concepts associated with that kind. Sortal predicates are those 
expressions that stand for these concepts.169 For Wiggins, a sortal predicate is an 
expression that gives a criterion for counting items of a kind, but also gives criteria of 
identity for members of that extension.170 
Importantly, Wiggins also separates out two different types of sortal. There are 
phase sortals, which an individual may fall under at one time and not another. E.g. I may, 
temporarily be a student and then stop being one (when I no longer pay my tuition 
fees). The same is true for being a girl, a boy, or a soldier, or a nurse, etc.171 There are, 
however, substance sortals too – putatively human being. In contrast to phase sortals, if an 
individual falls under a substance sortal, it cannot cease to do so and continue to exist. 
They apply to an individual x at every moment through x’s existence.172 Phase sortals are 
typically ‘restrictions’ of more general sortal terms.173 
This distinction gives Wiggins the resources to answer relativistic counter-
examples to Leibnizian identity. A sortalist may say that an individual x is the same 
human being as y, but not the same nurse (he was once a nurse, but has since retired): the 
identity of a and b thus seems to turn on which sortal we subsume them under – we are 
drawn towards relativism. But this conclusion is only reached if we ignore the sorts of 
sortals at play. As Wiggins puts it: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Geach 1962, 1972, 1973, Noonan 1976, 1978 
168 Wiggins 1996 ‘Replies’: 227 
169 Wiggins’ use (as described in 2001: 9, 77) is shaped by Strawson’s, in his 1959 (168–9). 
170 See Grandy 2008 for a more precise articulation of ‘sortal’. 
171 For Wiggins’ description of this distinction see Wiggins 2001: ch.1, §3, especially page 30 (also 
summarized in Snowdon 1990). Wiggins also occasionally talks of ‘ultimate’ sortals (as in his 1967: 32) – 
but this phrasing has been all but expunged from his recent work (though n.b. 2001: 129), and will not be 
discussed here. 
172 Wiggins 2001: 30 
173 Ibid: 33 
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[One must] distinguish between sortal concepts that present-tensedly 
apply to an individual x at every moment throughout x’s existence, e.g. 
human being, and those that do not, e.g. boy, or cabinet minister. It is the 
former… that give us the privileged and… the most fundamental kind of 
answer to the question ‘what is x?’ It is the latter, one might call them 
phased-sortals, which, if we are not careful about tenses, give a false 
impression that a can be the same f as b but the same g as b.174, 175 
 
Thus, relativism can be read – in some cases at least – to emerge from confusions of 
phase sortals with the substance sortals they restrict. 
Wiggins has another recourse, in answering apparent relativity: the constitutive 
‘is’. To get a grip on this metaphysical relation, consider another case that appears to 
support the relativist’s thesis: Having broken a jug, reduced it, by accident or malice, to 
a heap of fragments, you (conscientiously) cement the pieces back together … but 
(mischievously) into a coffee-pot this time, and not a jug. The relativist will claim we 
have a case where ‘the jug is the coffee pot’ is true with the covering concept same 
collection of material bits, but false with the covering concept same utensil.176 So Leibnizian 
identity is again called into question. 
Wiggins’ influential response to this example first appeared in his examination 
of material coincidence, in his paper ‘On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time’.177 
There, he outlines a ‘metaphysics of constitution’ that distinguishes between two uses of 
the word ‘is’. ‘Is’ can represent an identity relation (e.g. George Eliot is Mary Ann 
Evans’) – and this is how it is usually taken. So when we state that the jug is the heap of 
fragments, and the heap of fragments is the coffee pot, we seem to be describing 
identity (which must then be relative since the coffee-pot and the jug cannot have the 
same properties (being different utensils)). Yet Wiggins claims that ‘is’ can also represent 
the much weaker ‘constitution’ relation. Notably, where identity is symmetric and 
reflexive the constitution relation is asymmetric and irreflexive – the heap constitutes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Wiggins 2001: 30 
175 It is often to this distinction – between phase and substance sortals – that theorists turn to explain 
what is meant by ‘fundamental’. See Snowdon 1990: 4. See also Olson 1997: 28 
176 ‘…and the jug and the coffee-pot cannot be construed as phases of an individual collection of matter’. 
(Wiggins 2001: 34, 36–43) It is possible, indeed, that Wiggins would consider this construal of the 
situation as some form of ‘process philosophy’ – to which he is also firmly opposed (see Wiggins 1982: 
26) (His dubiety about process philosophy may stand as a point of controversy between him and Dupré – 
disturbing the allegiance encouraged in chapter 3 – but this is an issue that will not be pursued here.) 
177 Wiggins 1968. It is in the discussion of material coincidence that it is most influential (as we will see). 
See e.g. Rudder Baker 2000 
	   43	  
the coffee-pot and the jug, but neither the coffee-pot, nor the jug constitute the heap.178 
Wiggins’ re-description of the story then, is as follows: x and y are not identical under 
the sortal utensil (f) (since one is a coffee-pot and one a jug). But neither are they 
identical under the sortal collection of fragments (g), since neither x nor y is identical with 
the collection of fragments – they are merely constituted by that very collection. 
Once again, let us allow ourselves to be persuaded by Wiggins’ careful 
modifications. Identity is identity under a sortal, and this does not, in the end, commit 
him to a relativization thesis. Any apparent relativity can be explained away in the 
manner just outlined. Thus, the sortalism borne from our everyday individuative norms 
is tempered by the requirements of Leibnizian identity.179 
 Let us now return to mapping the development of the dual theses of identity and 
individuation. 
 
§1.2.d. Principles of individuation 
 
Wiggins writes that each sortal encapsulates a particular ‘mode of being’ or ‘nature’ (in 
the case of living things) or a ‘function’ (in the case of artefacts).180 This distinction 
between natural things and artefacts is an important one, to which we will return – but 
for the time being let us focus on the latter, which provides a rough outline of the 
general approach. For natural things, the nature is the mode of being for things of that sort: 
 
It is the principle of activity of a kind whose members share and possess 
in themselves a distinctive source of development and change.181 
 
Take the sortal cat, for example. Wiggins will say that there is a distinctive ‘mode of 
being’ for cats, a Leibnizian ‘law’ of activity, to which all members of that kind are 
subject.182 And this ‘law’ – or ‘principle’ – encapsulates, ultimately, what it is to be a cat, 
from typical behaviour to determinate patterns of growth and development183 – eating 
habits, metabolic processes, social (or, more usually, anti-social) tendencies, and so on.184 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Wiggins 2001: 36 The ‘is’ of constitution functions in the same way as the ‘is’ in ‘The soufflé you are 
eating is flour, eggs and milk’. 
179 Wiggins 2005a: 444 
180 Or, as discussed below, an ‘operation’ (in the case of organs) 
181 Wiggins 2012: 8 
182 Wiggins draws the connection with Leibniz in his 1979: 313–315 and in his 2001: 84–85 
183 Wiggins 2001: 86 
184 Ibid: 84 
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In each cat these standard capacities are necessarily determined in specific ways, from 
their particular gait to the way they jump, and purr, and nap. And that specialized and 
refined actualization of the characteristic activity for felis catus is what ordinary thinkers 
(like us) have in mind (though imperfectly185) when examining these creatures’ spatio-
temporal continuity. It is the continuity of this specific actualization that counts for 
spatio-temporal continuity. 
This, then, is the special effectiveness of the ‘what is it?’ question: 
 
[I]n the case of continuants it refers us back to our constantly exercised 
idea of the persistence and life-span of an entity.186 
 
When, in our non-philosophical lives, we adjudicate in matters of identity we do so by 
asking whether the objects in question are joined by a single, continuous path through 
space and time. To determine this we examine their particular activity – for which we 
need to know, or have some provisional idea, of what they are. If, in the end, they are 
joined in this way, we rule in favour of identity, otherwise we do not. This, Wiggins 
claims, is how we conceive of sameness when we apply it in the world – and this analysis 
allows us to add flesh to the logical bones bequeathed to us by Leibniz. It gives us a 
workable sufficient condition for identity. 
As we’ve seen, Wiggins bolsters the Leibnizian schema of identity by referring to 
our basic ideas of sameness187 – but at the same time he also extrapolates from our pre-
theoretical practices a much more precise theory of individuation. As the rudimentary 
practices guide us towards a sufficient condition, those same everyday individuative 
practices are shored up against the formal metaphysics of identity. Thus, drawing out 
that which underpins our pre-theoretical conceptions he constructs a theory that 
satisfies the exigent logical requirements of that relation.188 
To this end, in chapters two and three of the Sameness and Substance books, 
Wiggins sets out his D-principles: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Wiggins 2012: 8, and 2005a: 444: The ideas we grasp are ‘…ideas which are clear, as [Leibniz] would 
say, that is operationally effective for reliable application of a thing-kind word to a thing and yet indistinct, 
that is inexplicit, incomplete and open to improvement…’ See also 2001: 83n.6 
186 Wiggins 2001: 59 
187 Ibid: 2 
188 Wiggins 2005a: 444 
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D-principles transcribe or transpose the formal properties of identity into 
universal norms to which all singling things out, all acts of recognizing 
the same again, all reconstructing the histories of things not continuously 
observed, and all judgment about identity and difference have, on pain of 
our losing hold altogether of reference and identity, to make themselves 
singly and collectively answerable.189 
 
They set the requirements that must be met if our everyday individuative acts are to 
correspond to the formal properties of identity. A brief overview of these principles will 
be sufficient here. 
The first three principles set out what we have already seen. D(iii) incorporates 
D(i) – a statement of the basic sortal truth that everything is something190, 191 – and D(ii) – 
the refinement of this truth based on observation192 into the more ‘substantial’ sortalism 
that accommodates the phase/substance sortal distinction. What we end up with at 
D(iii), then, is the formal statement of the (workable) sufficient condition 
(corresponding to the one presented above): 
 
D(iii): a is identical with b if and only if there is some concept f such 
that (1) f is a substance-concept under which an object that belongs to f 
can be singled out, traced and distinguished from other f entities and 
distinguished from other entities; (2) a coincides under f with b; (3) 
[coincides under f] stands for a congruence relation: i.e. all pairs <x,y> 
that are members of the relation satisfy the Leibnizian schema Φx if 
and only if Φy.193 
 
Then, the subsequent principles – D(iv)–D(x) – formulate exactly what it is to be a 
substance sortal (or rather, the associated substance concept) which can stand as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Wiggins 2005a: 444 
190 Wiggins 1967: 27 
191 The status of D(i) is obscure to me. It stands as a logical truth here (and in Wiggins (2001): ‘…it seems 
certain…that for each thing that satisfies a predicate such as ‘moves’, ‘runs’ or ‘white’, there must exist 
some known or unknown, named or nameable, kind to which the item belongs...’ (2001): 21) – but if 
there is some proof, or argument other than the one from observation, to D(ii) it is not obvious to me 
what it is. And indeed, Wiggins deletes the passages relating to this in his later work (Compare 1980: 62–
68 and 2001: 64–69). 
192 Wiggins 1980: 62 
193 Wiggins 2001: 70 
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effective foundation for individuative acts. We need not go into all these in depth, but 
let us consider D(v) and D(vi), which play significant roles in the following sections. 
As it stands, the sufficient condition, formalized in D(iii) marks the distinction 
between phase and substance sortals. But as Wiggins notes, there are apparent substance 
sortals, which will not do the work we assign to them in this context: 
 
There are countless predicates in English that have the appearance of 
sortal predicates but are purely generic (animal, machine, artefact) or are 
pure determinables for sortal determination (space-occupier, entity, 
substance).194 
 
These apply to x at every moment of x’s existence, but they are not suitable for 
individuation. They do not successfully answer the ‘what is it?’ question because they do 
not specify what matters turn on in regard to persistence – i.e. they do not allow us to 
trace spatio-temporal continuity.195 Thus, we find D(v) which sets out the all important 
requirement for a principle of activity/functioning/operation: 
 
D(v): f is a substance-concept only if f determines either a principle of 
activity, a principle of functioning or a principle of operation for members of 
its extension.196 
 
These principles, as mentioned, are ‘principles of individuation’ – principles ‘by which 
entities of [that] particular kind may be traced or kept track of and reidentified as the 
same’.197 If we are trying to individuate artefacts (chairs, say, or tables), we turn to their 
principle of functioning. For natural organs (hearts, livers), we turn to their principle of 
operation. And when we are trying to pick out and trace natural substances, like cats, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Wiggins 2001: 69 
195 Can we really not individuate under more generic sortals? Snowdon presses Wiggins on this. Does 
animal not encapsulate a general biological activity sufficient for saying whether a is identical with b? No – 
think of the dramatic kinds of metamorphoses some organisms can survive and others cannot (compare 
sparrows, dogs, frogs and butterflies). One size does not fit all when it comes to animal individuation. But 
what about ‘mammal’? Could one re-identify some x by thinking of it as a mammal? Perhaps, but there are 
two reasons for doubt. Firstly, there is still striking variation among the living activities of mammals 
(compare dogs, dolphins and duck-billed platypi). Secondly, there is surely something important (for the 
descriptivist, at least) in the fact that we do not, in practice, pick things out primarily as ‘mammals’. 
Children, certainly, seem to grasp what it is t be a dog or a cat, before understanding the more generic 
sortal mammal. 
196 Wiggins 2001: 72 
197 Ibid: 22, 27 
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rhododendrons, or human animals, we turn – as we’ve seen – to their distinctive 
principle of activity. 
Also worthy of mention here is D(vi). This principle – relevant to discussions of 
fission – states that f is a substance concept only if it determines a notion of coincidence 
(or in the case of changeable substances, a notion of continuity198) that is fully transitive:  
 
D(vi): If f is a substance concept for a, then coincidence under f is fully 
determinate enough to exclude this situation: a is traced under f and 
counts as coinciding under f with b, a is traced under f and counts as 
coinciding under f with c, yet b does not coincide under f with c.199 
 
D(vi) emphasizes another distinction between merely apparent and genuine substance 
sortals. It distinguishes between sortals that covers substances – changeable, persisting 
substances of the kind we find around us, i.e. particulars – and sortals that cover clones, 
or varieties, or strains, i.e. universals.200 Consider, for example, the amoeba that splits – 
neither of the products can be the same amoeba as the ‘parent’. They exemplify the 
same strain or clone, but no more.201 As we will see (in chapter 4), this analysis feeds 
directly into Wiggins’ recent assessment of brain transplantation – as does the 
discussion in the next section, which focuses on the metaphysical distinction between 
natural things and artefacts. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Wiggins 2001: 59 
199 Ibid: 72 
200 Ibid: 73 
201 Wiggins 2005a: 445 
	   48	  
§1.3. Artefacts and natural objects 
 
Having gained a surer grip on Wiggins’ general approach, attention can now be directed 
to the particulars of his theory. His D thesis is, he claims, an extrapolation of the 
framework that underpins our everyday practices; as such, it is avowedly sortalist. When 
we identify, and re-identify objects in our environment, they are picked out as being of 
kinds, or sorts, of things. And not just any ‘sort’ will do. For sortal terms to guide us in 
individuation they must pick out what an x actually is (rather than describing some 
phase of it). To individuate x, x must be singled out under a substance sortal. 
 But what terms stand as substance sortal terms? This is one of the questions that 
exercises Wiggins in S&SR. There are a number of applicants: hat, cat, student, nurse, 
human…  Many of these describe a being’s phases, or at least, non-substance sortals. 
What words fulfil the requirements (the D-principles) necessary for being a substance 
sortal predicate (i.e. an expression that stands for a substance concept) by which we can 
assess identity judgments? Or, to ask a parallel question, borne from an older 
metaphysical tradition: which things are substances? 
 For Wiggins, it appears that natural things, specifically living things – plants, 
animals, and so on – are substances par excellence. He writes: 
 
[They] exemplify most perfectly and completely a category of substance 
that is extension-involving, imports the idea of characteristic activity, and 
is unproblematic for individuation.202  
 
As he sees it, the semantics of natural kind words are such that they clearly encapsulate a 
specifiable principle of individuation for their members (as required by D(v)).203 Those 
terms which we use to pick out natural things – cats, dogs, and so on – are semantically 
such that they refer to exemplars of that kind, and the specific principle of activity its 
members exhibit. (The scientific validity of this claim is examined in §3.3.) 
 There are, however, other objects in our environment that seem to lay claim to 
‘substancehood’, and a correlative aim of Wiggins’ work is to examine whether or not 
artefactual kind terms – ‘table’, ‘car’, etc. – can function as substance sortal terms as well. 
In §1.3.b., Wiggins’ concerns with artefacts are discussed. Following this, various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Wiggins 2001: 90 
203 Ibid: 72 
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interpretations of Wiggins’ position are outlined and critiqued, after which an alternative 
reading is presented. 
   
§1.3.a. The semantics of natural kind words 
 
Before discussing the semantics of these terms it is necessary to distinguish, if only 
vaguely, between natural and artefactual kinds. The line has been drawn in different 
ways, but a prominent view – exemplified below in Rudder Baker’s analysis – is that 
‘natural’ things are things that are independent of human practices. ‘Artefacts’, by contrast, 
are taken to be products of human practices, fabricated by humans (‘man-made’) – and 
artefactual kinds are marked out by us and defined in relation to the practices from 
which they issue and the functions they perform. For what follows, this is labelled the 
standard view (stately more precisely below).204 
How does Wiggins take ‘natural kind’ words, like ‘cat’ and ‘tree’, to refer? His 
discussion in S&SR begins with a critique of the nominalist essentialist account of 
natural kind words. An introduction of this will stand us in good stead for what follows. 
The nominal essentialist seeks, as Wiggins writes, ‘to specify the sense of “sun” or 
“horse” or “tree” by a description of such things in terms of manifest properties and 
relations or in terms of appearance.’205 
For example, the essentialist will group fruit together as lemons because of their 
yellow appearance, tartness of taste, thickness of skin (etc.). This is to play the role of 
taxonomist. And, as Wiggins points out, this way of selecting members of a kind is not 
open to the world.206 Accounts that describe how natural kind words refer in terms of a 
nominal essence cannot explain how our conceptions of a kind can evolve (as we learn new 
things about them) while still being conceptions of that same kind. When scientific 
inquiry reveals to us, e.g. that lemons have a distinctive genetic structure (if in fact they 
do), we will want to exclude from the kind lemon, fruit that are only superficially similar 
(like etrogs), and include bruised, unripe, and discoloured fruit that have the appropriate 
molecular make-up. Thus: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 For a further analysis of the ‘standard view’ see Hilpinen 1993: 156–7 
205 Wiggins 2001: 78 
206 Ibid: 78, 160, 173 
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[A] more satisfying account [of natural kind semantics] will emphasize the 
contribution that the world itself makes to those conceptions.207 
 
It is exactly this kind of receptivity that is supposed to be captured by Wiggins’ deictic-
nomological method,208 a position built firmly on the foundations laid by Saul Kripke and 
Hilary Putnam.209 As we find it in S&SR, this doctrine states that the explanation of the 
sense of a natural kind word revolves around exemplars (or ‘stereotypes’) of that kind 
(thus requiring context: deixis) and the nomological connections that hold between 
them. So, Wiggins writes: 
 
…x is an f (horse, cypress tree, orange, caddis-fly…) if and only if, given 
good exemplars of the kind that is in question, the best theoretical 
description that emerged from collective inquiries into the kind would 
group x alongside these exemplars.210 
 
That is, there are law-like principles, known or unknown,211 that hold between 
exemplars, and can thus collect together the extension of the kind around these 
representatives.212 These gradually evolving theoretical descriptions (Putnam’s ‘sameness 
relations’) are the ones that e.g. biologists lay out as they investigate the natural world a 
posteriori.213 And a particular theoretical description encapsulates the ‘principle of activity’ 
to which we turn when individuating natural substances. It encapsulates the 
‘determinate pattern of growth and development towards, and/or persistence in, some 
particular form’214 – and thus meets the central D(v) requirement for substance sortal 
terms. 
 There are nuances that, for the sake of succinctness, can be passed over here;215 
the core claim is that on this model of reference, natural kind words seem to meet the 
requirements laid out by the D-principles. Wiggins writes: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Wiggins 2001: 78 
208 See especially Wiggins 2001:79 –80ff 
209 Kripke 1980. And – though less directly influential for Wiggins – Putnam 1973 
210 Wiggins 2001: 79 
211 Wiggins 2001: 72, and 1980: 80f 
212 Wiggins 2001: 80 
213 Ibid: 86 
214 Ibid: 86 
215 Some will be discussed in chapter 3. For example, we might raise questions about how the sameness 
relation is supposed to be identified in the first place, since – surely – weighting different areas of 
similarity differently will create different measures of ‘sameness’. This thought, assayed in Okasha 2002. 
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[The deictic-nomological method] contains most of the answer to the 
problems that we have posed about the demands of D(iii), D(iv), D(v) 
and all the other D principles. If there have to exist true law-like 
principles in nature to underwrite the existence of the multiply 
instantiable thing that is the reference of a natural-kind predicate if law-
like principles of this kind have to exist in order for that general thing’s 
extension to be assembled around the focus of actual specimens or for a 
reality-invoking kind of sense to be conferred on the term standing for 
the concept f, then they must also determine directly or indirectly the 
characteristic development, the typical history, the limits of any possible 
development or history, and the characteristic mode of activity of 
anything that instantiates the kind.216 
 
On the deictic-nomological model, natural kind words work well as substance sortal 
predicates because they refer us to the rich inner workings of the kind’s members, and 
thus encapsulate the laws that constrain their persistence. 
 
§1.3.b. Artefact words and puzzles 
 
On the standard view, natural items are contrasted with artefacts, objects like hammers and 
clocks, which are dependent on human practices and intentions. Such things are also 
subject to our individuative practices; we track them, assert ownership of them, and so 
on. Yet, unlike Putnam, Wiggins appears to reject the application of the deictic-
nomological method to such things on the grounds that the correlative terms lack 
nomological grounding.217 
Consider – as Wiggins does – the case of a clock:218 clocks can be constituted by 
different materials and can work according to vastly different mechanisms (compare, 
e.g., a sundial, a grand-father clock, and a fob-watch). The nomological claims we can 
make about members of the kind clock are strikingly meagre in comparison to the 
copious and detailed biological and chemical descriptions that link members of e.g. the 
kind human being. The stereotypes lack internal or scientific resemblances, and cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Wiggins 2001: 84 
217 Ibid: ch.2, §2–3. In this, Wiggins’ position aligns with Schwartz (see Schwartz 1978). For a good 
introduction to these issues, and an overview of the debate before Wiggins’ arrival, see Kornblith 1980. 
218 It is this example with which Losonsky takes umbrage (in Losonsky 1990). He believes that artefacts 
do, contra Wiggins, develop in a nomologically grounded way. 
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grouped by reference to a common constitution; there are no hidden depths to plumb, 
so to speak, when asking whether x is a member of the kind clock.219 Consequently – 
Wiggins contends – things like clocks can only be grouped under functional descriptions 
that are precisely indifferent to specific constitution and any particular mode of interaction 
with the environment.220 In short, he sees members of the kind clock, and similar 
‘artefactual’ kinds, to be collected by reference to a conceptually shallow nominal essence. 
E.g. a tin-opener is any instrument made for opening soldered tins, a pen is any ink-
applying writing implement.221 The semantics of these kinds of kind words make no 
reference to law-like dispositions, or typical histories of their membership, but to a 
function – and it is to this (formalized into the ‘principle of functioning in D(v)) that 
Wiggins directs us when individuating these kinds of things. 
 
[O]rdinary artefacts are individuated by reference to a parcel of matter so 
organized as to subserve a certain function…222 
 
On one reading then, it seems that Wiggins holds that artefact kinds are grouped by 
reference to nomologically shallow functional essences, and that it is by reference to the 
matter that subserves this function that we individuate these kinds of thing.223 Further, 
he seems to hold that the persistence conditions encapsulated by artefactual kind terms 
are in some sense weaker than those of their natural kind counterparts. For example, the 
kind term clock alludes only to a particular function, not to a particular organization, or 
continuity – and as a result does not rule against e.g. disassembly, part-replacement, and 
pauses of indeterminate length. This shallowness is illustrated clearly by Wiggins: 
 
A clock may stop because it needs winding up. Such a pause does not 
prejudice its persistence. A clock can stop because it needs to be 
repaired; and again it persists, however long the lapse before the 
repair… The nominal essence of clock must involve a stipulation of 
some sort concerning the capacity to tell the time. But surely the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 And for this reason, as Wiggins points out, we are never surprised by facts about artefacts, but are 
constantly astonished by the intricate workings of members of natural kinds (of the order of surprise that 
might strike one on learning that tadpoles are frogs). Wiggins 2001: 88 
220 Wiggins 2001: 87 
221 Ibid: 87 
222 Ibid: 91 
223 ‘Functioning’, as Wiggins has it, is no more ‘than remotely analogous to the activity of natural things’. 
Wiggins 2001: 90 
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uninterrupted continuance for all t of the capacity at t to tell the time at 
t will not be stipulated. This is too strong. The only loss that could 
count to any appreciable degree against the persistence of the clock is a 
radical and irretrievable loss of the time-keeping function.224 
 
This analysis appears to lead Wiggins to the thought that the semantic difference 
correlates to a metaphysical distinction. The nomological shallowness provokes puzzles of 
identity which demonstrate a contravention of D(vi). 
One of the most notorious of these puzzles – and one repeatedly discussed by 
Wiggins – is the so-called ‘Theseus’s ship’ case. In this fission narrative, drawn from 
Plutarch’s Lives by Hobbes and redeployed in ISTC (and its sequels), we are asked to 
imagine a ship that has all of its parts gradually replaced with strong, new planks, screws, 
etc. There is nothing in the nominal essence of ship that precludes this (nor would we 
want there to be). But imagine that someone collects all the old, discarded parts – 
blemished, but not unusable – and builds with them another vessel, of exactly the same 
design as the first. Given the weakness of the conditions for artefact persistence – 
admitting both part replacement and disassembly and reassembly – the second vessel, 
made from the original parts, can also be seen to be the same ship as Theseus’s. Here, 
then, is the puzzle: both resultant vessels can be construed as identical with the original, 
and yet they can hardly be identical with each other. The transitivity of identity is 
undermined (thus the contravention of his D(vi)).225 
In the situation described the term ship fails to fulfil a condition that, for 
Wiggins, a term will meet if it is a substance sortal term.226 The repercussions are 
potentially severe; we will begin to question whether ship can be a substance sortal 
concept at all. The same is true for clock, pen, tin-opener, and so on. The principle of 
functioning does not seem enough by itself to successfully pick out and trace an object 
through time, and the conclusion we are led towards is that these sortals are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Wiggins 2001: 91–92 (And, as Wiggins notes, ‘even under this circumstance, the clock itself may be 
held to have survived…’) Are there biological analogues of this? The living activity of seeds trapped – and 
preserved – in glacial ice might, for instance, be said to undergo a pause of indeterminate length. But in 
these cases, at least, this kind of stasis appears to be a facet of the living activity – it is part of the mode of 
being of such things that they can survive freezing. Contrast with the artefacts that survive in spite of such 
interruptions. 
225 On this, see Wiggins 2001: 93, 99, where he configures this problem as a tension between the ordinary 
commonsensically strict notion of identity and the commonsensically loose requirements of artefact 
identity. Note also, that these kinds of artefact puzzles are not applicable to all supposed artefacts. 
Artworks are especially interesting here, and Wiggins devotes some time to exploring the degrees of 
replacement and repair that, e.g. paintings can undergo (Wiggins 2001: 136–139) 
226 This failure can also be formulated in terms of the D-principle D(iii) – see Wiggins 2001: 70 and 92. 
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sufficient for individuation. This, as Wiggins notes, correlates to the disquieting thought 
that the items these artefactual terms refer to are not ‘genuine entities’.227 Whether or 
not he himself holds this view will now be discussed.228 
 
§1.3.c. Wiggins’ view of the existence of artefacts 
 
There are two main lines of interpretation of Wiggins’ metaphysical analysis of artefacts. 
Massimiliano Carrara and Pieter E. Vermaas hold that Wiggins’ denies the existence of 
artefacts. Lynne Rudder Baker and Michael Losonsky claim that he considers artefacts 
to be, in some way, ontologically inferior to natural items, and not ‘genuine substances’. 
These readings are discussed below. An important distinction is drawn between 
questions about existence and questions about substance, and some significant, 
distinguishing marks of the Quinean and Aristotelian metaphysical traditions are 
outlined. 
Does Wiggins deny that artefacts, like chairs and tables, actually exist? This is the 
view Carrara and Vermaas attribute to him in their paper ‘The fine-grained metaphysics 
of artifactual and biological functional kinds’.229 Examining Wiggins’ discussion of 
artefacts, they claim both that he denies artefacts are members of real kinds, and that 
this consequently leads him towards an ‘Aristotelian’ conception, whereby 
‘…metaphysically there are not such things as cars and tables because, in an Aristotelian 
vein, cars and tables do not have their own essences or principles of activity.’230 This, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Wiggins 2001: 99–100 
228 The focus above is on the general worries puzzles like this provoke, not on Wiggins’ specific response 
to this particular case. However, for the sake of completeness, a brief overview can be entered. Wiggins’ 
thoughts about Theseus’s ship have changed during his philosophical career. In S&S and S&SR he 
suggests we deploy supplementary principles to bolster artefact identity conditions. He adapts an identity 
condition for quantities, formulated by Helen Morris Cartwright. The – almost comically gestural 
(Wiggins 2001: 100) – condition concerns the addition and subtraction of matter: matter can be 
exchanged and replaced so long as (i) the artefact retains its capacity to perform the function for which it 
was designed, and (ii) it retains more than half its matter (ruling out fission). More recently, in his 2012 
paper, Wiggins proposes a slightly subtler response: we can only answer this question when we have 
entered into serious dialogue with those who make and use the ships: ‘it would be wise for philosophy not 
to hold itself aloof from the uses of those who[se] ship it is. Typically, they will decide such a matter not 
once and for all but incrementally and in a way that the theorist needs to understand before he ventures 
to criticize.’ (Wiggins 2012: 15) The suggestion, then, is that answering the puzzle is a much bigger project 
than philosophers typically take it to be. It will be a matter of more thoroughly elucidating our thoughts 
about artefacts and ownership – and while no further verdict on the case will be offered here, the closer 
focus on the descriptive analysis of our artefact concept is encouraged in §4.4. 
229 Carrara and Vermaas 2009 
230 Ibid: 126 
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they describe as an ‘Aristotelian anti-realistic conception of artifacts’.231 Setting it out in 
greater depth, they write: 
 
[W]e cannot find regularities in behaviours and form in functionally 
characterized artifacts, such as clocks, and they are not subject to 
common laws comparable to the natural kind case. Functional descriptors 
thus do not refer to an inner constitution of artifacts… 
 The result is twofold. From an epistemological point of view the 
conclusion is that artifact kinds do not support induction at all. We 
cannot infer, for example, any truth about chairs from the observation of 
some instances of chairs… From an ontological point of view the result 
is that artifacts exist only in what Sellars (1963) calls the ‘manifest image’. 
People project artifact careers, but by a serious ontological inventory of 
the world, artifacts do not exist.232 
 
This passage is notable in two respects. Firstly, it attributes to Wiggins a curiously 
extreme view. Secondly, it exhibits a peculiar overlap of metaphysical traditions; 
questions are being asked that are out of place in this methodological context; different 
strands of Western metaphysics are becoming snarled in the conceptual equivocation of 
‘substance’ and ‘existent’. To draw out this latter point first, it will be helpful to turn to 
some recent methodological studies by Jonathan Schaffer in which he turns to the 
crucial, but neglected, distinction between Quinean and Aristotelian approaches to 
metaphysical practice.233 Using these studies we can read Vermaas and Carrara’s ‘anti-
realism’ as a Quinean corruption of the Aristotelian position, and following this, 
inappropriate as applied to Wiggins’ work. 
For Quine, as Schaffer sees it,234 the main task of metaphysics is to say what exists. 
(Thus, the characteristic question with which Quine starts his inquiry: what is there?235) In 
general, his answer is the understated ‘everything’, but he recognises that there is room 
for disagreement over cases – we might wonder whether properties exist, or meanings, 
or numbers – inventorying which of these things exist is the remit of metaphysics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Carrara and Vermaas 2009: 126 
232 Ibid: 130 (my emphasis) 
233 E.g. Schaffer 2003, 2009, 2010 
234 Schaffer 2009: 347–348 
235 Quine 1963: 1 
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 The science-led method that Quine deploys to pursue this task has already been 
mentioned. The only entities that we should admit to our ontology are those that are 
posited by our best theory,236 which for Quine is physics. The theories by which we 
explain the physical interactions of matter, are taken, and translated into canonical logic. 
Those items that the bound variables must range over to be true are the items to be 
included on our ontological ‘call-sheet’. (Thus the slogan: to be is to be the value of a variable.) 
One result of this kind of programme is that it produces what Schaffer calls a ‘flat 
ontology’. There is no order to the list of things that exist. They are either included in the 
list, or they are not. Schaffer writes: 
 
[T]he Quinean and the Aristotelian tasks involve structurally distinct 
conceptions of the target of metaphysical inquiry. For the Quinean, the 
target is flat. The task is to solve for E= the set (or class, or plurality) of 
entities. There is no structure to E. For any alleged entity, the flat 
conception offers two classificatory options: either the entity is in E or 
not.237 
 
On the Quinean model, therefore, we are encouraged to ask: do artefacts exist? Counter-
intuitive as it is, given the Quinean method the response might be in the negative, since 
entities like chairs and tables (unlike quarks, perhaps) are inessential to physical 
explanations. (This is the picture (or at least part of the picture238) that we find in Peter 
van Inwagen’s Quinean metaphysics (‘…there are’, he writes, ‘no tables or books or 
rocks or hands or legs…’239).) 
 In contrast to the flat ontology of Quinean metaphysics, the Aristotelian picture 
is of an ordered structure: a graded, hierarchy of being. As Schaffer reads him, Aristotle’s 
attitude to the sorts of existence questions we find in Quine is trivializing;240 asked 
whether or not numbers,241 time,242 or the infinite,243 exist his answer tends to be a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Quine 1963: 12–13 
237 Schaffer 2009: 354 
238 Peculiarly, van Inwagen claims that organisms exist, and do so because they have a single biological 
life, which organizes them in such a way as to create unity. Here again we see a bizarre mottling of 
metaphysic. He claims his position is Aristotelian and Quinean; but being Quinean, he is reductionist 
about biology, and being reductionist about biology, and reducing biological life to a matter of physico-
chemical reactions, he cannot also be Aristotelian in the sense (as he claims) of attributing privileged 
substancehood to organisms. 
239 Van Inwagen 1990: 18 
240 Schaffer 2009: 348 
241 Aristotle Metaphysics 1077b32–3 
242 See Owen 1986: 275 (via Schaffer 2009: 352) 
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dismissive ‘yes’. He is concerned instead, with the further issue of how such things exist – 
or, more specifically, as Schaffer has it: his focus is on ontological dependence. 
 On the Aristotelian model, of the things that we encounter some depend on, or – 
in a more medieval idiolect – are ontologically posterior to others.244 Consider, for instance, 
the relation between a mouth and a smile, or a quality, like ‘green’ and a blade of grass – 
in these cases one thing is seen to depend upon another, not perhaps causally but (as is 
discussed in §3.4), essentially. There are different ways that items can ontologically depend 
upon others245 – they can inhere in, be posterior to, or be grounded on – and some of these 
will be examined in the pages below. But the important point here is that while the 
relation of ontological dependence is apparently absent in the Quinean programme,246 it 
is the mainstay of the Aristotelian framework; it is the aim of the Categories, broadly 
speaking, to mark out lines of dependence. A core issue for Aristotle – Schaffer 
contends – is determining what the primary substances are, those things that stand under 
(sub-stantia) the others. Substances are the focus here, rather than existents. 
 These methodological musings may seem somewhat obscure, but the 
intermediary point is that Carrara and Vermaas’ ‘Aristotelian anti-realistic conception’, 
which denies the existence of artefacts, is a Quinean corruption of the Aristotelian claim 
(unsurprising given the current dominance of the Quinean approach in the Anglophone 
world).247 Aristotle – on Schaffer’s reading, at least – would not have been concerned 
with whether or not to include artefacts in his ontology. Rather, the question that 
troubled him, and to which it seems he found a positive answer, was: are they ontologically 
posterior to other entities? Or, are they substances? 
 Crucially, this is the level on which Wiggins engages with the puzzles of artefact 
identity.248 Nowhere does he ask whether artefacts exist. Rather, his interest lies in 
whether the worries above imperil the thought that artefacts are substances. Having 
outlined the Theseus’s ship narrative, he remarks that it seemingly drives us towards the 
‘fearful outcome… anticipated in the high metaphysical tradition of substance that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Aristotle Physics 206b13–16 
244 For an overview of Aristotle’s notions of priority and posteriority and how they relate to dependence, see 
Gill 1989: 3ff 
245 See, e.g. Correia 2003: 1013 
246 Schaffer argues that the Quineans have attempted to eschew talk of dependence, yet remain implicitly 
committed to it – see his 2009: §1. 
247 Schaffer 2009: 347 
248 It is interesting that the Aristotelian analysis of dependence is enjoying something of a revival at the 
moment. Philosophers like Schaffer and Fine are seen to be effecting a ‘significant reorientation’ (Koslicki 
2012b: 186) in the analytic sphere, suggesting that questions in metaphysics are more profitably 
understood as questions about dependence. 
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seeks… to demote artefacts from the status of genuine entities…’249 Clarifying this 
remark – he refers specifically to Aristotle, who ‘maintained that natural things are the 
real beings par excellence to which everything else is secondary’.250 
 
§1.3.d. Wiggins’ view of the substancehood of artefacts 
 
Ultimately, the Quineanism in Carrara and Vermaas’ analysis might be rephrased in 
terms of issues about ontological dependence (indeed, Schaffer’s contention is that such 
analyses presuppose these metaphysical relations).251 But even so, would they be right to 
attribute any form of this Aristotelian view to Wiggins? He recognises the issues, and the 
possible demotion of things like clocks and computers; but does he deny their ‘genuine’ 
substancehood? And does this mean that he sees them to be ontologically inferior to 
natural substances? This is how both Losonsky and Rudder Baker read him. In his ‘The 
Nature of Artifacts’,252 Losonsky writes: 
 
David Wiggins defends the view… that ‘artificial machines’ are not ‘true 
substantial unities’…253 
  
More explicitly, in her ‘The Shrinking Difference between Artifacts and Natural 
Objects’,254 Rudder Baker states: 
 
I am not claiming that Wiggins denies that there exist artifacts, only that 
he distinguishes between natural and artifactual kinds in ways that may be 
taken to imply the ontological inferiority of artifacts.255 
 
In this section, the focus will be on Rudder Baker’s analysis of Wiggins. On her reading, 
Wiggins holds that natural items are genuine substances and that artefacts are not, and are 
in some way ontologically inferior to them. Having constructed this reading she attempts 
to demolish it, stating that Wiggins’ grounds for distinguishing artefacts from natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Wiggins 2001: 99–100 
250 Ibid: 100 n.25 
251 Schaffer 2009: §1–2 
252 Losonsky 1990 
253 Ibid: 81 
254 Rudder Baker 2008 (this paper is a reworking of her 2004) 
255 Ibid: n.5 
	   59	  
things either fail completely, or fail to legislate any relevant ontological distinction 
between the two kinds. Her interpretation of Wiggins will be questioned and rejected. 
 Rudder Baker claims that Wiggins presents five possible ways of distinguishing 
between natural objects and artefacts, in such a way that the former can be conceived in 
some way ontologically ‘superior’, or more ‘genuine’ than the latter. They are: 
 
(1) Fs are genuine substances only if Fs have an internal principle of 
activity. 
(2) Fs are genuine substances only if there are laws that apply to Fs as 
such, or there could be a science of Fs. 
(3) Fs are genuine substances only if whether something is an F is not 
determined merely by an entity’s satisfying a description. 
(4) Fs are genuine substances only if Fs have an underlying intrinsic 
essence. 
(5) Fs are genuine substances only if the identity and persistence of Fs is 
independent of any intentional activity.256 
 
Immediately striking is that, while (1)–(5) undoubtedly connect in some way to the 
condition that was found in S&SR, they represent a dismantling of Wiggins’ original 
position.257 Wiggins’ view is that natural things are those that have principles of activity 
founded in law-like dispositions that form the basis for extension-involving sortal 
identification.258 Thus, having a principle of activity (Rudder Baker’s (1)) is intimately 
related to whether or not there can be a science – in the sense of an a posteriori 
investigation – of an item (2). Equally, the intrinsic essence of a substance is taken, by 
Wiggins, to encapsulate the principle of activity, so (1) and (4) do not seem to be 
separable either. It is not necessary to spell out all the connections between (1)–(5) in 
depth; the general point is that one might have initial concerns with another ‘piecemeal’ 
analysis of Wiggins’ work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Rudder Baker 2008: 3–4 
257 This is made explicit by Rudder Baker in her 2008: n.5: ‘All the conditions either follow from, or are 
part of, the basic distinction that Wiggins draws between natural objects and artifacts. There is a complex 
condition that natural objects allegedly satisfy and artifacts do not: “...a particular constituent x belongs to 
a natural kind, or is a natural thing, if and only if x has a principle of activity founded in lawlike 
dispositions and propensities that form the basis for extension involving sortal identification(s) which will 
answer truly the question “what is x?”’ 
258 Wiggins 2001: 89 
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 One may also wonder at what point the ontological judgement ‘Fs are genuine 
substances only if…’ enters Rudder Baker’s reading? Wiggins is focussed on 
substancehood, but he talks of ‘exemplifying the category of substance’, not of being 
‘genuine substances’ – and it is nowhere in her essay made explicit where this comes 
from. (This is returned to, below.) 
These then are two preliminary concerns. They can be twinned with some 
equally general worries about her rejection of (1)–(5). In her paper, she claims that 
Wiggins’ distinction between artefacts and natural things is misguidedly grounded in one 
or more of (1)–(5). Her tactic is to go through each in turn and present counter-
examples to show why these conditions fail to mark a genuine distinction, and why, 
consequently, they cannot support any ontological disparity between artefacts and 
natural items.259 A brief survey of the counter-examples suggests, again, that her analysis 
misinterprets Wiggins’ particular construal of notions like ‘activity’, and ‘science’, and 
‘essence’. (And again, the following objections are only intended as vague indicators of a 
more general worry with her interpretation.) 
In refuting (1), she uses ‘a heat-seeking missile’260 as an instance of an artefact 
that possesses an internal ‘principle of activity’. Yet it is by no means clear that this 
captures what Wiggins means by a ‘principle of activity’261 – that is, a nomologically 
grounded mode of being, about which we may learn unknown and potentially surprising 
facts. Heat-seeking missiles lack nomological depth. There are related difficulties with 
Rudder Baker’s counter-example to (2), where she offers ‘computer science’262 as a case 
where artefacts are the subject of scientific inquiry. Computer science, presumably, is not 
the kind of a posteriori enterprise that Wiggins is thinking of, which attempts to fill out the 
theoretical descriptions holding between exemplars (again, it seems unlikely that we will 
discover new facts about Amstrads, in the way that we might with natural things). 
Further, in rejecting (3), Rudder Baker offers ‘gold’ as an example of a natural 
thing263 – but one may well question whether this is a sortal term, in the sense laid out 
above, since (like ‘water’ and ‘air’) it fails to take numerical modifiers. (Also in response 
to (3), she describes a situation where archaeologists believe two artefacts to be of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Rudder Baker 2008: 4–6 
260 Ibid: 4 
261 ‘[A] delicate self-regulating balance of serially linked enzymatic degradative and synthesizing chemical 
reactions [that enables an object] to renew [itself] on the molecular level at the expense of those 
surroundings, such renewal taking place under a law-determined variety of conditions in a determinate 
pattern of growth and development towards, and/or persistence in, some particular form’ Wiggins 2001: 
86 
262 Rudder Baker 2008: 5 
263 Ibid: 5 
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same kind, without knowing what they are (i.e. whether or not they were used in battle 
or in religious rituals), substantiating the thought that artefacts can be determined 
indexically rather than by satisfying a description. Significantly, however, picking out 
these archaeological finds indexically will not allow the archaeologist to pick them out as 
artefacts rather than, potentially, parts of artefacts.) 
Her reading of Wiggins’ analysis of ‘natural kind’ and ‘intrinsic essence’ in (4) is 
also problematic. She denies that natural things necessarily have an underlying intrinsic 
essence, and cites wings (of birds and insects) as counter-examples to the fourth claim. 
This however, misconstrues Wiggins’ view of natural kinds and natural substances – in 
anticipation of the arguments in chapter 4, one prominent line of interpretation finds 
him rejecting the idea that organs, or body-parts register as substances. (The place of 
‘intrinsic essence’ in his work is also discussed in more detail below.) 
With these concerns raised, an intermediate point can be made. These listed 
counter-examples, as well as being ill-fitting, indicate that Rudder Baker has a prior 
understanding of the distinction between natural things and artefacts against which she is 
measuring Wiggins’ putative conditions. She claims that the distinctions described in (1)–
(4) fail because there are natural things and artefacts that are not accommodated by this 
suppressed view. It is in (5) that this prior understanding of the distinction is brought to 
the fore. She states that, unlike (1)–(4), the fifth does distinguish between artefactual and 
natural kinds.264 
 
An artifact’s being the kind of thing that it is depends on human intentions.265 
 
And, elsewhere: 
 
Artifacts are objects intentionally made to serve a given purpose; natural 
objects come into being without human intervention.266 
 
For Rudder Baker ‘artefacts’ are intentionally made to serve a particular purpose.267 Hers 
is a statement of, what was called above, the ‘standard view’ of the distinction between 
natural things and artefacts – and she goes on to claim that Wiggins must turn to (5) to 
undergird his artefactual/natural distinction: the independence from human intentions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Rudder Baker 2008: 6 
265 Ibid: 6 
266 Ibid: 1 
267 Ibid: 1 
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determines the difference between artefacts and natural things. For Rudder Baker, the 
ontological disparity she finds in Wiggins can only be based on this fifth condition: 
artefacts are ontologically inferior because we made them – they depend, in some way, 
on the human mind. 
Yet this critical method, and indeed the generalizing found in Vermaas and 
Carrara, fails to register the important point that Wiggins’ actual condition is intended to 
be stipulative.268 Wiggins demonstrably avoids endorsing the standard view – a point he 
makes explicit in the texts to which Baker, Vermaas and Carrara refer. He states 
explicitly that his distinction does not map onto the distinction between fabricated 
objects which are the products of human minds, and natural objects which are not: 
 
[A] particular continuant x belongs to a natural kind, or is a natural thing, 
if and only if x has a principle of activity founded in lawlike dispositions 
and propensities that form the basis for extension-involving sortal 
identification(s) which will answer truly the question ‘what is x’? …it is 
not the question of whether a thing was fabricated but rather the 
difference between satisfying and not satisfying this condition that makes 
the fundamental distinction. Loosely and because there is no other handy 
term, I shall continue to call objects that fail this crucial condition 
‘artefacts’. But this is without prejudice to the question… of the 
possibility (which I have no wish to prejudge) of the artificial synthesis of 
natural things.269 
 
He specifically recognizes the possibility of artificially (intentionally) synthesized natural 
objects (as in the quotation above).270 He also accommodates artefactual readings of 
non-man-made objects like wasp’s nests, and India rubber balls.271 Similarly, he holds 
that some artefacts on the standard view – like works of art272 – have a nomological depth 
beyond that of e.g. chairs, and are less ‘artefactual’ as a result. Rudder Baker’s is a 
misinterpretation of the distinction Wiggins draws and her critique, which attempts to 
show how Wiggins’ account fails to correspond to the standard view, misses the point. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 This is clear from his 1980 (89) and his 2001 (89) though, as discussed below, he examines the 
standard view in his 1995. 
269 Found in Wiggins 2001: 89 
270 Wiggins 2001: 90 (also e.g. his 1996 ‘Reply to Snowdon’, and his 1980, chapter 6) 
271 Ibid: 90 
272 Ibid: 136–139 
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 On Baker’s reading, Wiggins sees artefacts to be dependent on human minds. 
Further, she holds this to be the basis for a metaphysical distinction in Wiggins’ work: 
artefacts are mind-dependent, and thus not ‘genuine substances’, in contrast to natural 
things which are consequently ontologically superior. And perhaps she is right to deny that 
mind-dependence is metaphysically relevant here273 – but this criticism does not apply to 
Wiggins’ analysis. In the next section, this point is precisified by a closer analysis of 
Wiggins’ discussion of the substance concept, and the elision that Baker makes between 
‘genuine’ substancehood and ontological superiority is rejected. 
 
§1.3.e. Wiggins’ view of substance 
 
The following interpretation is guided by comments in Wiggins’ paper ‘Substance’.274 
Ostensibly an introductory essay, but one of impressive complexity, it starts by 
explaining Aristotle’s use of the term ‘substance’ (or its correlates ousia, on hupokeimenon, 
etc.), and situates it firmly within the tradition that Schaffer, as above, contrasts with the 
Quinean programme.275 It goes on to respond to the empiricist rejection of the notion, 
and in doing so, encompasses the issue of the substancehood of artefacts. 
 Wiggins states that among our core concepts, alongside our notion of sameness, is 
the concept of substance. When we look to our everyday practices we see that they are 
premised on the primitive idea of a ‘a persisting and somehow basic object of reference 
that is there to be discovered in perception and thought…’276 Here, I quote liberally: 
 
Salient among the things that we have to recognize, if we are to make sense 
of the world, are the substances.277 
 
There is a central thought in our conceptual scheme which we do not 
know how to do without, that we can gradually amass and correct a larger 
and larger amount of information about one and the same thing, the same 
subject, and can come to understand better and better in this way how 
these properties intelligibly cohere or why they arise together.278 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Rudder Baker 2008: 7–8 
274 Wiggins 1995 
275 Wiggins 1995: 214ff 
276 Ibid: 214 
277 Ibid: 216 
278 Ibid: 216 
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Their claim is a claim on our practical and theoretical reason. Everything 
conspires to force them upon us if we have the slightest concerns to find 
our way about the world or understand anything at all about how it 
works.279 
 
Wiggins’ descriptive approach elucidates the concept of substance by turning first to the 
primitive notion he finds underlying our practices. From the outset, therefore, the notion 
of substancehood is supposed to be attuned to the world-view of the human inquirer.280 
As is typical of the descriptive approach, there is a blurring between ontological and 
epistemological issues: 
 
For us, the importance of the category of substance… is not so much 
ontological as relative to our epistemological circumstances and the 
conditions under which we have to undertake inquiry. These circumstances 
and conditions determine where we have to begin in order to find our way 
about, in order to designate spatial and temporal landmarks, and in order 
to find workable, dependable, low-grade generalizations about how 
identifiable classes of things come into being, persist and behave.281 
 
We turn to how the substance concept functions in our thoughts to elucidate this 
metaphysical notion. And – as has been emphasized – this elucidation is one strand in 
Wiggins’ wider connective analysis, and proceeds in concert with elucidations of other 
central concepts, relating to identity and individuation. Some of these connections are set 
out above, and some of the elements of Wiggins’ elucidation of substance appear in the 
proximal quotations. 
One central component of the concept is that the continuity of a substance 
cannot be understood as bare continuity. Rather, it is implicit in our individuative 
practices to see in the substances that we pick out, specific laws, or principles of activity.282 
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280 Ibid: 217 
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282 Thus, ‘[s]ubstance, so understood, and activity… are notions made for one another.’ Wiggins 1979: 315. 
See also 1995: 218 
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Wiggins’ sees our pre-theoretical substance concept as encapsulating some notion of 
entities that ‘have a source of change or principle of activity within them’.283 
Following Strawson and Aristotle, Wiggins also focuses on the grammatical 
distinction between subject and predicate when analysing this pre-theoretical concept (the 
‘subject’ being the element of the sentence (like ‘Socrates’) that refers to a particular 
thing, where the predicate refers to a general characteristic borne by that thing (e.g. ‘is 
wise’)).284 For us to engage with the world in the way that we do (Wiggins claims) we 
must pick out these items which submit to predication without being predicated: 
 
A substance …is something that is neither in anything else nor predicable 
of anything else…285 
 
Referring back to the discussion above, and viewing things through the descriptivist’s 
lens, one can see how this grammatical distinction can be taken to exemplify some form 
of ontological dependence. And this seems to be the thought expressed in the following 
passage from ‘Substance’: 
 
Among the different subjects you can talk about, some are and some are 
not in others in the way in which colours and their determinate shades 
are in things. Some are and some are not in things in the way in which 
knowledge in general or some specific knowledge… is in things… To the 
extent that anything is not in other things in this way, it enjoys a certain 
autonomy.286 
 
Looking to our everyday practices, Wiggins finds that we see some things – colours and 
so forth – to be in other items, to depend in some manner upon them. Substances are 
those things upon which other things depend (and here, at least, ‘ontological 
dependence’ seems to be understood as a basic relation in our conceptual scheme). 
 A third central element which Wiggins divines in our substance concept is that of 
‘internal cohesiveness’287 or ‘real unity’.288 In our dealings, we treat these basic objects as 	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284 See Strawson 1974 (see also Snowdon 1998 for a commentary). The grammatical feature – which Burtt 
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scheme, and thus (by Strawson’s descriptivism) to stand as an indication of metaphysical structure. 
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being more than collections of interchangeable parts. This thought (examined in greater 
depth in §3.4) can also be construed in terms of a type of ontological dependence;289 we 
see certain things as being prior to their parts (we understand hearts, for example, by 
reference to the role they play as parts of the whole organism). In this connection, 
Wiggins quotes Spinoza: 
 
By a substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through 
itself: that whose concept makes no essential reference to anything else.290 
 
This is a cursory sketch – to be developed below – but provides (hopefully) a clearer 
sense of Wiggins’ substance project. His aim is to draw out the interrelated elements of the 
substance concept which underwrites our everyday practices. And – significantly – he sees 
that as we bring this concept to bear on the world around us, we find that some items 
realize these elements to lesser and greater degrees. Some objects more obviously 
‘exemplify the category of substance’.291 For Wiggins, it is not a ‘yes/no’ matter of either 
being or not being a substance (this much is recognized by Baker, who talks of 
‘inferiority’, and it is missed in Vermaas and Carrara’s binary picture). 
 
It will relax the intellectual cramp that threatens if, instead of trying to 
decide the question whether artefacts as a class are or are not substances, 
we resolve to reinterpret the question and see it as a question about the 
distance at which this or that particular artefact (or this or that group of 
artefacts) lies from the central case in respect of durability, internal 
cohesiveness, having a relatively self-contained principle of activity, and 
exemplifying some simple law of change.292 
 
It is important to note that in this passage, from ‘Substance’, Wiggins is writing about 
artefacts as they are defined on the standard view – and it demonstrates that, in contrast to 
Baker’s assessment, Wiggins may well hold that artefacts (on the standard view) can 
exemplify the category of substance.293 Nor should this be surprising, Wiggins suggests, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Wiggins 1980: 98 
289 The connection between ‘ontological dependence’ and ‘priority’ is articulated well by Gill (in her 1989). 
290 Ethics, first part, definition III, quoted in Wiggins 1995: 223 
291 Wiggins 2001: 90 
292 Wiggins 1995: 243 
293 Wiggins, for instance, will see intentionally produced, synthetic organisms and certain artworks, to be 
substances. Wiggins 2001: 89–90 
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since fabricated objects are made in such a way that they register as basic persisting 
objects in our pre-theoretical conceptual scheme. 
 
[T]he solidity, durability, and internal cohesiveness of a vast 
preponderance of our artefacts, some of them outlasting their makers 
(who certainly were substances) by millennia, would be a standing 
reproach to any would-be puristic ruling to the effect that artefacts stand 
at too great a distance from the natural continuants that furnished us with 
our original paradigm of substance. Indeed such a ruling would represent 
in at least one way an affront to the spirit of the original conception. For 
not only do artefacts submit to predication without being predicated, not 
only can they furnish us with a ‘this’ and furnish (insofar as we know 
what this means) something ‘separable’. Their usefulness and 
effectiveness in the performance of the functions signals and celebrates 
the very same evolving understanding of the way ordinary perceptible 
things behave that made the notions of substance, of nature, and of 
substances with their natures so interesting and important to us in the 
first place.294, 295 
 
Are artefacts substances? The question is blunt and both ill fits the subtle elucidatory 
analysis Wiggins offers of substance and neglects the distinction he draws between 
artefacts and natural items. Are artefacts genuine substances? This is better, but the binary 
distinction between genuine and non-genuine still fails to correspond to the spectrum of 
substancehood that Wiggins articulates. What then is his view? By definition, ‘artefacts’ 
do not have principles of activity but principles of functioning (or operation).296 
Depending on the complexity and nomological depth of the principle of functioning, 
artefacts may more or less clearly exemplify the category of substance – but definitionally 
they are less substantial than natural things, which possess a principle of activity.297 
 Perhaps, in some respects, Rudder Baker is right; Wiggins does see artefacts to be 
less substantial than natural things. Yet one must read this metaphysical pronouncement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Wiggins 1995: 242 
295 Wiggins encourages us to think of the ‘sense of dislocation that would result from our withholding the 
status of substance’ from them. Wiggins 1995: 242 
296 Wiggins 2001: 89 
297 ‘Substances are things that have a source of change or principle of activity within them.’ (Wiggins 
1995: 219) 
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carefully. It is not difficult to take it to mean that items which fall further from the 
paradigm substances, and exemplify that category less well, are somehow less ‘real’ than 
natural things – this is what is suggested by Rudder Baker’s talk of ‘ontological 
inferiority’.298 It is, however, an interpretation that sits awkwardly alongside the pluralistic 
elements of Wiggins’ project. 
 The quotations above indicate that Wiggins does see certain things – colours, for 
example – to be ‘ontologically inferior’ to the objects in which they inhere, insofar as 
‘inferiority’ is read as ‘posteriority’. Thus there is some kind of hierarchy in his 
metaphysics. And if he held, as Rudder Baker believes he does, that artefacts are, as a 
class, mind-dependent on natural objects (us) there might be some basis for this thought. 
But he does not hold this. Wiggins has no taste for desert landscapes. His metaphysics is 
verdant and fertile; therein we find substances – whose metaphysical character has been 
sketched above – and properties that inhere in those substances. And there are other 
entities besides, which are not ‘posterior’/‘inferior’ to substances, yet have distinct 
metaphysical characters – among them are ‘concrete universals’ (introduced below). 
Moreover, his metaphysics is not in the thrall of the exclusionary ‘ambitious’ 
descriptivism some find in Strawson.299 He makes no attempt to discredit the structures 
or entities described in other metaphysical frameworks. This pluralism is clarified in §3.3, 
but the essence of his view is that there are different metaphysical frameworks or models 
which partition reality in various ways – models that posit four-dimensional objects, or 
mereological simples rather than substances – and those these models may be alien to one 
another,300 they may yet be cotenable.301 Concrete universals, four-dimensional objects and 
mereological simples may not be substances but that does not make them in anyway 
‘ontologically inferior’ (in the sense of ‘posteriority’), or less ‘real’. 
 There is much here in need of explication, but the general point may be roughly 
put: artefacts may not exemplify most perfectly the category of substance, yet this should 
not prejudice us against their reality. Furthermore, a parting proposal may be entered 
here (to be developed in the pages that follow). The richness of Wiggins’ metaphysical 
language allows him to go beyond this relatively uninformative pronouncement about 
substancehood. He is led to ask: if artefacts are not paradigm substances, what are they? 
He has the resources to examine their metaphysical character in greater depth. Among 
the things he might say about these entities, which possess principles of functioning, is 	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that they submit (like substances) to predication, and – more distinctively – that their parts 
are conceived as being ontologically independent of the whole (this latter feature explaining 
why it is that we care as little as we do about artefactual part replacement).302 This 
description of their metaphysical character is taken up again in chapter 4, but for now 
the point is made. To be a substance is not a yes/no matter – nor does substancehood 
correspond to ontological superiority. 
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§1.4. Conclusion 
 
The D theory is – as Wiggins has it – a seamless web,303 and one in which the impolitic 
reader may become caught and confused. The aim in this chapter has been to emphasize 
the different strands that constitute it, and their connections. It has been shown how, 
consonant with his descriptivist methodology, Wiggins develops a sortal theory of 
identity and individuation that attempts to articulate the reciprocity between those two 
concepts. The above exposition also sets out his account of the substance concept, its 
centrality in our individuative practices, and how different items – artefactual or natural 
– may exemplify it to lesser and greater degrees. 
 Simultaneously, this chapter has identified variant readings of Wiggins’ work. 
Snowdon’s attempt to detach Wiggins’ thoughts about identity and individuation was 
seen to fail – in large part because of his misinterpretation of ‘individuation’ – and his 
critique of what he saw to be Wiggins’ ‘psychological’ thesis was consequently 
dismissed. Vermaas and Carrara interpreted Wiggins as denying the existence of artefacts, 
and this was read as a Quinean corruption of his neo-Aristotelian position. Relatedly, 
Rudder Baker’s critique of Wiggins’ view of artefacts was seen to be based on a 
misattribution of the standard view of the artefact/natural item distinction. It was also 
seen to neglect the gradations of substancehood that Wiggins describes, and to make a 
contentious connection between substancehood and ontological superiority. Wiggins’ pluralism 
allows him to deny that artefacts are paradigm substances without committing him to 
the claim that they are ‘ontologically inferior’ or less ‘real’. 
 Another aim here has been to give reasons for these variant readings. One is the 
opacity of Wiggins’ writing – though it has been emphasized as well that a systematic, 
descriptivist work of this kind is perhaps inevitably intricate. Another is the fact that his 
project sits somewhat outside the Analytic mainstream, which deploys a ‘piece-meal’ 
approach to philosophical questions. Commentators like Snowdon and Rudder Baker, 
who attempt to isolate the individual components of his theory, risk missing the 
connections that hold between these different elements. Thirdly, and more generally, it 
has been suggested that misinterpretations result from an ahistorical analysis of 
philosophical questions. Treatments like Vermaas and Carrara, which fail to situate 
Wiggins’ within the appropriate tradition and use metaphysical terms like ‘exist’ 
uncritically, will not be able to appropriately engage, or exposit the work in question. 
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 This chapter has also raised some points for further investigation. Wiggins is 
seen to rely heavily on the viability of conceptual invariance, and this is discussed more fully 
in the next chapter, with respect to the person concept. At the end of §1.3 mention was 
also made of his metaphysical pluralism – and this is set out and examined in §3.3. 
Questions were also raised about the distinction between artefacts and natural objects, 
and it was suggested that the metaphysical character of artefacts may be fleshed out in 
terms of the ontological dependence of their parts – this will bear on the discussions of 
biological mechanism and transplantation in chapters 3 and 4. 
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THE HUMAN BEING THEORY  
 
The theory of individuation that has been set out in the preceding chapter finds 
distinctive expression in Wiggins’ account of personal identity. In chapter 7 of S&SR (a 
greatly revised version of the chapter that appeared in S&S) he considers identity 
judgments about persons, and elaborates the procedures by which we trace ourselves 
through space and time.304 
 In accordance with the method outlined above, Wiggins claims that we need to 
settle on the sortal under which we subsume ourselves before we can examine our 
principle of activity (and from there, our persistence conditions). What develops is his 
human being theory – a position novel enough, and subtle enough, to invite multiple, 
sometimes contradictory, readings. Eric Olson interprets the human being theory as a 
version of the Neo-Lockean account, whereby we are seen, fundamentally, to be 
persons – not animals – and our persistence conditions are those of these psychological 
beings. In contrast, Harold Noonan and Peter Unger position Wiggins as an ‘animalist’, 
i.e. as holding that we are fundamentally human animals – not persons – with the 
concomitant biological mode of being. It is the aim of the first section of this chapter to 
show what these readings capture, and where they falter. 
 In essence, these divergent interpretations miss Wiggins’ crucial claim that we 
are fundamentally both persons and biological beings. This is the thought that lies at the 
heart of the human being theory – one that is simultaneously productive and controversial. 
Aside from the other worries it may excite, one is bound to wonder – as Snowdon305 
does – how we can be, fundamentally, more than one sort of thing. Wiggins himself notes 
that his proposal appears to provoke the worries with relativity with which he started his 
inquiry. Whatever else we may say, ‘a person’ means something different from ‘a human 
being’, and hence being one is different from being the other – they have different laws 
of activity, and thus different persistence conditions.306 To accept that we pick ourselves 
out, correctly, and fundamentally, as both is to accept the relativity of identity, anathema 
to the Leibnizian formulation of identity that Wiggins defends. 
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305 Snowdon 1996: 35 
306 ‘Well, someone may say, whatever truths there may be to discover about this, the expression “a person” 
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 In §2.2 Wiggins’ ingenious response to this concern is laid out. He claims that, 
though the terms ‘person’ and ‘human being’ differ in sense (just as ‘equus caballus’ and 
‘horse’ capture different aspects of that animal),307 and though they may even differ in 
extension,308 the concepts to which these terms allude are in some way concordant.309 Our 
understanding of what a person is interweaves somehow with our understanding of 
what a human being is. The result of his argument here is briefly stated in an opening 
passage from chapter 7 of S&SR: 
 
[I]n so far as they assign any, the concepts person and human being assign 
the same underlying principle of individuation to A and to B and that that 
principle, the human being principle, is the one that we have to consult in 
order to move towards the determination of the truth or falsehood of the 
judgment that A is B…310 
 
The conceptual consilience Wiggins divines between person and human being allows him to 
accommodate the insights of both neo-Lockeanism and animalism. It also provides a 
generative method for answering the puzzles of the personal identity debate. Assessing 
the identity conditions of persons leads into a well-trodden but nonetheless prickly 
thicket of philosophy; Wiggins’ advice is to turn to the concordant concept human being 
to avoid it. Both concepts assign the same underlying principle of individuation – but in 
the latter case it is less obscure.311 
 The aim of §2.3 is to problematize the connection Wiggins discerns between 
person and human being. There are three central struts that support his argument here, 
which emerge out of his elucidation of the person concept. The first is a Strawsonian 
point that our concept of a psychological being seems to allude to a biological substrate. 
The second relates to the semantics of the term ‘person’ – we use it, he argues, as though 
it were a natural kind word. The third strut is an argument from interpretation and 
indexicality, which develops out of Davidsonian thoughts about the conditions that must 
hold for us to be able to interact with one another in the way that we do. In each, 
Wiggins’ focus is a putatively pre-theoretical concept, an element – like substance – of our 
conceptual scheme. Yet the contention below is that his semantic analysis misses its target. 	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308 Wiggins 2001: 193 
309 Wiggins 1996: 248 
310 Wiggins 2001: 194 
311 Ibid: 193–4 
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Our use of the term ‘person’ – inflected by cultural bias – is not a reliable basis for an 
examination of our (human) conceptual scheme. This point is made, in §2.3.a., by 
reference to a genealogy of the notion of a person (supported by Marcel Mauss’s 
historical study). The object of Wiggins’ semantic analysis is shown to be a cultural 
accretion, devoid of any unifying rationale – a conception, as Wiggins would have it, and 
not the concept itself.312 
 The genealogical study demonstrates how cultural biases intrude on Wiggins’ 
descriptivist project, and in §2.3.b. it is suggested that while the Strawsonian argument 
and the argument from interpretation may grant insight into the structure of our 
conceptual scheme, they do not substantiate Wiggins’ claim that this primitive concept – 
which underwrites our everyday dealings with others – is a substance sortal concept. This is a 
culturally local bias that appears, it seems, out of his semantic analysis. It is proposed, in 
line with comments by David Bakhurst, that the pre-theoretical person concept does not 
necessarily subsume entities for every moment of their existence. The fact that person 
may be a phase sortal, while human being is a substance sortal is taken to undermine the 
connection that Wiggins sees between the two.  
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§2.1. Neo-Lockean and animalist readings 
 
In Book II of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke defines a person as: 
 
 …a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places…313  
 
This definition is the linchpin for his account of ‘personal identity’, i.e., that which 
constitutes the identity of persons through space and time. It has been the subject of 
varied critiques but remains the lodestone for contemporary Anglophone discussions of 
personal identity. 
Prefiguring Wiggins, Locke proceeds along sortalist lines, and divines an 
intimate relation between understanding what sort of a thing is and what it takes for 
such things to persist. For Locke we are fundamentally persons, that is thinking, self-
conscious beings; so self-consciousness is a criterial property for personhood, and 
consequently (for the sortalist) stands as the central condition for identity. Our survival, 
as self-conscious beings, depends on the continuation of our consciousness – and 
ultimately, for Locke, this continued consciousness is evidenced by the self-recording 
faculty of experiential memory. A memory of an earlier experience indicates that an 
individual is continuous with (identical to) the person that experienced it: 
 
[A]s far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 
action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.314 
 
Wiggins’ work emerges in dialogue with Locke’s. And – importantly – he takes the 
Lockean account to disclose an important insight about the kinds of beings we 
fundamentally are. In S&S he writes: 
 
There is something so interesting about the notion that a person is an 
object essentially aware of its progress and persistence through time, and 
peculiar among all other kinds of thing by virtue of the fact that its 
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experiential memory of what it was in the past; and this notion is so 
closely related, not only to profound contentions of Leibniz and Kant,3 
but also to deeply ingrained ordinary ideas of life as something to be 
reviewed and looked back upon; that I believe we should look with some 
suspicion at the contention that a continuity of consciousness condition 
of personal identity is irreducibly circular. 
 
3 Cf. Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique XXXIV…; J. Bennett, Kant’s Analytic, Cambridge 
1963, p.117, ‘the notion of oneself is necessarily that of the possessor of a history: I can 
judge that this is how it is with me now, only if I can also judge that that is how it was 
with me then. Self-consciousness can coexist with amnesia – but there could not be a 
self-conscious person suffering from perpetually renewed amnesia such that he could at 
no time make judgments about how he was at an earlier time.315 
 
This thought about the importance of experiential memory is restated and modified in 
S&SR: 
 
[W]hat I am in the present (‘my present self’) always lies under the 
cognitive and affective influence of what I remember having been or 
having done or undergone in the past, no less than of that which I 
intend or am striving to make real in the present or the future. But if it is 
the nature of persons to be remembering beings whose conception of 
what they themselves are is all of a piece with their experiential memory, 
then some constitutive connexion ought to be expected (it will be said) 
between their experiential memory and their identity.316 
 
In the first quotation Wiggins suggests, along the Kantian lines contained within the 
footnote, that we cannot but experience ourselves as remembering beings. It is part of 
our conceptual framework that earlier thoughts underpin our present ones. As the 
second quotation makes clear, he weakens, or at least does not explicitly state this 
position in later work; but he continues to view remembering and memory as central, 
significant elements of our nature – and in doing so aligns himself with Locke. Add to 
this his overt description of his work as ‘neo-Lockean’ (in e.g. ‘The Person as Object of 
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Science…’),317 and it is unsurprising to find interpretations of his work as endorsing 
some kind of psychological, ‘neo-Lockean’ persistence condition for persons. It is for 
these reasons that Olson writes, in The Human Animal: 
 
Whereas my view is that psychological continuity is completely 
irrelevant, except derivatively, to our persistence, Wiggins insists that 
certain broadly mental capacities – sentience, desire, belief, motion, 
memory and others – are part of what it takes for a person to remain 
alive, and so to continue existing… Wiggins argues [that memory] is 
‘crucially relevant to our choice of continuity principle for determining the 
biographies of persons’… Although there is much in Wiggins’s work 
that I do not understand, his view seems to me to be a sophisticated 
version of the Psychological Approach.318 
 
The contention here, however, is that this is a misreading of Wiggins’ position. Wiggins 
does not take experiential memory to indicate anything about identity. He is sympathetic 
to Locke’s position (and in his earlier work perhaps more so), but he never goes so far 
as to endorse an exclusively psychological criterion of identity. He rejects the view that 
our survival stands or falls with continued consciousness – memory is not called on as 
evidence for survival. 
It is understandable that Olson – whose focus is on S&S, and an earlier paper, 
‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness…’319 – reads Wiggins as a supporter of 
Locke. In both texts, Wiggins carefully defends the Lockean thesis against various 
critical descendents of the objections raised by Joseph Butler in his First Dissertation.320 
But where Wiggins denies any circularity or absurdity in Locke’s consciousness 
criterion321 he denies too that memory can provide any significant basis for identity 
judgments, and ‘is doomed always to bring too little too late…’ to the analysis.322 (And 
though, of course, its publication followed Olson’s The Human Animal by four years, 
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S&SR explicitly distances itself from that earlier position, and recants any dubiety about 
Butler’s critique.323) 
Wiggins finds in Butler an insurmountable obstacle to the Lockean account. The 
famous objection, to which he pledges full support, runs thus: 
 
One should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal 
identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, 
any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which 
it presupposes.324 
 
The Butlerian thought, which appears obscurely in S&S and fully in S&SR, is that 
determination of a genuine memory invokes another account of identity, and so cannot 
constitute it.325 In S&SR (shorn of the previous arguments against absurdity and 
circularity) the point is demonstrated with an example case of putative remembering. 
Imagine, Wiggins writes, that we know that A once inadvertently caused a fire in the 
Chigwell College of Commerce. Suppose that B seems to remember doing this. That 
appears to suggest that B is A. However, Wiggins continues,  
 
B is only the same person as A if his seeming to remember is his really 
and truly remembering setting fire to the books stack.326 
 
It must be a genuine memory.327 But how can this genuineness be substantiated? How 
can it be established that B is not, for example, subject to some bizarre hallucination, or 
suffering delusions? Here we reach the nub of Butler’s point, as Wiggins reads it: 
 
Where someone appears to remember starting that fire, they can’t be right unless they 
were indeed there at the fire.328  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 ‘…the new chapter on personal identity, focuses on human beinghood, and recants anything I have 
ever said against Bishop Butler’s objection to Locke’s account of personal identity.’ Wiggins 2001: xiii (see 
also 204 n.12) This shift helps to account for his positioning of himself as a ‘neo-Lockean’ in the earlier 
work, but not the later. 
324 Butler 1736 
325 Cf. Wiggins 1976: 142f, 1980: 161ff, and 2001: 203ff 
326 Wiggins 2001: 204 
327 N.b. this worry appears in Wiggins 1976, and 1980, as the concern that ‘C* offers no account of error’. 
E.g. Wiggins 1976: 138 
328 Wiggins 2001: 204 (original italics) 
	   79	  
Which is to say another account of identity must be invoked to explain what it is for 
someone to do something, and then genuinely remember doing it. As is discussed in 
§2.2.a., this thought segues into a positive thesis about our spatio-temporal continuity 
being understood by reference to some material foundation – and Wiggins subsequently 
claims that this material foundation can only be an animal – specifically a human being. 
The intermediary point here, however, is simply that Olson’s characterization of 
Wiggins as endorsing an essentially ‘psychological’ criterion of identity does not, and 
cannot, correspond to Wiggins’ Butlerian critique of Locke. 
 
§2.1.a. Quasi-memory 
 
Before turning to the material foundation, and the human being theory, it is necessary to 
note another avenue that this discussion of Butler opens up, and one which receives 
considerable attention in S&SR and the correlative secondary literature: the issue of 
quasi-memory. 
 As Wiggins points out, the most obvious way of distinguishing between real and 
apparent memories is to say that the genuine memory – and not the delusion – is of an 
experience the rememberer herself actually had; and as was evident to Butler, this creates 
a circularity in Locke’s account. Yet Sydney Shoemaker and Derek Parfit have argued 
that genuine memories and delusions can be distinguished by yet other means: it is not, 
they say, about who had the original experience, but rather about how the subsequent 
memory-experience was caused that determines whether or not a memory is delusional.329 
Thus, Napoleon’s memory-like experiences of Waterloo are not delusional because they 
are causally connected to the events at Waterloo in the right way, while the same is not 
true of the memory-like experiences of George IV (who was never there, but believed 
he was).330 So, Parfit writes: 
 
To answer this objection, we can define a wider concept, quasi-memory. I 
have an accurate quasi-memory of a past experience if (1) I seem to 
remember having an experience, (2) someone did have this experience and 
(3) my apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right way, on the 
past experience.331 	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It is along these lines that some neo-Lockeans deny that memory-experiences 
presuppose identity (citing cases of memory-transplantation to show how an individual 
can have a non-delusional quasi-memory of someone else’s experience).332 By this means 
they hope to circumvent Butler’s circularity objection, and any reformulations by those 
like Wiggins. Consequently, a considerable portion of chapter 7 in S&SR is devoted to 
replying to this neo-Lockean line. 
While my aim here is only to acknowledge the discussion, it is helpful to briefly 
consider Wiggins’ response. Pointing to Parfit’s definition of quasi-memory he asks 
whether condition (3) can admit incomplete or imperfect or partially wrong or oddly produced 
memories as quasi-memories. (For these are things we surely have: you may remember 
your last birthday party, perhaps, but what clothes were you wearing, and who was 
there?) As Wiggins puts it, trenchantly: 
 
The thing we see that Parfit presents [in the passage above] is not a 
definition of ‘quasi-remember’ or ‘quasi-memory’ at all. It’s a definition 
(he himself announces that it is a definition) of ‘have an accurate quasi-
memory’. Inaccurate quasi-memory is not provided for.333 
 
It’s true that the neo-Lockean may well disagree with this (Shoemaker, certainly, seems 
to).334 In any case, quasi-memory is not the focus of the present work, and more paper 
will not be added to the reams already spent on it. As will be discussed in chapter 4, 
there are other, more interesting, disagreements between Wiggins and the neo-
Lockeans. 
 
§2.1.b. Against an ‘animalist’ reading 
 
The focus being put on this material/biological foundation, combined with the critique of 
Lockeanism (and neo-Lockeanism), suggests that Wiggins will ultimately endorse some 
variant of an ‘animalist’ thesis. In Olson’s dichotomous terms, he appears to propound a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Parfit gives the example of Jane, who agrees to have Paul’s memory-traces implanted in her brain 
(1984: 221) These kinds of science-fiction thought experiments are critiqued in §4.2. 
333 Wiggins 2001: 224 
334 See Wiggins’ and Shoemaker’s discussion in The Monist (Shoemaker 2004a, Wiggins 2004a, Shoemaker 
2004b, Wiggins 2004b) 
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‘biological’ theory, while rejecting a ‘psychological’ one.335 This is how Harold 
Noonan336 and Peter Unger337 both read him – i.e. as claiming that we are fundamentally 
human animals, and not fundamentally persons, and that our persistence conditions are 
those of the animals that we are. Yet this is another misreading, once again capturing 
some of the story, but not all. 
Wiggins certainly holds that we are, fundamentally, a kind of animal – specifically, 
members of the species homo sapiens. But as noted, he is also deeply impressed by the 
Lockean thought that we are conscious, remembering beings. The kind of picture 
outlined by the animalist, which denies that we are fundamentally persons, does, as 
Wiggins puts it, ‘insufficient justice to a line of reflection still prompted by John Locke’s 
account of these things: what I am in the present (‘my present self’) always lies under 
the cognitive and affective influence of what I remember having been or having done or 
undergone in the past, no less than of that which I intend or am striving to make real in 
the present or the future.’338 
Wiggins denies that continued consciousness is a condition for our survival 
(according to the human being theory we may survive in vegetative states) – but we are 
beings who typically have a rich psychology, who have potential (as will be discussed) 
for Bildung, who are, among other things, rememberers. The animalist account fails to 
capture these complexities, and Wiggins consequently disassociates himself from it. 
 A terminological point can be entered here. Despite the (relative) popularity of 
the term ‘human animal’, following the publication of Olson’s book in 1997, it does not 
appear in S&SR or in Wiggins’ subsequent work.339 Instead, Wiggins talks of ‘human 
beings’. The discussion above offers an explanation. The two terms differ in sense: the 
first refers to what, following Bakhurst, one may call a ‘mere animal’; the second, to 
biological beings that, as John McDowell puts it, are ‘at home in the space of reasons’.340 
Wiggins inclines towards ‘human beings’ because it does not restrict the area of inquiry 
to the biological (the ambit of ‘biological’ is discussed in chapter 3).341 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Olson 1997: 7ff 
336 Noonan 1998: 302 
337 Unger 1990: 120–123 
338 Wiggins 2001: 196 Note, though, that Wiggins nowhere explicitly talks about ‘animalism’. This passage 
appears as part of a defense of the human being theory, in which he denies that it neglects the Lockean 
concern with the psychological (as animalism, as construed, also does). 
339 Others use the term frequently to describe his view – even those who do not appear to position him as 
an animalist (e.g. Bakhurst 2005). 
340 McDowell 1994: 125. Bakhurst brings McDowell to bear (in his 2005) 
341 There is another potential reason why Wiggins prefers ‘human being’ to ‘human animal’. ‘Human 
being’ has a different linguistic pedigree to ‘human animal’ – where the latter is a technical term that exists 
almost exclusively within philosophical discourse, the former is not. It is the former, then, which is 
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 Wiggins is not a neo-Lockean (pace Olson), but nor is he an animalist (pace 
Noonan and Unger). He agrees with the animalists that our persistence conditions are 
those of the organic beings that we are, but objects to their rejection of the neo-
Lockean claim that we are fundamentally persons. He simultaneously rejects the neo-
Lockeans’ exclusive focus on psychological continuity, which overlooks the biological 
aspects of our nature. He holds instead that we are fundamentally human beings and 
persons. This is a claim he defends by focusing on the consilience of those concepts – a 
connection explored in the next section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ostensibly better suited to Wiggins’ kind of descriptive analysis (though this style of descriptive analysis – 
which functions on the use of terms – is critiqued in §2.3 below). 
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§2.2. Arguments for conceptual consilience 
 
For Wiggins, our understanding of what a person is interweaves, somehow, with our 
understanding of what a human being is. This is a thought, which in ‘Person as the 
object of science’, he tries to capture in the following diagram (with due deference to 
Frege):342 
 
 
Though the terms ‘person’ and ‘human being’ differ in sense, person and human being refer 
(in the same way that horse and equus caballus do) to ‘the same things out there in nature’ 
(‘homines’).343 Wiggins presents different, interlinking arguments to substantiate this 
intersection.344 He presents a Strawsonian argument for why persons may necessarily be 
material things (§2.2.a.). There is also a semantic argument, grounded in the way we use 
‘person’ as though it were a natural kind word (§2.2.b.). And lastly, but perhaps most 
importantly, there is an argument from interpretation and indexicality (§2.2.c.), which 
collects together various insights from Donald Davidson in an attempt to elucidate a 
central element in our conceptual scheme. 
  
§2.2.a. The Strawsonian argument: a preliminary link 
 
It is Peter Strawson’s thought that person is a ‘primitive concept’ that forms the initial 
connecting cord between that concept and human being.345 Wiggins uses Strawson’s 
analysis to augment the Butlerian critique (presented above) to claim that our concept of 
a thinking being must also be of a material being. While there is some disagreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Wiggins 1987: 60 
343 Ibid: 60 
344 Which appear in various forms in Wiggins 1976, 1980, 1987, 1996, 2001, 2005a, 2012 
345 Strawson 1959: ch.3 
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about what exactly Strawson means by ‘primitive’346 Wiggins’ interpretation (followed 
here) runs thus: 
  
[A] person is, par excellence (and as a presupposition of all the traditional 
questions in the philosophy of mind), the bearer of both M-predicates and 
P-predicates, where M-predicates are predicates that we could also 
ascribe to material objects and P-predicates are predicates that we could 
not possibly ascribe to material objects and comprise such things as 
actions, intentions, thoughts, feelings, perceptions, memories, and 
sensations: and that ‘a person’ is a type of entity such that both predicates 
ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal 
characteristics are equally applicable to an individual of that single type.347 
 
Strawson’s claim develops out of his descriptivist critique of Cartesian mind/body 
dualism. Briefly put, his thought is that the idea of an immaterial, thinking thing collides 
with a basic principle about psychological thought, made evident by our practices of 
thought ascription. The idea is that one can only ascribe experiences to oneself if one is 
prepared to attribute them to others. And to do this, Strawson claims, one must be able 
to fix on other subjects such that they cannot be – as Descartes proposed – non-spatial.348 
 What is significant for present purposes is a particular objection that Wiggins 
levels at this Strawsonian account, to which he is otherwise largely sympathetic. 
Strawson notes that, while our practices of self-reference require that we are bearers of 
P-properties and M-properties, we can conceive of ourselves as lacking P-properties (for 
example, as comatose or unconscious individuals).349 Yet, in the same way that the 
material body can survive the loss of psychological properties, so too – says Strawson – 
can a person’s consciousness outlive her body: 
 
[E]ach of us can quite intelligibly conceive of his or her individual 
survival of bodily death. The effort of imagination is not even great.350 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 E.g. Ishiguro 1980 
347 Wiggins 1987: 63–64 
348 Strawson 1959: ch. 3. See also Snowdon 2009 for a helpful commentary. 
349 There is no tension here because he sees this idea, of our lacking psychological properties, as 
‘secondary’ to the primary concept of person. Strawson 1959: 115 
350 Strawson 1959: 115 
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While Wiggins agrees that we can conceive of ourselves as lacking psychological 
properties, as Snowdon points out351 he also takes issue with this overly even-handed 
treatment of the mental and physical aspects of a person. He suggests that the situation 
Strawson describes – of a consciousness outliving her body352 – clashes with how we 
ordinarily conceive of psychological experiences. The decisive proposal in his 1987 
paper ‘Person as the Object of Science…’ is that once it has been sufficiently worked 
out, we will find that the notion of a bearer of P-properties will necessarily involve 
ascription of M-properties. That is to say that psychological states and capacities are, in 
some way, essentially ‘matter-involving’.353 
 Wiggins does not aspire to prove the confluence of P-properties with M-
properties in its full generality.354 But in the 1987 paper he attempts to demonstrate its 
plausibility by presenting studies of psychological events that cannot but be conceived 
of as involving something material. Of prime interest is his conceptual analysis of 
remembering, in which we find the crucial intersection of his thoughts about his Strawson, 
and the earlier, Butlerian critique of the Lockean memory criterion. 
Consider again the example given above: A’s setting fire to the College of 
Commerce, and B’s memory of causing the fire. How do we understand the claim that 
B remembers this? Not, surely, as meaning only that B has some kind of agent-centered 
inner representation of the event. A delusional might have such a representation too. 
The point is that we must also think there is the right sort of causal relation between the 
act and the subsequent memory-experience. Something else must be invoked. And it is 
at this point that Wiggins turns to an influential – but now somewhat overlooked – 
paper, by C.B. Martin and Max Deutscher.355 In ‘Remembering’ Martin and Deutscher 
assay a claim about what exactly it is to be the ‘right sort of causal relation’ – a claim, 
which Wiggins characterizes in the following way:  
 
[I]t is impossible to say what the right sort of causal connection between 
an incident and memory representation of it is without having recourse to 
the notion of something like a memory trace.11 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Snowdon 1996: 33 
352 For however short a time – Strawson describes how quickly this ghost-like entity will fade away (1959: 
116) 
353 Wiggins 1987: 64 (see also Snowdon 1996: 33) 
354 Ibid: 64 
355 Deutscher and Martin 1966 
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11 The memory trace may be conceived under the specification ‘the normal 
neurophysiological connection whatever that is, between rememberings and the 
incidents of which they are rememberings’… Deutscher and Martin carefully explore a 
multiplicity of alternatives to the explicit memory-trace account of the causal connection 
between incident and experiential memory of incident. They show that none of these 
accounts can simultaneously allow for the possibility of prompting and define the 
particular sort of operativeness we are looking for between incident and 
representation.356 
 
According to this analysis of remembering, we cannot conceive of memory causality as 
‘a transaction over a matterless gap between the external world at one time and a mind 
at a later time’.357 Thoughts about remembering and memory necessarily involve (overtly 
or otherwise) some conception of the normal sort of bodily process that issues in the 
inner representation of a past experience. I.e. we cannot conceive of an individual 
actually remembering something without also thinking that their memory is the result of 
a material process, which reaches back to the initial activity.358, 359 
 How stable is Wiggins’ position here? Snowdon identifies one potential issue:360 
while it may be the case that remembering and perceiving and other such psychological 
states require some material foundation why, he wonders, must this foundation be 
organic, ‘biological’ and ‘living’? That, surely, is what Wiggins needs if he is to tie the 
knot between the relevant concepts: and it is a live issue whether or not psychological 
states can only be had by organic beings. (And certainly, science-fiction stories furnish 
us with numerous examples of robotic intelligences, as well as immaterial 
consciousnesses.) Of beliefs and desires, alongside other psychological states, Snowdon 
writes: 
 
[There is] nothing obviously biological in the idea of these structures.361 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Wiggins 1987: 65 and 209 n.11 
357 Ibid: 65 and 209 n.12 
358 What of ‘computer memory’? It is likely that Wiggins will dismiss this as metaphorical usage, 
secondary, if not tertiary, to our everyday conception of memory. 
359 The argument in the 1987 paper thus stands as a structural shift in Wiggins’ work. In 1976 and 1980, 
he registers Butler’s concern with the Lockean criterion, that the memory condition cannot be sufficient, 
because it presupposes another account of identity. His 1987 paper marks an explicit transition from this 
critique to the positive thesis that this alternative account involves something material, and, as indicated, 
physiological. 
360 Snowdon 1996: 44 
361 Ibid: 44 
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Closer attention to Wiggins’ texts reveals an implicit response to this concern. Consider 
his analysis of perception, which also appears in the 1987 paper: 
 
For there to be a perception of x, something would have to be able to 
count as a misperception of it. But what is the difference? If we are to 
make the distinction we need, then there has to be something 
independent of what is subjectively given in perception. But then we 
must ask the position of the perceiver. There must be such a thing as an 
answer to the question of where the perception is from. Otherwise there is 
nothing that the perception is answerable to. And what else can fix where 
the perception is from but the body, head, and eyes of the perceiver?362 
 
This passage indicates the importance of the arrangement of the material foundation (in a 
way that the discussion of memory does in more abstract terms). ‘Perception’ is clearly 
meant to be visual perception, and visual perception requires some suitable material 
structure: e.g. the body, the head, the eyes. The predictable answer to this will be that a 
suitably structured robot (i.e. one with cameras and some kind of recording unit) might 
be said to ‘perceive’ (although, as with computer ‘memory’, there is the possibility of 
this sliding into metaphor).363 But consider too – Wiggins might say – the desires, 
experienced by persons, which Snowdon denies need any ‘biological’ element.364 Certain 
desires surely seem to contradict this. After all, in the same paper, Snowdon himself 
points to our overwhelming sense of being a certain sex365 – but if we include sexual 
desire among the states of persons, particular kinds of biological structure do seem to be 
necessary. Thinking of persons as entities enjoying a variety of psychological 
experiences – including sexual desire – we might well begin to think of them as having a 
particular kind of biological makeup.366 
 Maybe it will be said that – irrespective of love, desire, hatred (and other such 
arguably paradigmatic psychological states) – the crucial question is whether or not our 
idea of memory involves conceiving the rememberer as a biological being. And this, 
perhaps, is less obvious than it is in the case of e.g. sexual desire. Wiggins’ first recourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Wiggins 1987: 65 
363 Snowdon 1996: 40 
364 Ibid: 44 
365 Ibid: 35 
366 Note that this does not mean we cannot (perhaps) synthesize persons – but we are committed to 
thinking that to synthesize them we must effectively synthesize the workings of the human body. Wiggins 
notes this repeatedly, e.g. 1996: 247, and 2001: 90. 
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is to Martin and Deutscher’s discussion of remembering, and to the centrality of the 
notion of a ‘memory trace’. If one is persuaded that our ideas about memory necessarily 
involve the notion of this ‘memory trace’, one might also be persuaded that 
rememberers can only be beings that possess those special capacities afforded by our 
neurophysiological make-up. 
However Wiggins’ position does not stand or fall with Martin and Deutscher’s 
analysis. It is consonant with his general approach to emphasize instead the complexity, 
and the deeply integrated nature of our psychological states. This harks back to a point 
made in chapter 1; that Wiggins opposes a drive in much English-language philosophy 
to take a piecemeal approach to philosophical issues and to separate areas of study into 
smaller, more ‘easily digestible’ chunks without attending to the connections between 
them. One may well wonder whether a piecemeal attitude is organizing Snowdon’s 
discussion here, and one option for Wiggins is to say that a memory is not a distinct, 
isolable, object of study – it also involves auditory and visual and emotional states, 
which are more clearly reliant on a biological nature. He may respond to the kind of 
question proposed by Snowdon by asking how separable psychological states – desiring, 
believing, imagining, remembering – actually are, and whether we can conceive of a 
memory devoid of any other aspect. If we focus on how deeply interrelated our 
psychological states are, and how some such states cannot but be conceived of as being 
borne by biological beings, then perhaps this can be taken to suggest a link between 
personhood and animalhood (if not yet human beinghood). These are thoughts 
contained within the passage from Hegel that Wiggins quotes at the start of his chapter 
on personal identity in S&S: 
 
It is only in its proper body that mind is revealed. The [idea of the] 
migration of souls is a false abstraction, and the physiology ought to have 
made it one of its axioms that life had necessarily in its evolution to attain 
to the human shape as the sole sensuous phenomenon that is adequate to 
mind.367 
 
The thought is that our psychological states can only be enjoyed by beings with a 
particular physiology – human beings – and this stands as the first, provisional link 
between the person and human being concepts. It is a speculative connection, and not one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Wiggins 1980: 148, quoting Hegel, Lectures on Fine Art 
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that Wiggins tries to strengthen particularly (the quotation from Hegel does not appear 
in the later texts).368 He takes it to be suggestive but not conclusive; the argumentative 
work is done by his semantic argument, and his argument from interpretation and indexicality. 
 
§2.2.b. The semantic argument and the Animal Attribute View 
 
As a descriptivist, Wiggins is interested in elucidating the structure of our conceptual 
scheme. And in S&S, and to a certain extent S&SR, his method for doing so involves, 
in no small part, an examination of our use of language.369 Following his paper ‘Locke, 
Butler and the Stream of Consciousness’, a central aim of his 1980 book is to present an 
explicitly ‘descriptive’ analysis of ‘person’370 – investigating how we commonly apply the 
term, in order to elucidate its meaning, and the conceptual requirement it fulfils.371 
Wiggins takes Locke’s account of ‘person’ as his point of departure – and while 
his sympathies with Locke have fluctuated, his objection to the Lockean definition of 
‘person’ has remained unwavering. He describes Locke’s definition as an ‘analytical 
excogitation of a nominal essence’.372 That is, in the Essay, ‘person’ is not taken to 
introduce a real essence in the way that a natural kind term would do; it stipulates one, as 
do the terms we use to refer to artefacts and positions of authority.373 A central strand 
of Wiggins’ work has been to argue that this rendering of ‘person’ clashes with our use 
of that term in everyday practice. We do not use it as though it is a role to be fulfilled, or 
as though it has a functional specification. Thus, Wiggins writes (and mark well the 
descriptivist entreaties to ‘our innermost convictions’ etc.): 
 
Nobody thinks of the persons we actually encounter in nature as artifacts, 
or as having identities which are ‘for decision’ as artefact identities are 
sometimes for ‘decision’ when there is a changing of parts…374 
 
A pure conventionalist view of the identity of people would fly in the 
face of the innermost convictions of almost everyone…375 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Though the thought is preserved, e.g. in 2001: 198–9 
369 Wiggins 2001: 2 
370 Wiggins 1980: 149 
371 See also Wiggins 1976: 149, 151, and 1987: 62–63 
372 Wiggins 1976: 151 
373 Wiggins 1987: 63 
374 Wiggins 1976: 151 
375 Ibid: 151 
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[A]t flies in the face of the innermost convictions of almost everyone to 
try to think of the persons we encounter in nature as having identities 
that are any less determinate than the identities of animals.376 
 
The definition of person is not something we conceive for ourselves in the 
way in which we have conceived for ourselves the nominal essences for 
hoe or house…377 
 
‘Person’, Wiggins claims, functions in our everyday practice as though it were a natural 
kind word.378 We do not stipulate, as the constructionists do (discussed below), what 
‘person’ means; rather we learn more about persons by singling them out in rerum 
natura.379 It is not by consulting textbooks, or dictionaries, that we learn what persons 
are, but by encountering them in the world around us. And when we try to adumbrate 
the marks of personhood – consciousness, memory, imagination, love, intelligence… – 
we find an essential aposiopesis,380 spaces we have yet to fill. The attributes of persons are 
not circumscribed by a definition; we constantly add to them as we discover more about 
ourselves and each other. 
Yet while Wiggins takes these features as indicators that ‘person’ is akin to a 
natural kind word, he is cautious of giving it the full status of such terms, like rabbit, ivy, 
butterfly, and (putatively) human being.381 Rather, he suggests that we see ‘person’ as 
something like a qualification of a natural kind determinable, a ‘hybrid concept’ with a 
natural kind element and a systemic element as well382 (alike to how ‘vegetable’ collects 
together a group of savory, edible plant kinds).383 
 Whether it functions as a natural kind word, or akin to one, this descriptive 
analysis appears to indicate that the person concept intersects with some idea of a natural, 
animal kind. This is something Wiggins takes to be clear in our use of that term (and 
consequently explains why we feel the strain we do when trying to understand whether 
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robots are persons – since they have shallow nominal essences,384 and when we think of 
ourselves as ‘artefact-like’ – that is, being subject to part-replacement, and so on):385 
 
[I]t is certain that we still believe that, to have genuine feeling or purposes 
or concerns, a thing must at least be an animal of some sort.386 
 
Wiggins holds that the richness of our use of ‘person’ suggests that it is conceptually 
allied, in some way, with a natural kind concept. This line of argument culminates in 
S&S in what Wiggins calls the ‘Animal Attribute View’.387 He sets it out as follows (note 
the dots which show how this elucidation of person is not a strict definition, but an 
essentially incomplete statement that is to be filled out by looking to persons as we 
encounter them): 
 
Perhaps x is a person if and only if x is an animal falling under the 
extension of a kind who typical members perceive, feel, remember, 
imagine, desire, make projects, move themselves at will, speak, carry out 
projects, acquire a character as they age, are happy or miserable, are 
susceptible to concern for members of their own or like species… [note 
carefully these and subsequent dots], conceive of themselves as 
perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, desiring, making projects, 
speaking… have, and conceive of themselves as having, a past accessible 
in experience-memory and a future accessible in intention.388 
 
The frailties of this treatment are considered in depth in §2.3, but it is worth noting here 
that however effective this argument is, it is not enough to substantiate a specific 
connection between person and human being. Even if this semantic analysis of ‘person’ is 
found to be persuasive, the connection it forges is between person and animal. There is, as 
yet, no special association with the concept human being. As Wiggins himself notes: 
 
[I]t is not absolutely excluded… that the extension of person should give 
hospitality to such creatures as chimpanzees or dolphins or even, in 	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385 This is revisited in §4.2. 
386 Wiggins 1980: 175 
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exchange for suitably amazing behaviour, to a parrot. According to this 
view, a person is any animal that is such by its kind as to have the 
biological capacity to enjoy fully the psychological attributes enumerated; 
and whether or not a given animal kind qualifies is left to be a strictly 
empirical matter.389 
 
More needs to be said. The extra link is provided by another argument, which appears 
alongside the semantic one, and works in concert with it. This argument has come to 
increasing prominence in Wiggins’ later texts. This is an argument from interpretation and 
indexicality. 
 
§2.2.c. An argument from interpretation and indexicality 
 
‘Interpretation’ here is a term of art, and requires some unpacking. It refers to a 
discussion found in the work of Donald Davidson – another figure who, alongside 
Strawson, exerts a keen influence in Wiggins’ work.390 In his paper ‘Radical 
Interpretation’,391 Davidson examines the structure that underpins certain aspects of our 
linguistic practices; following on from Quine’s work in Word and Object392 he investigates 
what exactly it takes for us to be able to understand one another – what it is that makes 
our interpretation of the linguistic behaviour of a speaker possible. 
 In broom-broad brush-strokes, Davidson sees there to be two important 
assumptions on the part of the interpreter (assumptions which he calls, collectively, the 
‘principle of charity’):393 the first is that the speaker’s behaviour satisfies strong 
normative constraints – i.e. that she reasons in accordance with logical laws; the second 
is that our interpretive procedures depend on thinking the speaker asserts something 
she believes to be true, and that something’s being true. In order to make this second 
assumption, the interpreter must overcome innumerable unknowns (for how can one 
know what someone else believes?), and doing this, Davidson suggests, she projects 
herself into the subject’s position, and assumes that the speaker does or would believe 
what she, the interpreter, would believe in their position. That is, she must see the 
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390 See Wiggins’ autobiographical note to this effect in his 1996: 229 (also 2001: 198) 
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speaker as a being like her.394 She sees the speaker as a being with whom she can get ‘on 
the same wavelength’. 
How does this connect with Wiggins’ work? Wiggins is interested in our 
everyday practices, and Davidson’s discussion gives an insight into certain everyday, 
linguistic procedures. These interpretive assumptions are ones we must make for us in 
order to be able to interact with each other in the way we do: for interpretation to be 
possible, one has to see others as being like oneself. That is, we must see each other as 
‘subjects of interpretation’,395 beings with whom we may get ‘on the same wavelength’, 
or ‘on net’.396 
Crucially, Wiggins sees this requirement of our everyday linguistic practices to 
underwrite our use of the term ‘person’. He states that persons are ‘subjects of 
interpretation’. In S&SR he writes: 
 
Par excellence, a person is… a subject also of interpretation, a being that 
both interprets and is interpreted.397 
  
And, more recently, in his ‘Identity, Individuation and Substance’: 
 
[A] person is… a creature that interprets other human creatures and is 
wide open to be interpreted by them.398 
 
Significantly, understanding person thus makes good sense of the natural kind-style 
aposiopesis Wiggins identifies in our usage of the term. Understanding persons as 
‘subjects of interpretation’ is the principle (note, not a definition)399 by which the marks 
of personhood are enumerated: 
 
No wonder… that, in the interest of our securing and vindicating our 
mutual attunement, the Lockean elucidation of ‘person’ grows and grows. 
For there is no clear limit to what concerns and capacities and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 See Joseph 2011 for an overview 
395 Wiggins 2001: 198. See Wiggins 1980: 222 and 2001: 198 for the explicit connection he draws between 
his own analysis and Davidson’s.  
396 Wiggins 1987: 69 and 1996: 245 
397 Wiggins 2001: 198. For an indication of the shift in focus of Wiggins’ analysis of ‘person’, contrast this 
rendering with the claim in his 1987 that ‘…a person is, par excellence (and as a presupposition of all the 
traditional questions in the philosophy of mind), the bearer of both M-predicates and P-predicates’ (63) 
398 Wiggins 2012: 16 
399 Wiggins 1987: 68–69 
	   94	  
perceptions and feelings… we shall have to credit our fellows with if we 
are to make sense of them.400 
 
We cannot give a definitive list of the marks of personhood because the concerns and 
capacities we must be attuned to in order to interpret are not static or restricted. 
Wiggins emphasizes the procedural richness of putting oneself ‘in another’s shoes’ in 
S&S;401 in the Longer Note 6.36 he claims the interpreter’s imaginative act cannot just 
be about what the speaker is seeing, hearing, etc., it must also be about recognizing the 
kinds of concerns they will have and e.g. the kinds of objects that will be of interest to 
them, and why.402 For interpretation to take place the interpreter needs to ‘know more 
than nothing not only about the world but also about men in general’.403 
Finally it begins to emerge how, in addition to supporting a link between person 
and some animal kind, interpretation secures an important connection between person 
and human being – because ‘person’ is understood to be indexical – persons are those 
entities that are like us (with whom we may get ‘on net’) where we are human beings. 
 
[W]e shall only count something as a person if it is the kind of thing that 
we who are human beings can interpret and can make sense of in a 
manner that is in principle not delimited or circumscribed… People are 
creatures of a kind to be the subjects of fine-grained interpretation by us, 
who are human beings, and to be the putative exponents of fine-grained 
interpretation of us… The thing we are concerned with here is a 
rationality of ends (as well as of means and the fit of means to ends). For 
these purposes, our only usable paradigm or stereotype of a reasonable 
being, or of a rational conscious being whom we can interpret, or of a 
person, is that of a human being. Our only proxy for a thinking, feeling 
soul is a striving, symbol using/misusing, embodied human being.404 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Wiggins 1987: 71 
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Wiggins acknowledges that this is not a ‘transcendental argument’ for the conceptual 
connection between person and human being.405 He concedes that there might be beings, 
other than humans, with whom we can get ‘on net’. But the aim of these arguments – 
set out above – is to tease out why we may think a conception of a non-human person 
stretches the concept too far. It is not logically excluded that other animals could be 
persons, but see, he says ‘whether you can describe, up to any required level of detail, 
how we should make sense of non-human creatures, become attuned to them, or be in a 
position to treat their feelings as if they were our own; or see how you imagine making 
sense of these creatures without doing that.’406 It is hard to think we could understand 
Martians or dolphins or automata as anything other than inscrutable alien 
intelligences.407 (This is discussed further in §4.4.b., where a shift in Wiggins’ attitude is 
identified.) 
 
§2.2.d. Intermediary conclusion 
 
Wiggins’ elucidation of person is insightful. He presents a series of persuasive arguments 
that indicate a link between that concept and the concept human being. Doing so, he 
manages to accommodate attractive elements of both the neo-Lockean and the 
animalist positions. 
 Reading ‘person’ in conjunction with Davidsonian thoughts about interpretation 
shows exactly why the Lockeans think as they do: experiential memory is so central to 
our view of ourselves because it plays a central role in interpretation. When people do 
or suffer something, this impresses itself on their mind, colours their experience, and 
influences their future responses.408 Therefore, Wiggins can say that experiential 
memory is of considerable importance, while resisting the Lockean emphasis on it: 
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Locke can be right about remembering as central among the marks of 
personhood without Locke’s or the neo-Lockeans’ being right about 
personal identity…409 
 
The conceptual consilience Wiggins finds between person and human being creates a 
synthesis of the neo-Lockean and animalist accounts. Confused by the intricacies of 
person we can turn to the concordant sortal concept human being when answering the 
questions of the personal identity debate. That substance sortal encapsulates a principle of 
activity, or ‘mode of being’ for members of that sort – from which persistence conditions 
may be extrapolated.  
According to Wiggins, the ‘human being principle’ is the theoretical description 
that we find (via the deictic-nomological method described in §1.3) holding between 
exemplars of that kind. It includes all the biological processes characteristic of human 
beings: the way we typically breathe, walk, digest, reproduce, grow, age and die. It also 
includes, for example, typical behaviour, social tendencies, and manner of interaction 
and communication. Each human being gives this principle specific determination, and 
it is this specialized and refined determination of the human mode of being that we 
track when individuate ourselves. 
The human being theory thus leads to determinate answers in a number of the 
traditionally problematic cases. The amnesiac is seen to be identical with the person who 
suffered whatever event resulted in amnesia because memory does not register on 
identity, and they are clearly possessed of the same principle of activity.410 The same is 
true for the comatose patient. They are identical with the person who suffered the 
accident that caused the coma since, though they have lost consciousness (perhaps 
never to regain it), they continue to be the kind of entity that could fulfil those 
characteristic, and uncircumscribed, capacities.411 Wiggins does not mention patients in 
vegetative states,412 but he will likely say they also continue to realize a particular 
principle of activity.413 The foetus is identical too, to the adult it will later become, 
realizing, as it does, that same principle of activity.414 
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413 Though there will be some questions about the extent of the interference of technology (discussed in 
chapter 4). 
414 Note that a question arises here about the boundaries of the human being. When does the principle of 
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Mention should also be made of the brain transplantation story (to be discussed 
in greater length in chapter 4). There is considerable vacillation in Wiggins’ view of this 
canonical tale – in which Brown has his brain transplanted into Robinson’s skull – but 
at points he concedes that Brownson is Brown.415 This verdict is not founded on neo-
Lockean sensibilities but emerges out of his human being theory. Wiggins sees Brown’s 
particular and refined activity416 to be ‘inherited’ by Brownson from Brown in roughly 
the same way that it is inherited in normal survival.417 When judging whether or not a 
human individual continues we look to the ‘transfer of the plurality of specialized and 
refined capacities’418 – and this, it seems, can be achieved, conceivably at least, in brain 
transplantation.419 
Wiggins’ engagement with the personal identity debate is subtler than most. He 
brings his characteristic acuity to bear on the problems found therein.420 Gathering 
together the insights of Strawson and Davidson, he elucidates the meaning of our 
everyday concept of person and the thoughts that underpin our use of the word. With 
these elucidations now elucidated, questions will be raised about the real strength of the 
lien between person and human being. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
divides and becomes twin embryos… I am committed to react to this fact with a general ruling to the 
effect that the human being dates from a time after the zygote finally splits or settles down to develop in a 
unitary fashion.’ (2001: 239) 
415 Wiggins 2001: 207. This may well be one of the reasons he is sometimes read as a neo-Lockean. The 
‘brain transplantation case’ is often seen as a guide to Lockean or animalist leanings: Lockeans and neo-
Lockeans see Brownson to be identical to Brown, while animalists like Olson firmly deny this (e.g. Olson 
1997: 42ff). 
416 Wiggins 2001: 22, 194 
417 Ibid: 226 
418 Ibid: 211. He qualifies this further by saying, of cognitive capacities, that ‘these things figure in the 
specific determination of the determinable principle of activity to be invoked in making judgments of 
identity through time…’ (211 n.22) 
419 Or at least, Wiggins holds, it is achieved if certain requirements are met. See the discussion in §4.1. 
420 Anticipating the arguments in chapter 3, it is worthwhile noting that this conceptual consilience also 
seems to immunize Wiggins against the sort of ‘thinking part puzzle’ described by Olson (e.g. 2007: 215). 
Understood as concordant with human being (a natural substance), our substance sortal predicate ‘person’ 
will not apply to undetached heads, brains, etc. (Cf. Olson 2007: 218) There is thus no reason to pursue 
the kind of eliminativist picture encouraged by Olson and Merricks (2001b). 
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§2.3. Testing the conceptual connection 
 
Descriptivists, like Strawson and Wiggins, turn to our conceptual scheme to extrapolate 
the structure of reality. As was noted in §1.1, this method is not without difficulties, and 
among them is the concern, raised by Burtt and Mei, that in examining their ‘everyday 
thoughts’ the descriptivist runs the risk of importing cultural biases into their 
metaphysical framework. The contention here is that Wiggins’ analysis of our use of the 
term ‘person’ does precisely this. Wiggins avers that his semantic analysis will grant us 
insight into the pre-theoretical concept that supposedly sustains it. The claim assayed 
below is that our use of the term is guided by diverse and sometimes conflicting 
rationales, and that it does not, therefore, provide a stable basis for Wiggins’ 
descriptivist claims. The fragmentary nature of our notion of a ‘person’ becomes clear 
when it is subject to a genealogical analysis.421 
 
§2.3.a. A genealogy of the notion of a person 
 
‘Genealogy’, as a philosophical method, came to prominence in the 1970s in the work 
of Michel Foucault422 (himself drawing largely on the work of Nietzsche423). It has been 
picked up in the Anglophone tradition by Bernard Williams,424 Edward Craig,425 Quentin 
Skinner,426 and Raymond Geuss.427 Crudely put, genealogy is a form of historical 
critique, designed to problematize norms by presenting them, not as natural and 
inevitable, but as products of diverse historical factors.428 
 Genealogical analysis is used in a variety of ways, but for present purposes the 
‘modified’ genealogy that Geuss deploys is perhaps most suitable. In his Public Goods, 
Private Goods, he presents genealogy as taking as its object of study some ‘deeply 
entrenched contemporary item or phenomenon’ – in his case a conceptual distinction, 
i.e. that between ‘public’ and ‘private’.429 For Nietzsche it was Christian morality, for 
Foucault, the prison system, and sexuality. Before the application of genealogy, each of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 In the following section, talk of ‘the concept person’ will be largely eschewed in favour of ‘the notion of 
a “person”’, ‘notion’ being a much less loaded term in Wiggins’ texts (and one suggested by Mauss’s 
essay). 
422 E.g. Foucault 1994 
423 E.g. Nietzsche 1887 (see Foucault 1994) 
424 E.g. Williams 2002 
425 E.g. Craig 1990 
426 E.g. Skinner 2002 
427 E.g. Geuss 1999: 1–29, and 2001 
428 See Hill 1998 for an overview 
429 Geuss 2001: viii 
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these items presents itself as being unitary and coherent: while there may be different 
elements, each ‘item’ appears to be unified by some single, unitary rationale.430 
Furthermore, this rationale is often construed as stemming from a single point of 
origination: thus sexuality is supposed to have its natural origin in biological nature, and 
Christianity, despite its schisms and heresies, ‘can still be seen as arising from a unitary 
aboriginal Sinnstiftung by Jesus in Palestine two thousand years ago’.431 
Wiggins clearly recognizes that we use the term ‘person’ in different ways, but 
throughout his work he tries to show how, ultimately, these different conceptions are 
bound together by a unitary rationale. This aim is made explicit in the 1987 paper, ‘The 
Person as Object of Science…’,432 where he draws the connections between the three 
seemingly disparate aspects of our everyday thoughts about ‘persons’: 
 
1) the idea of the person as object of biological, anatomical, and 
neurophysiological inquiry 
2) the idea of the person as subject of consciousness 
3) the idea of the person as locus of all sorts of moral attributes and the 
source or conceptual origin of all value.433 
 
There is something admirably optimistic about the kind of story Wiggins tells, 
presenting ‘person’ as capturing a coherent idea in spite of the variety of ways that we 
apply the term. And there is something rather sad about trying to disassemble this 
jigsaw and show that some pieces will never fit together; but such is the aim of the 
genealogical project (certainly as Geuss conceives it). A genealogical analysis shows how 
such ideas, far from being unitary, are in fact syncretic phenomena, with many distinct 
roots, no single beginning (hence the ‘genealogical’ metaphor), and no unifying 
rationale. The elements of Christianity, born from Stoic thought, Roman law, Hebrew 
scriptures and the politics of resistance to Roman power (etc.) are distinct and possess 
completely different rationales.434 The same, it will be argued here, is true of the notion 
of a ‘person’ – and this should be no surprise, since the process by which that concept 
reached its current state will be just as complex (and indeed, according to Mauss, that 
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process encompasses Christian doctrine relating to the soul, and the Holy Trinity435). As 
Geuss puts it: 
 
Any significant human phenomenon that has succeeded in maintaining 
itself throughout a long history into the present… can be expected to 
be a highly stratified composite whose parts derive originally from 
different periods. The original rationale of each of these parts will have 
been oriented to a completely different (past) context of action.436 
 
The notion of a ‘person’ is just such a phenomenon. 
 Wiggins claims that person and human being are non-accidentally concordant. His 
analysis of the semantics of ‘person’, and its associations with the notion of a subject of 
interpretation, is meant to secure the connection between the two concepts – but the 
genealogy problematizes this treatment by suggesting that our use of the term is 
informed by numerous, culturally diverse, and sometimes conflicting influences, 
unbound by a unifying rationale. 
 
§2.3.a.i. Preliminaries 
 
Three preliminary points should be made. Firstly, the aim of a genealogy is not to 
discredit a practice, institution or item simply by focussing on a kind of shameful origin; 
that is, it does not commit the genetic fallacy (since the genealogical method 
presupposes no originary point).437 Secondly, like Geuss’s, this genealogy is ‘modified’ in 
the sense that it is not directed at an institution or practice, but an idea.438 The following 
analysis attempts to dissolve the appearance of unity in our everyday notion of a person. 
 Thirdly, a genealogical study may seem to be an overly ambitious project, and 
one ill-suited to the space constraints of the present study, but the story entered here is 
intended only as a rough sketch of some of the various, disparate elements of the notion 
of a person. Furthermore, if it is ambitious then the ambition exists outside this thesis. 
There are two texts that directly inform the following analysis: Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty’s ‘Persons and Personae’439 and Marcel Mauss’s ‘A Category of the Human Mind: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 See e.g. Mauss 1938: 19–20 
436 Geuss 2001: xiii 
437 Ibid: xv 
438 Ibid: xvi 
439 Rorty 1990 
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The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self’.440 Both attempt to show, in different ways, 
how ‘the various functions performed by our contemporary concept of person do not 
hang together’ (indicating too, the value of such a genealogy outside the current 
discussion).441 It is particularly in Mauss’s anthropological study, that the following 
analysis is grounded.442 
 Mauss’s last essay, published in 1938, is a survey of various historical and 
ethnographical studies, in which he describes the long and complex history of the 
seemingly natural notion of a person. He identifies its different renderings, and charts 
how they came into contact, and were subsequently conjoined, from societal role, to 
legal fact, to moral fact, and to metaphysical entity: 
 
From a simple masquerade to the mask, from a ‘role’ to a ‘person’ to a 
name, to an individual, from the latter to a being possessing metaphysical 
and moral value, from a moral consciousness to a sacred being, from the 
latter to a fundamental form of thought and action…443 
 
This quotation gives a sense of the vastness of the project. It also indicates one of the 
problems with Mauss’s approach. Emerging from the French sociological school 
dominated by Durkheim, it appears to construe the distinct notions as related in some 
form of linear narrative: the different points appear as stages, which lead on from one to 
the next. This, it should be noted, is troublesome for the genealogist, who sees her 
approach to be characterized by multiple branching (or, in Deleuzian idiom, as 
‘rhizomatic’).444 It is also potentially politically suspect, since this kind of evolutionary 
picture positions some cultures as ‘less evolved’ than others.445 
 Whether or not Mauss intended his narrative to be linear is unclear (there is 
room for disagreement).446 Either way, the aim here is to show how it can be read as 
something like a genealogy: to build on the different strands he identifies, and the 
interrelations he sees between them, in order to raise issues for Wiggins. The following, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Mauss 1938 
441 Rorty 1990: 22 
442 It is gratifying to hear that, following our discussions, Wiggins is now incorporating a treatment of 
Mauss into a paper rewritten for a forthcoming collection. 
443 Mauss 1938: 22 
444 Koopman 2012 
445 See e.g. below, the Pueblo of Zuñi construed as stuck in the ‘Totemic stage’, from which our own 
conception of person evolved. 
446 Certainly in this essay, it seems he does not. He talks about simultaneous movements (the movement 
away from the Totemic mask civilizations, and the injection of the ‘prosopon’ concept from Stoic 
tradition). 
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then, may be seen as a creative reinterpretation of Mauss, drawing out, by reference to his 
cross-cultural study, the different components of the notion captured by the word 
‘person’. 
 Having said this, there is still no better introduction to the essay, and to these 
thoughts, than Mauss’s own – and the relevance to Wiggins’ work is nowhere better 
signalled than at the start of ‘A Category of the Human Mind’: 
 
[This essay] deals with nothing less than how to explain… the way in 
which one of the categories of the human mind – one of those ideas we 
believe to be innate – originated and slowly developed over many 
centuries and through numerous vicissitudes, so that even today it is still 
imprecise, delicate and fragile, one requiring further elaboration. This is 
the idea of ‘person’ (personne), the idea of ‘self’ (moi). Each one of us 
finds it natural, clearly determined in the depths of his consciousness, 
completely furnished with the fundaments of morality which flows 
from it. For this simplistic view of its history and present value we must 
substitute a more precise view.447 
 
§2.3.a.ii. ‘Person’ as a mask 
 
Mauss’s investigation begins with the ‘mask’ culture of the Native American Pueblo of 
Zuñi, and the pre-Roman Etruscans; he finds in their practices the notion of the 
‘person’ as something like a mask or role – that is, like dramatis persona.448 And while the 
practices of the Pueblo of Zuñi are far removed from the historical process out of 
which the ‘personal identity’ debate emerge, this use of person is – as many have noted 
– apparent in the etymological roots of the English word ‘person’, as a mask, through 
which (per) resounds the voice (sonare). (Wiggins himself recognizes this.)449 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Mauss 1938: 1 
448 This is an example of the unfortunate consequences of his evolutionary analysis; the, still extant, 
Native American cultures are seen to be in some senses ‘stuck’ in the ‘aboriginal state’ (Mauss 1938:4) out 
of which our own culture emerged. 
449 Wiggins 1996: 282 n.27. It is worthwhile noting that Mauss questions this reading: ‘In reality the word 
does not even seem to be from a sound Latin root. It is believed to be of Etruscan origin, like other 
nouns ending in ‘-na’ (Porsenna, Caecina, etc.). Meillet and Ernout’s Dictionnaire Etymologique compares it 
to a word, farsu, handed down in garbled form, and M. Benveniste informs me that it may come from a 
Greek borrowing made by the Etruscans, πρόσωπον (‘perso’).’ (Mauss 1938: 15) Nevertheless, as he 
emphasizes, either way it emerges from the Etruscan’s mask civilization. (Mauss 1938: 15) 
	   103	  
 In these ‘mask cultures’, the communities, or ‘totemic groups’ are described as 
possessing only a fixed number of names450 – and in naming rituals, these ‘characters’ or 
‘roles’, or ‘persons’ are conferred on members of the group. Following this baptismal 
rite, the bearers of the name are regarded, at any time, as the reincarnation of the original 
bearer.451 Indeed, for Mauss, this account of ‘person’ as mask is central to the logic of 
reincarnation, where a single person is seen to span different biological lives: 
 
The individual is born with his name and his social functions… The 
number of individuals, names, souls and roles is limited in the clan, and 
the line of the clan is merely a collection (ensemble) of rebirths and deaths 
of individuals who are always the same.452 
 
On first reading, these kinds of ethnographic details might seem to register on a 
completely different level to the one that Wiggins is working on. But attention to S&S, 
and his earlier paper, ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness’, reveals that he 
explicitly engages with exactly this kind of hypostatization of social roles, in analysing 
our understanding of what it is to be a ‘person’.453 His point of reference is Clifford 
Geertz’s Person, Time and Conduct in Bali rather than Mauss, but the issues discussed are 
strikingly similar, focussing on ‘the strange fusion of role and human being that is 
involved in [the Balinese] system of naming’.454  
 Wiggins’ comments about Balinese naming practices surface in his discussion of 
fission. Fission becomes a conceptual possibility on the neo-Lockean model because an 
exclusive focus on consciousness cannot proscribe against, e.g. hemispherectomies, and 
subsequent so-called ‘deltas’ in the stream of consciousness.455 One aim, in ‘Locke, 
Butler and the Stream of Consciousness…’ and S&S, is to demonstrate how this sort of 
splitting would destabilize our everyday usage of the term, since it presents persons as 
things that can transcend bodies, and individual lives.456 If this is right, then for the 
descriptivist the neo-Lockean’s focus on memory and consciousness cannot be seen to 
constitute personal identity (since it clashes so forcefully with our everyday pre-
theoretical practices). He writes: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 Allen 1985: 32 
451 Ibid: 32 
452 Mauss, as quoted in Allen 1985 (33) 
453 Wiggins 1976: 146, and 1980: 166 
454 Wiggins 1980: 166 
455 See Wiggins 1976 for this ‘delta’ terminology. 
456 Wiggins 1980: 163ff 
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The conceptual possibility of a delta in the stream of consciousness jogs 
our whole focus on the concept of personhood.457 
 
Geertz’s study of Balinese society becomes important, therefore, because it describes an 
‘extant conception’,458 where person functions less like a substance sortal, and more like 
what Wiggins calls a ‘concrete universal’.459 
 What is a ‘concrete universal’? Wiggins’ discussion of these entities is only 
cursory (emerging in dialogue with his reading of Plato’s Parmenides).460 He outlines the 
idea we have of a type of being with potentially spatially and temporally dislocated parts 
– the collection of all Cox’s Orange Pippin trees, for example,461 or, in this context, the 
collection of those who wear the same mask.462 (An ancillary point to be made here, and 
revisited below, is that whatever they are, concrete universals have a different metaphysical 
character to substances). For the Balinese, a single person may be comprised of distinct 
individuals. Nor is this hypostatization of social roles restricted to the Balinese, and the 
Zuñi, and the pre-Roman Etruscans; Wiggins finds a version of this concrete universal 
conception of person in our own culture (or, as he puts it, ‘a neighbouring 
compartment’). He quotes from Sartre’s commentary on Flaubert: 
 
Un homme n’est jamais un individu; il vaudrait mieux l’appeler un 
universal singulier; totalisé et, par la même, universalisé par son époque, il 
la retotalise en se reproduisant en elle comme singularité.463 
 
[A man is never an individual; it would be better to call him a singular 
universal; total, and also, universalized by his epoch, he retotalizes it by 
reproducing it as a singularity.] 
 
Examples abound in Western literature.464 The point is that, in these contexts, ‘person’ is 
understood as a role that is played, and which can be played by different individuals. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 Wiggins 1980: 169 
458 Ibid: 167 
459 Ibid: 166 
460 Wiggins 2001: 229 
461 Wiggins 1980: 166 
462 Ibid: 167 
463 Ibid: 167 
	   105	  
appears that it is not only an ‘extant conception’, but one which exists (if residually) in 
our own thoughts about what persons are. And it is one, as Wiggins notes, that clashes 
with the simultaneous and persuasive thought that a person is an entity with an 
individual biography: 
 
[T]here is no question of building up a coherent historical record of the 
individual passions, thoughts and actions of an individual person. There 
is little or no provision for the individual or, as it were, the perspectival 
aspect of human experience. The whole ordering of the events of human 
history is interpreted so far as possible in terms of the recurrence of 
generic types of doing or suffering. And where there scarcely is such a 
thing as history, the idea of biography loses all purchase…465  
 
Wiggins sees the concrete universal conception to clash too strongly with our everyday 
attitudes to person and the practices that relate to them – so he tries to shear it from the 
central notion. Yet more needs to be said for this to be other than arbitrary. The clash 
between the ‘mask’ conception of person and our everyday practices is taken as grounds 
for rejecting that conception of person; but could it not equally be taken as evidence of 
the contradictory make-up of the notion itself? It is true that the ‘concrete universal’ 
conception sits awkwardly alongside our use of ‘person’ to pick out a locus of moral 
attributes, but perhaps this is because our notion is syncretic, with elements organized 
by diverse rationales. It is not immediately clear what licenses Wiggins’ disavowal of the 
‘concrete universal’ conception. It is, maybe, significant that this discussion of Geertz 
and the Balinese disappears after S&S (and is not referred to in the secondary 
literature). 
 
§2.3.a.iii. ‘Person’ as a legal fact 
 
Let us turn to another potentially controversial element: the conception of the person as 
a legal fact. As noted, Mauss sees the ‘mask’ rendering of person to be one of the earliest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 In slightly less august terms than Sartre’s, we find a similar use of ‘person’ in the trope that pervades 
Western literature, of one’s becoming or being one’s parent (e.g. Brookner 1995: ch.1, Gaiman 2013: ch.1, 
Goodison 1986: ‘I am becoming my mother’). Describing the inheritance of character, Julien Green 
captures the common thought in his novel Léviathan (Green 1929/1993: 32): 
In growing older we become our parents.  
465 Wiggins 1980: 167 
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stages in its evolution. He identifies evidence of this kind of ‘mask’ civilization in early 
rituals in Rome466 – but then describes a conceptual move away from the person as ‘a 
mask, a tragic mask, a ritual mask and the ancestral mask’, towards the privileges of those 
individuals with a right to a mask. Personhood becomes ‘a fundamental fact of law’.467 
Rights are accorded to the bearers of masks (or latterly, to those holding names which 
stood in place of the masks).468 Thus, compare the states of Roman citizens, or ‘legal 
persons’ (‘all freemen of Rome were Roman citizens, all had a civil persona’469) with their 
slaves (‘Servus non habet personam’470), beings who lacked ‘personality’, owning neither 
body, nor ancestors, name, nor belongings; individuals, but not persons. Here, the 
person is presented as a legal entity, and ‘personhood’ is a legal status, and the 
individuals who are granted it are subject to the laws of persons, rather than of 
property.471 
 This legal sense of person survives – and it is indicative of the connections 
between this and the ‘mask’ conception that in the modern, juridical usage, different 
individuals may still be the same person. This is because, in the current British legal 
system, corporate bodies register as ‘persons’: 
 
IV.6. Law. a. ‘A human being (natural person) or body corporate or 
corporation (artificial person), having rights and duties recognised by the 
law… TUCKER Lt. Nat.  (1834) II. 188 A crowd is no distinct existence, …but 
if the same people be erected into a corporation, there is a new existence superadded; 
and they become a person in law capable to sue and be sued [etc.]’472 
 
Again we find a point of tension between two ideas about what persons are. This legal 
conception sees our usage of the term ‘person’ to refer to some (legally specified) 
stipulative definition, which is palpably at odds with Wiggins’ claim that it functions like 
(although it might not be) a natural kind word.473 ‘Person’, here, is a construct of legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Mauss 1938: 15 
467 Ibid: 15–17 
468 Mauss identifies an interesting point of transition in the dissolution of the father’s power over the life 
and death of his descendents (vitae necisque potestas) – prior to the dissolution, his children, as bearers of his 
name, were ‘part of his person’ (in the fullest sense) (Mauss 1938: 16).  
469 Mauss 1938: 16 
470 Ibid: 17 
471 Ibid: 17 
472 See entry in the Oxford English Dictionary 
473 Consider too that a corporate person may be constituted by numerous and diverse individuals at 
different times, and exist spatially dislocated (in different ‘branches’). Perhaps this will provoke similar 
difficulties to the mask conception. 
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practice – an entity with certain rights and duties – and we learn about persons in this 
sense, not by looking to the world but by looking to how they’re specified in law (in the 
same way that we grasp what a chairman is, for example). 
 Here, the marks of personhood are seen to be socially determined. What 
counts as a person is a matter of convention or tacit agreement – it has a nominal 
essence that is up for discussion.474 That we use ‘person’ in this way is noted by 
Snowdon, in his contribution to Identity, Truth and Value: 
 
[I]t is not clear that there is any deep difference between those 
concepts which we all regard as capable of nominal elucidation and 
the notion of a person…475 
 
Snowdon rejects the natural kind reading in favour of the stipulative one,476 but the 
suggestion here is that both are valid. The notion is a stratified composite with 
conflicting elements. 
 As before Wiggins does not deny that ‘person’ can be read as specifying a 
nominal essence.477 Again, in ‘The Person as Object of Science…’ he writes: 
 
 [T]he concept person had best not be like the concepts of various 
kinds of executant or like concepts that have to change in response to 
technological progress such as surgeon, or infantryman or footplateman, or 
like legal concepts that we may decide at any moment to modify, such 
as tenant, citizen, metic, minor, or like legal concepts that we simply 
invent, such as patrial.478 
 
He does not deny that we do sometimes use ‘person’ in this way. Rather he warns us 
against such usage, because he thinks that to treat ‘person’ in this way is to invite a form 
of moral degeneration. There are social and political implications of treating the concept 
of person otherwise than as a peculiar restriction of a natural kind concept. This view is 
made explicit towards the very end of S&S: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Bakhurst 2005: 463 
475 Snowdon 1996: 38 
476 ‘We would not countenance the possibility that the elements on the standard list elucidating person 
might be eliminated given investigation of a wider sample, nor that features with no obvious connection 
to those already on it might, on investigation, merit being put on the list.’ Snowdon 1996: 38 
477 Though at times he seems tempted to (e.g. 1980: 173) 
478 Wiggins 1987: 63 
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Not only does [a constructionist conception of persons] reduce the 
theoretical subject matter of morals and politics and limit the range 
and variety of counterfactual speculation that this subject matter can 
be expected to sustain; and not only does it reduce drastically (for the 
same reasons) the scope for real criticism of the actual works of social 
engineering that ought to have [been] held in check by a healthy 
respect for the partly imponderable real essence of actual persons: it 
will also license a state of affairs in which there was absolutely nothing 
except fear of confusion to obstruct proposals for modifying or 
reinventing even the accepted specification of what a person was – just 
as we constantly and effortlessly modify and refashion through time 
certain institution- and artifact-concepts...479 
 
This is one section of what Wiggins calls his ‘anti-constructionist tirade of 1980’480 – a 
furious attack that has largely been cut from subsequent texts (and appears only in 
condensed form in the concluding pages of S&SR).481 The reason for this cut is not 
made explicit, but as Bakhurst notes, many will find it judicious.482 Some will think the 
constructionist a straw-man.483 Others, like Bakhurst, will find something awkward in 
this moral attack on a metaphysical position.484 To these lines of criticism the following 
can be added: irrespective of its damaging outcomes, the descriptivist’s concern should 
be with how we use ‘person’, and in some context we certainly use ‘person’ as though it 
possessed some nominal essence; moral objections to this usage will not show that it is 
incorrect, only (potentially) problematic. 
 
§2.3.a.iv. ‘Person’ as a moral fact, and as a metaphysical entity 
 
Let us finish Mauss’s story. The sense of person that grounds Wiggins’ account only 
starts to appear towards the end of the narrative. Mauss describes a third strand in the 
idea of a person, the result of the interweaving of the juridical notion and the legal-cum-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 Wiggins 1980: 180–181 
480 Wiggins 2005a: 474 
481 Wiggins 2001: xi (and 242ff) 
482 Bakhurst 2005: 463 
483 Ibid: 464 n.6 
484 Ibid: 464 
	   109	  
moral ‘prosopon’ that is found in the Stoic tradition. What results from the cross-
pollination of Greek and Roman thought is a notion of person as both the legal ‘mask’, 
but also the true face of the person/citizen.485 Here, a person is both a role, or position, 
with particular rights and duties, and also the individual who is responsible for their own 
actions, who is faced with choices, with respect to those legal duties: 
 
The word πρόσωπον did indeed have the same meaning as persona, a 
mask. But it can then also signify the ‘personage’ (personnage) that each 
individual is and desires to be, his character (the two words are often 
linked), his true face… πρόσωπον is no longer only a persona, and – a 
matter of capital importance – to its juridical meaning is moreover 
added a moral one, a sense of being conscious, independent, 
autonomous, free and responsible.486 
 
As Mauss points out, we find the superimposition of the juridical and moral in Marcus 
Aurelius’ command to ‘carve out your mask’487 – and this connection, between the legal, 
and the conscious, moral person transfuses more recent accounts (though it is a point 
bordering on the banal, it is no surprise that Locke’s account of personhood is 
constructed by reference to the legal conception). 
 Even here, however, where we are moving into more familiar territory, 
‘person’ will not carry the full weight that Wiggins assigns to it. In particular, the 
persona/prosopon conception as it stands in the Greco-Roman tradition does not refer to 
each and every human being. It still functions like a status, which can be achieved or 
withdrawn. As Martin Hollis points out, in general, in the Classical era, there was ‘no 
single generic word for each and every human being’488 (to say nothing of those cultures 
perhaps further from our own, like the Balinese and the New Guineans).489 (Nor, it 
seems, is Wiggins fully blind to this concern.490) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485 Mauss 1938: 18–19 
486 Ibid: 18. Hollis presents a fair summary of the development up to this point (Hollis 1985: 219). 
487 Mauss 1938: 19 
488 Hollis 1985: 217 
489 La Fontaine 1985: 123 
490 Wiggins 1996: 248 
In the classical era, Greeks and Romans seem to have found no need whatever for a 
term with the general sense or function of the word ‘person’.27 
 
27 The Latin word persona means primarily (1) mask or (2) a character in a drama. What first 
pushed the word in the direction of its modern meaning was the task of codifying Roman 
Law. 
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 It is only after the advent of Christianity that Mauss sees ‘person’ to pick out 
all and every human being for the entirety of their existence. It is here that we have the 
transition from ‘the notion of persona, of “a man clad in a condition”, to the notion of 
man, quite simply, that of the human “person” (personne).’491 This is a fourth strand of 
the notion of a person, which grounds Wiggins’ treatment. There is no need for present 
purposes to examine it in too great a depth – except to say that, following the 
intermingling of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the evolution of the concept 
of the soul, Mauss claims that ‘person’ begins to apply to all human beings (just as all 
human beings have a soul, ‘which Christianity had given them’).492 Personhood becomes 
something that all humans, citizens or slaves, possess and cannot be stripped of. 
 
§2.3.b. A critique of Wiggins’ semantic analysis 
 
As we use it in everyday speech, ‘person’ functions in multifarious ways; the study above 
is taken to lend substance to the claim that the notion of a ‘person’ is a cultural 
accretion, a ‘syncretic phenomenon’. It is not, as Mauss presciently saw, a ‘primordial 
innate idea, clearly engraved since Adam in the innermost depths of our being…’493 
 Crucially, our use of the term ‘person’ is guided by conflicting rationales. We use 
it as though it picks out particulars but also, sometimes, as though it picks out concrete 
universals; we use it as though it were a natural kind word, but also stipulatively. The 
thought here is that an analysis of our use of so plastic a term cannot provide a stable 
basis for Wiggins’ descriptivist claims. How we use it will grant us no insight into a 
coherent pre-theoretical concept.494 
 Furthermore, focussing on ‘our’ use of the term may be seen to introduce 
cultural biases into Wiggins’ descriptivist picture. Wiggins is interested in some strands 
of the notion of a ‘person’ but not others. The concrete universal conception is 
marginalized – but what then of the cultures, like the Balinese, which put particular 
emphasis on this understanding of personhood? Do they fail to capture a fundamental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 Mauss 1938: 19 
492 Ibid: 17. See also La Fontaine 1985: ‘[the conception of prosopon] is translated by Christianity into the 
idea of the soul to arrive finally at the notion of a unity, of body and soul, mind and conscience, thought 
and action which is summed up in the concept of the individual which Mauss labeled ‘la personne morale’ 
(124). See also Hollis 1985: 217 
493 Mauss 1938: 20 
494 More generally, one might wonder whether the person concept can be reduced in this way, whether 
attempting to separate certain elements will damage that rich and complex notion. One may well think 
that the ambiguities between these different, occasionally conflicting elements, are an important feature of 
our living language, and our way of interacting with others. This is prompted by Wittgensteinian thoughts 
conveyed to me by Christoph Schuringa. 
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element of our conceptual scheme? Wiggins can, plausibly, avoid such morally and 
politically disturbing conclusions495 by revising his reading of Geertz, and focussing on 
the obvious ability he shares with the Balinese, for getting ‘on net’. Still, it is important 
to recognize the worry, which touches all metaphysical inquiries but achieves particular 
prominence with this descriptivist project, that the cultural bearing of the philosopher 
will have direct effects on their metaphysical claims. 
 Do these thoughts disturb the conceptual consilience of person and human being? 
It should be remembered that Wiggins does not think there is a ‘transcendental 
argument’ to conjoin the two concepts.496 He simply aims to provide arguments that 
strongly suggest a connection. And where the semantic analysis fails, he may turn to the 
other two connecting cords: the Strawsonian argument and the argument from 
interpretation. Perhaps they more neatly tie person and human being together? Perhaps – 
but if so, the connection is not quite of the kind that Wiggins claims. 
 The Strawsonian argument and the argument from interpretation are not based 
on how we use the term ‘person’; rather, they are used to flesh out the structure that 
undergirds our everyday thoughts. If we examine our modes of thought ascription we 
will find that thinking things must be material things. If we look to how we interact with 
one another we see that we must understand others as subjects of interpretation. Wiggins 
takes these thoughts to elucidate an element of our conceptual scheme – the person 
concept. 
 They are persuasive arguments, and both hint towards the conceptual 
concordance of this basic, pre-theoretical thought and the thought of a human being – 
one of us – the kind of biological being with our distinctive capacity for culture, and so 
on. On these grounds, Wiggins holds that person and human being assign the same principle 
of activity; when we are interested in the persistence conditions of one, we can examine 
the persistence conditions of the other. Claiming this, he is implicitly committed to the 
thought that both person (which we might reasonably take to cover the things whose 
persistence the personal identity debate is focussed in tracking) and human being are 
substance sortals. The question to be investigated in the remainder of this chapter is: what 
justifies this substance sortal reading of person? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 See, e.g. Wiggins 1980: 222 ‘We entertain the idea, unless we are irredeemably conceited or colonialist 
in mentality, that there be something we ourselves can learn from strangers about the true, the good, and 
the rational…’ 
496 Wiggins 1995: 248 
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‘Person’ looks like a fundamental or basic sort of classification.497 
 
This conclusion emerges, in ‘The Person as Object of Science…’, from Wiggins’ 
semantic analysis. When we use the term ‘person’, we use it as a substance sortal 
predicate, which applies to an individual for every moment of their existence. Yet our 
everyday usage is not, as noted, a stable foundation for Wiggins’ position. So: can the 
substance sortal reading be substantiated by the other two arguments? 
 On a generous interpretation, the Strawsonian argument supports the claim 
that certain psychological states can only be enjoyed by beings with a particular 
physiology – human beings. But this, by itself, is not enough for Wiggins’ purposes. It 
might be basic to our conceptual scheme to understand psychological beings as material 
beings; it remains open whether or not psychological beings must be psychological 
beings for every moment of their existence.498 
 What about the analysis founded in Davidson’s ideas about interpretation? Is 
the notion of a subject of interpretation necessarily the notion of a fundamental sort of 
thing? If an individual is a subject of interpretation is it necessarily so at every moment 
of its existence? Consider again what is meant by ‘interpretation’: 
 
[T]he only way for us to make sense of being a person is to think of 
persons… as subjects of fine-grained interpretation by us, as subjects for 
whom we are subjects of fine-grained interpretation, and as creatures 
with whom we can have relations of co-operation and reciprocity.499 
 
Understood thus, can we conceive of personhood as being acquired? Let us turn to our 
everyday dealings. Think of gestating or newly born babies. Think of the way we interact 
with them. We do not treat them as beings we can reason with, with whom we can 
engage in joint projects. We do not see them as beings who – but for some physiological 
impairment – interpret, reason, empathize, or imagine themselves in our shoes (unlike, 
e.g. adults suffering severe mental delay). There are conceptual capacities they have yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497 Wiggins 1987: 63 
498 And indeed, attending to his comments in his 1987 paper, Wiggins does not seem to want to use the 
Strawsonian point to do anything other than gesture towards the connection. 
499 Wiggins 2000: 1 
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to acquire.500 There is potential there, but we do not enter into co-operative and 
reciprocal relations with them. 
 The thought that personhood is acquired is nicely captured by David Bakhurst 
in his commentary ‘Wiggins on Persons and Human Nature’.501 Bakhurst emphasizes 
the process of enculturation that eventually allows a child to ‘tune in’, or ‘get on net’, with 
those around it: 
 
Human beings owe their distinctive psychological powers to ‘cumulative 
cultural evolution’: each individual inherits the legacy of the collective 
achievements of past generations. This is not just a matter of the 
transmission of knowledge and skills across generations. Rather, 
children’s minds and characters are formed through their assimilation of 
culture. At its strongest, this perspective endorses an idea that might be 
thought anathema to Wiggins, though it emerges in the work of thinkers 
he admires, such as John McDowell and Lev Vygotsky: the idea that 
personhood is acquired. On such a view, human beings are born ‘mere 
animals’ and become persons as they attain a ‘second nature’, in the form 
of conceptual capacities and moral sensibilities which make them, as 
McDowell puts it, ‘at home in the space of reasons’. These capacities and 
sensibilities are acquired and refined through Bildung – initiation into the 
traditions of thought and action embodied in language and culture. 
Personhood is thus both a result of the normal maturation of human 
beings and an artefact of culture.502, 503 
 
Bakhurst’s proposal can be read as suggesting that the person concept – underwritten by 
the Davidsonian notion of a subject of interpretation – need not be a notion of a 
fundamental kind of thing. And this seems to resonate with our interpretative 
procedures; it makes sense, for example, of many of the ways that we think of and 
interact with gestating or newly-born babies. At the very least it puts the onus on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Note too, how commonplace it is to wonder what kind of person a baby, as yet unborn or newly-born, 
will become. Looking at an ultra-sound image of a foetus we may well think the entity depicted there is 
not yet a person, but will become one. 
501 Bakhurst 2005 
502 Ibid: 467 
503 In anticipation of the discussions in chapter 3 it should be noted that this picture fits neatly with John 
Dupré’s (e.g. Dupré 2010c/2012). 
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Wiggins to explain why, if one is a subject of interpretation, one must have always have 
been so. 
 Wiggins’ reply to Bakhurst is as follows: 
 
Reading his proposal quite literally, I am troubled to think that one might 
find oneself saying that A was more of a person aged 32 than he was at 
20, or that B was more of a person than C was and meaning it quite 
literally. Once we started saying that sort of thing and taking it as 
seriously confirming Bakhurst’s proposal, we should need to take more 
seriously than we now do the fact that we sometimes say ‘D is a real 
Mensch’ whereas (we say) ‘E is scarcely human’ – ways of talking we do 
not think of as committing us to think of human beinghood as something 
acquired or committing us to exempt E from all reproof for his 
callousness or brutality. Is it not better to conceive of a human person as 
a creature with a natural capacity, which may or may not be realized, for 
reason, morality, Bildung… and better to say that these achievements 
fulfil the potentialities of human beinghood / personhood? Adapting a 
dictum of Woodger’s I have quoted before would it not be better to say 
that the child is the primordium of the moral / rational being but not of the 
future person, because the child already is that person?504 
 
Yet Bakhurst’s proposal is in conflict with none of this. Wiggins is articulating two 
objections – but neither is an insurmountable obstacle. 
 His first objection sounds on a moral register and follows from his views, 
alluded to above, about what it means to be a ‘good person’. In his 1976 essay ‘Truth, 
Invention, and the Meaning of Life’505 he suggests that to think of personhood as a 
status to be achieved ‘make[s] a mess of what we mean by “a good person”’.506 Where 
personhood is seen as a socially-determined status, ‘person’ is used as a functional term 
(i.e. as referring to beings with a determinate, specifiable function/purpose) and this is 
at odds with the emphasis in our everyday moral language, which revolves around 
notions of autonomy and the exercise of our human capacities for self-direction.507 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 Wiggins 2005a: 475 
505 Wiggins 1976 and also 1987 
506 Wiggins 1987: 63 
507 Wiggins 2000: 1 Note too, that this connects to the moral objection to the nominal-essentialist account 
of ‘person’ (described above). 
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is one way of understanding the claim above that it is ‘better to conceive of a human 
person as a creature with a natural capacity, which may or may not be realized, for 
reason, morality, Bildung…’. The pre-theoretical concept is deeply embedded in our 
moral practices – and our moral practices belie any functional reading of it (as having a 
principle of functioning). 
 Wiggins’ second – related – point seems to be that persons are better 
understood as creatures with certain natural capacities because it is only by seeing them 
thus – and not as beings defined by some nominal essence – that we can accommodate 
the aposiopesis that is a necessary correlate of seeing individuals as subjects of interpretation 
(note how the ellipsis that signals the essential incompleteness of the list is included in 
the quotation).508 We cannot stipulate what capacities a being must have to be ‘one of 
us’. We must look to the world to discover this. When thinking properly ‘about what 
interpretation and reciprocity involve on the levels of reason and response’509 the only 
stereotype we can have of a person is a human being.510 
 Yet Bakhurst can wholeheartedly agree that the constructionist, stipulative 
account of personhood is problematic. His suggestion, refined here, is only that our 
stereotype of a person is a human being who has achieved some level of psychological-
cum-cultural integration (not e.g. an unborn, or newly born, baby). When we think 
about persons we naturally think of beings whom we can interpret and who can 
interpret us; our stereotype is a human being who has passed through certain 
developmental stages. (Wiggins himself exhibits this bias in the above quotation, where 
he suggests that Bakhurst’s proposal licenses the thought at a 32 year-old could be 
‘more of a person’ than a 20 year-old. It might suggest that a 32 year-old is more of a 
person than a one day-old, or an unborn baby in the third trimester of gestation – but 
this is less intuitively surprising.) Seeing personhood as a stage in the life of a human 
being does not commit one to thinking that the marks of personhood are stipulated by 
us. We do not think of butterfly or fawn as being nomologically shallow concepts just 
because they refer to stages in an animal’s life. 
 Perhaps Wiggins will say – following Aristotle – that human beings are 
essentially ‘rational animals’. On these grounds he may justifiably object to Bakhurst’s 
claim that ‘human beings are born “mere animals” and become persons as they attain a 
“second nature”’ since it conflicts with the Aristotelian thought that rationality pervades 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508 See also Wiggins 2001: 198 
509 Wiggins 2000: 1 
510 Ibid: 199: ‘the marks of personhood are assembled of persons as we know them from the only case we 
shall ever become familiar with, namely that of persons who are human beings.’ 
	   116	  
our being, and is not a skill to be acquired.511 And, in his early work, Wiggins does 
appear to interpret ‘person’ along these lines, as being the form, the psuche, of the human 
being. He writes, in the avowedly Aristotelian ISTC: 
 
[F]or our purposes it will not do very much harm to think of psuche as 
much the same notion as person…512 
 
Yet this is not how he reads ‘person’ now. Roughly, a rational animal is a creature that 
can learn, and understand, and think about itself, and find its place in the world. A person 
is such a creature that is also one of us – a being who we can interpret and who interprets 
us. The two are distinct. As was seen above (§2.2.b), there may be rational animals – 
dolphins, or aliens – who are not persons.513 
 Where, then, does this leave us? Nothing that has been said seems to have 
severed the conceptual connection between person and human being; irrespective of the 
semantic analysis, the Strawsonian argument and the argument from interpretation 
provide strong grounds for thinking that our pre-theoretical concept – ‘person’ – is 
sustained by our notion of a human being. Still, the contention has been that the 
connection is different in kind from the one that Wiggins finds. In S&S and S&SR, he 
holds that both sortals assign the same underlying principle of activity;514 for this to be 
the case, both need to be substance sortals. Guided by Bakhurst, however, we are led to 
the thought that personhood – insofar as it is underwritten by the Davidsonian notion 
of a subject of interpretation – can be acquired. It was claimed too that the Strawsonian 
argument does not justify the substantial reading. Person, while still construed as a 
fundamental element of our conceptual scheme, appears as a restriction of human 
being.515 
 The thought that person is a ‘fundamental or basic sort of classification’ is 
grounded in the way we use the term ‘person’. It is true that we do use it as a substance 
sortal (think how awkward we find the claim that human beings become persons) – but 
we use it too as though it describes a phase. The ‘mask’516 and ‘legal’517 conceptions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 For a helpful introduction to this Aristotelian thought see Boyle forthcoming. 
512 Wiggins 1967: 46–47 
513 Wiggins 1987: 72 
514 Wiggins 2001: 194 
515 In fact, attention to Wiggins’ own various discussions of the relation between the concepts person and 
human being suggests an asymmetric dependence, characteristic of the dependence of a restricted sortal on 
a substance sortal. See Wiggins 1987: 60 and 75 
516 See, e.g. Mauss 1938: 8–9 
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person – both still present in our practices – construe ‘person’ as a status that an 
individual can attain. Similarly, on the Lockean account, one may conceive of a man 
ceasing to be one person and becoming another, 
 
[This explains] our way of speaking in English when we say such an one 
is ‘not himself’, or is ‘beside himself’; in which phrases it is insinuated, as 
if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that self was 
changed; the selfsame person was no longer in that man.518 
 
The genealogy shows that our uses of the term are supported by different, sometimes 
conflicting rationales. It thus demonstrates why our use cannot be a stable foundation 
for Wiggins’ analysis. It also indicates a point at which the term ‘person’ began to 
function properly as a substance sortal term – after the advent of Christianity (see 
2.3.a.iv.) – and the suggestion here is that it is this seam in the rich and variegated 
notion, and not some pre-theoretical concept, that Wiggins is tapping when he presents 
his substantial reading of ‘person’. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 See e.g. Tur 1987: 117 (and Mauss 1938: 17) 
518 Locke (1690/1975): II, xxvii, §18. Note the descriptivist appeals in this passage – it is a commonplace 
of our natural way of talking to describe ourselves as becoming different persons. This is suggested too, by 
common phrases like ‘she was a different person then’ and ‘you’re a different person here than at work’ 
(and so on). 
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§2.4. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been threefold; firstly, to present a clear statement of 
Wiggins’ account of personal identity; secondly, to correct various misreadings of it; and 
thirdly, to suggest a modification to his claim about conceptual consilience. 
 Central to Wiggins’ view is a careful and complex elucidation of the person 
concept; he shows how it functions in our everyday language, and ties it to the 
Davidsonian notion of a subject of interpretation. What emerges from his analysis is the 
claim that, when properly considered, we find that person is conceptually consilient with 
human being. The genealogy, however, encouraged us to test the semantic analysis of our 
use of the term ‘person’. Our use, it was suggested, is guided by conflicting rationale – 
and, as a result, Wiggins’ reading of ‘person’ was seen to be inflected by certain socio-
cultural biases. Among these was the thought that our notion of a person is necessarily 
the notion of a substance. This thought is not licensed or corroborated by the 
Strawsonian argument or the argument from interpretation. It might be that our 
understanding of what it is to be a psychological being involves understanding that 
being as in some way material; and perhaps our notion of a person is developed through 
examination of creatures on the same wavelength as us – but these claims are 
compatible with the further thought that person is a sortal term that marks a phase of the 
life of a human being. Thus the conceptual relation between person and human being – if 
there is one – might well be an asymmetric one. A human being may be understood to 
become a person; their spatio-temporal limits, therefore, are not the same. This 
undermines a central tenet of Wiggins’ human being theory, that those two concepts assign 
the same principle of activity. 
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 THE BIOLOGY OF PERSONS 
 
Leaving aside the issues about the consilience of person and human being, let us fix our 
thoughts more firmly on the latter of the two concepts. Irrespective of the fate of person, 
Wiggins takes human beings to be natural substances – and examining his analysis one 
becomes aware of how his metaphysical project intersects with certain concerns in the 
philosophy of biology. Specifically, his work bears on, and is affected by, discussions 
about biological anti-reductionism and biological individuality. It is the aim of this chapter to 
draw these discussions out. 
 As was noted in the introduction, Wiggins enters forceful claims about the 
relevance of the philosophy of biology to metaphysical issues519 – yet despite these 
claims, and occasional allusions to differing conceptions of that science,520 he fails to 
offer a sustained treatment of these issues. Moreover, his view appears to verge on what 
he calls ‘the anti-scientistic’521 and he writes, at times, to deny his aim has ever been ‘to 
place the question of what we are under the alien direction of physiologists, biologists, 
evolutionists or others who are expert in matters relating to organisms.’522 
Thus, commentators tend not to discuss the role of biology in Wiggins’ work,523 
unless it is to bemoan his failure to attend to it. (Michael Ruse, for example, describes 
him as displaying ‘an almost proud ignorance of the organic world.’524) This, it shall be 
argued, is an oversight of his critics. The following reading presents Wiggins as having a 
determinate view of the place of biology in his philosophical system – and this chapter 
aims to collect together and interpret his thoughts on the application of that science in 
metaphysics.  
What emerges is a broadly neo-Aristotelian analysis of the metaphysical 
character of organisms – an anti-reductionism, it is argued, that stands as a productive 
alternative to the kind of biological ‘emergentism’ advanced by, among others, John 
Dupré. Wiggins’ neo-Aristotelian picture is compatible with the thought that organisms 
are real because they possess novel causal properties, but it is not committed to it. Unlike 
the emergentist, Wiggins is not directly interested in causal dependence, but rather in 
some form of ontological dependence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 Wiggins 1967: vii, 1980: vii, 1996: 228, 2001: xi 
520 Wiggins 2001: xiii, 2005a: 475–6, 2012: 14ff 
521 Wiggins 2012: 14 
522 Wiggins 2001: 234 (see also 2005a: 475–476) 
523 Samir Okasha is a notable exception here – and his 2002 paper is discussed below. 
524 Michael Ruse 1987: n.358 
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Before turning to this, however, a more immediate concern must be addressed. 
Wiggins defers to biology to flesh out the human being principle – the theoretical 
description that allows us to articulate the spatio-temporal boundaries of human 
organisms. Yet, turning to the philosophy of biology, one finds lively debate about the 
possibility of some such theoretical description, and even about the viability of the 
organism concept itself. The aim in the next section is to set out this concern with 
biological individuality in greater depth, and to offer some clarifications. 
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§3.1. Investigating the human being pr inc ip le  
 
Wiggins states that when we pick out and track human beings – as we often do in our 
daily lives – our efforts are guided by a clear, if indistinct,525 idea of what the principle of 
activity of a human being is. We have a rough and ready conception of the activity, of 
such a thing – and, he writes, biological inquiry can tell us more about the typical growth 
patterns, behaviour, development, etc., of creatures like us: 
 
[W]e are led by simple conceptual considerations to precisely the account 
of living substances that biologists can fill out a posteriori by treating them 
as systems open to their surroundings, but so constituted that a delicate 
self-regulating balance of serially linked enzymatic degradative and 
synthesizing chemical reactions enables them to renew themselves on the 
molecular level at the expense of those surroundings, such renewal taking 
place under a law-determined variety of conditions in a determinate 
pattern of growth and development towards and/or persistence in some 
particular form.526 
 
However, when we turn to biology to precisify our understanding of these everyday 
individuals, certain puzzles appear. Picking human organisms out phenomenally seems 
relatively straightforward (we just ‘see’ organisms and take them to be delimited, e.g. by 
the boundaries of their skin), but investigation at the microscopic level shows that a 
human organism is: 
 
…a symbiotic system containing a multitude of microbial cells – bacteria, 
archaea, and fungi – without which the whole would be seriously 
dysfunctional and ultimately non-viable.527 
 
We enjoy numerous, mutually beneficial relationships with the vast numbers of 
endosymbionts that live within us. Are these endosymbionts parts of us? Do we include 
their activities in the ‘principle of activity’ of the human being? (The processes they are 
involved in – digestive, immunological, etc. – are not unimportant for our survival.) The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 See Wiggins’ Leibnizian thoughts on this in his 2012: 8 
526 Wiggins 2001: 86 
527 Dupré 2010a/2012: 125 See also Paracer and Ahmadjian 2000 for a good overview. 
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puzzle becomes even starker when we consider apparently colonial organisms, like slime 
moulds, corals and medusae jelly-fish.528 How do we set a principled limit to an 
investigation into the organismic activity? 
 Such questions – sidelined in discussions of personal identity529 – are raised 
philosophers of biology interested in biological individuality.530 While we seem, relatively 
unproblematically, to be able to pick out human beings (and many other organisms) 
phenomenally, this phenomenal ability of ours does not offer substantial theoretical 
grounds for saying what counts as a part of an individual. Thus, it is not clear where the 
limits of human ‘activity’ lie. 
 There are various responses to this kind of worry. 
We might – like Eliot Sober – think that organismic boundaries can be set by 
reference to something like ‘functional integration’.531 This chimes with our 
commonsense view of the biological realm, where – as Stephen J. Gould has it – a 
biological item  
 
…is an organism if it is spatially separated from others and if its parts are 
so well integrated that they work only in co-ordination with others and 
for the proper function of the whole.532  
 
Yet, as Thomas Pradeu has noted, functional integration remains awkwardly gestural: 
 
[W]e simply trust our impression that the organism is a coherent ‘whole’, 
which we cut into functional pieces.533 
 
Functional integration occurs at many different levels; cells are spatiotemporally 
localized and functionally integrated, but so are symbionts, and ‘colonial’ organisms, 
which have common vascular networks.534 There are innumerable overlaps, which 
suggest that ‘functional integration’ is not enough – or at least, not enough by itself – to 
provide substantial theoretical grounds for demarcating organismic limits. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528 Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 71 
529 Jack Wilson (in his 1999) draws attention to the tendency of such philosophers to overlook the 
relevance of philosophy of biology to personal identity. 
530 See e.g. Clarke forthcoming, Pradeu 2010, J. Wilson 1999 
531 Sober 2000: 151 
532 Gould 1984 (as quoted in J. Wilson 1999: 62) 
533 Pradeu 2010: 4 
534 Ibid: 5 
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 Perhaps instead we should make reference to the ‘human genome’ when talking 
about what is and what is not a part of the human being? On the genetic view, the 
organism’s parts are seen to be genetically homogenous; each cell in the human body 
has a characteristic genome, which is unique and distinctive to us. Symbionts, then, are 
excluded as parts because they are genetically different.535 Maybe it is by mapping our 
genetic codes that we can better understand our distinctive principle of activity? 
However, despite the pervasive assumption that there is a one-to-one relation 
between an organism and its genome, philosophers of biology view this idea as deeply 
problematic. Dupré, in his paper ‘The Polygenomic Organism’, identifies a number of 
points of controversy. Firstly, genetic individuals can be composed of spatially 
discontinuous clones (the genet versus the ramet individual). This is the case with aphid 
colonies (the product of asexual reproduction) and monozygotic twins536 – 
conglomerates we would not normally take to be individual organisms. Secondly, 
genetic mosaicism and chimerism – where different parts of the organism have different 
genomes – abound in the natural world (e.g. calico and tortoiseshell cats).537 A third 
challenge corresponds to the pervasiveness of epigenetic processes.538 In short, drawing 
organismic boundaries along genetic lines will lead us to lose sight of the original entities 
we picked out phenomenally. 
One may start to doubt there is a scientific theory that bears out our everyday 
individuative practices – but this is an unduly pessimistic conclusion. In order to set the 
parameters for the investigation into the activity of these phenomenal entities, Wiggins 
can call on recent work by Thomas Pradeu and Edgardo Carosella,539 which presents 
arguments for a physiological-immunological view of biological individuality. 
 As mentioned, organisms are commonly seen to be functionally integrated units 
– this was Gould’s assessment. The problem identified above was that the notion of 
‘functional integration’ – realized in ‘physiological’ accounts540 – was too vague. There are 
too many puzzle cases where it remains unclear whether the parts of the apparent 
organisms are themselves functionally integrated entities.541 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 Where philosophers interested in personal identity do engage with this discussion this seems to be the 
line that they take – see, e.g. Olson 1997: 129. 
536 Dupré 2010a/12: 118 
537 Ibid: 119 
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539 See Pradeu 2010 and Pradeu and Carosella 2006 
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Yet, in recent work, Pradeu (with Carosella) has presented a way of 
supplementing the standard physiological, functional-integration account, with a 
‘criterion of immunogenicity’ – and has consequently provided a viable alternative to the 
two views described above. For present purposes this approach need only be given in 
outline. He claims that the immunological system operates as a principle of inclusion for 
the organism, and can accordingly be used to draw the relevant lines to demarcate the 
organism. In his paper ‘What is an organism?’ Pradeu writes: 
 
[T]he immune system, by its surveillance activity, defines what will be 
accepted, and what will be rejected, by the organism, and therefore a 
criterion of immunogenicity constitutes a criterion of inclusion for the 
organism: the distinction between the entities which will stick together as 
constituents of the organism, and those which will be rejected from the 
organism, is made by the immune system.542 
 
Thus the immune system provides principled grounds for drawing the boundaries of the 
functional-integrated ‘whole’. It is a sub-system, the activity of which determines which 
are and which are not proper parts of an organism. Moreover, this account indicates a 
primary level of functional integration: cells may well be functionally-integrated, but the 
immune system provides grounds for defining them as parts of a greater (functionally 
integrated) unity.543 In sum, therefore, Pradeu’s focus on the immunological allows him 
to bolster the standard physiological account, and to overcome the issues of vagueness. 
Further, if successful, this physiological-immunological view provides Wiggins with a 
sound scientific basis by which to pick out certain interconnecting biological 
interactions544 – those moderated by the immune system – and to state that these are the 
physiological processes that constitute the ‘principle of activity’ of the organism. 
 It may be objected that Pradeu’s view still fails to capture the everyday entities 
that Wiggins is interested in. In contrast to previous immunological accounts,545 
Pradeu’s departs from what is known as the ‘self-nonself’ criterion of immunogenicity, 
which claims that an organism does not trigger immune responses to its own 
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(Pradeu 2010: 6) 
544 Pradeu 2010: 9 
545 Paradigm texts include Metchnikoff 1907 and Loeb 1937 (more recently, Gould and Lloyd 1999) 
	   125	  
constituents but to every foreign entity. Pradeu follows this line to accommodate the 
immune role that exogenous bacteria play in our bodies (they register, immunologically, 
as ‘parts’ of the body). But the result is that his account construes organisms as having 
heterogeneous constituents.546 He takes this to be ‘counter-intuitive’ to our everyday 
thoughts about organisms.547  
This worry, however, should not detain us. On reflection, it seems odd to say 
that revelations at this level of biological scrutiny are ‘counter-intuitive’. Few of us are 
aware of the huge numbers of symbiotic bacteria that cover our skin and the lining of 
our guts, so there will be no intuitions about whether or not they are parts of us. If 
Wiggins tacks thus, this rendering of organisms need not disturb him. On the 
phenomenal level, a human being conceived as an organism with heterogeneous 
constituents will not seem relevantly different from a human being seen otherwise.548 
Indeed, this finding is precisely the kind of information that biological inquiry into the 
human being principle was expected, hoped even, to deliver. 
 Pradeu’s physiological-immunological theory provides a suitably precise 
theoretical framework in which investigations into the human being principle may be 
conducted. Thus, the initial puzzles about the limits of human ‘activity’ may be 
bypassed. With this strut in place, attention can now be turned to discussions about the 
metaphysical character of organismic individuals. 
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547 Ibid: 11 
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§3.2. Are organisms real? 
 
In his paper, ‘Biology’s “Phoenix”: Historical Perspectives on the Importance of the 
Organism’, Keith R. Benson describes the twentieth-century relegation of the concept 
of the ‘organism’ to the backwaters of biological theory. He sets out an opposition 
between older, organismic theories of biology, and more recent, reductionistic ones: 
 
[T]he older tradition, with its descriptive methods from Aristotle, and the 
modern interpretation, often described as reductionistic and mechanistic, 
have been depicted as mortal adversaries and competitors. J.H. Woodger, 
the major twentieth-century advocate of the organism, popularized this 
notion in his 1930 article in the Quarterly Review of Biology. 
 
In histories of biology in the dim future there will probably be a 
chapter entitled ‘The Struggle for Existence of the Concept of 
Organicism in the Early Twentieth Century’, which will relate 
how this concept came to be neglected on account of the 
influence of Descartes, how the metaphysics of natural science 
in the Nineteenth Century so completely dazzled biologists that 
they never dreamed of regarding organisms as being anything 
but swarms of little invisible hard lumps in motion, and how the 
first blossoming of the concept of organism towards the end of 
the century was nipped in the bud by the mismanagement of 
those who advocated it. (Woodger, 1930–31) 
 
The struggle, which David Hull described as ‘more reminiscent of 
political polemics and biblical exegesis than science’ (Hull, 1974), 
eventually and inexorably led to the removal of the organism from center 
stage by the twentieth century.549 
 
This passage is interesting for a variety of reasons. Wiggins – as discussed – takes 
organisms to be paradigm substances. That is, he falls firmly on the Aristotelian side of 
the described opposition. He exemplifies the ‘descriptive methods’ of Aristotle, where 
metaphysics is guided by our everyday navigation of the world, and ontology 	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encapsulates those entities, like human beings, to which we cannot but attend. Like 
Woodger, Wiggins is a biological anti-reductionist (and the mention of J.H. Woodger, a 
somewhat neglected theoretical biologist and philosopher of biology,550 is significant 
too, since he is one of the few to whom Wiggins regularly refers when writing on 
biology (a connection discussed in greater detail below)).551 
 Benson’s article, written in 1989, situates reductionism as the mainstream. The 
terms ‘reductionism’ and ‘anti-reductionism’ are clarified below, but Woodger’s 
characterization captures the general idea: reductionists see organisms to be nothing 
more than the sum of their physico-chemical parts – anti-reductionists resist this claim, 
and Wiggins seems to be among them. Benson, towards the end of his paper, suggests 
that imminent research will encourage a revival of interest in the latter, and this has been 
borne out, to some extent, by the now widespread critiques of reductionism, and the 
growing popularity of the kind of emergentist thesis found in the work of Dupré. 
 The aim of the remainder of this chapter is to set out a particular dialectic 
between reductionists and anti-reductionists, and to show how Wiggins provides a novel 
and generative form of neo-Aristotelian anti-reductionism. It is suggested that a central 
point of controversy in the standard debate is whether or not organisms have novel causal 
properties. Anti-reductionists argue that they do and that, because of this, they are real. By 
contrast, Wiggins’ neo-Aristotelian picture positions an organism as irreducible, not 
because its parts are causally dependent upon the whole, but because they are ontologically 
dependent upon it. 
 
§3.2.a. ‘Reductionism’ and ‘anti-reductionism’ 
 
‘Biological reductionism refers to not one, but a family of interrelated theses,552 which 
may be distinguished from one another in a variety of ways. The first aim of this section 
is to clarify the different kinds of reductionism (and their antithetical partners);553 the 
second is to focus on a particular area of disagreement between anti-reductionists and 
reductionists, which concerns the reality of organisms. 
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552 Dupré 1993: 88 
553 Hull 1979 and Wimsatt 1976 both take this ordering to be necessary in statements of anti-
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 Ingo Bridgandt and Alan Love present a tripartite division between types of 
reductionism: epistemic, metaphysical and methodological.554 As they construe it epistemic 
reductionism focuses on theories, or concepts or models, and claims that such items in 
one scientific domain – e.g. biology – can be translated into,555 or derived from,556 or explained 
by557 theories, concepts or models in another – e.g. physics. Here, reduction can be 
conceived synchronically or diachronically – between contemporaneous theories or 
successive ones.558 Epistemic reductionists are primarily interested in how the branches 
of human knowledge connect, not about what entities there are, or what methods we 
should employ to investigate the biological realm. These latter areas correlate to 
Brigandt and Love’s characterization of metaphysical and methodological reductionism. 
 Metaphysical reductionism focuses on the structure of reality, and (relatedly) 
whether certain biological items do or do not exist. In general terms, the metaphysical 
reductionist’s thesis is that biological things are ‘nothing more’ than the physico-
chemical items that make them up (bundles of quarks or fields, etc.).559 The historical 
debate about the viability of the vitalist’s thesis demonstrates these kinds of metaphysical 
concerns. The vitalist holds that there are non-physico-chemical forces – vital sparks or 
élan vital – that govern biological systems.560 The metaphysical reductionists (in this 
context sometimes called ‘mechanists’)561 reject this view of non-spatial, formative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Brigandt and Love 2008. See also Nagel 1998, Sarkar 1992, and Wolfe 2010 
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Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. In the Unity of Science, Carnap advocates the translation of all statements – 
phenomenalist, biological, philosophical, etc. – into the language of the physical sciences (Carnap 1934). 
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The Structure of Science (1961). Nagel’s model – derivative – holds that a reduction is effected when the laws 
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theory (Nagel 1961: 345–358). 
557 Explanatory reductionism – advanced by e.g. Wimsatt and Kenneth Waters  (Wimsatt 1976, Waters 
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observations that are explained in the former (see Ney 2008). Like the derivative reductionists, the 
explanatory reductionists post a single ‘ultimate’ theory but also (i) admit reduction between fragments of 
theories and individual facts (thus taking theoretical weight off problematic ‘bridge laws’) and (ii) describe 
reductive explanations as causal explanations, where higher-level features in the domain of e.g. biology, are 
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558 Dupré 1993: 94 
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560 The most well-known (recent) representatives of this approach are Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch, 
(see Mayr 2004: 23) who describe the ‘formative power’, as ‘“something” without spatial character and to 
which no definite position in space can be assigned’, an entelechy. (Driesch 1908) 
561 As with ‘reductionism’, we must recognize the ambiguous ambit of ‘mechanism’ and ‘vitalism’ (see 
Wolfe 2010 and Hein 1972) and resist being drawn into unhelpful dichotomies (e.g. vitalism versus 
mechanism (Roe 2003)). 
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‘entelechies’. Nowadays, most philosophers of science do the same – few endorse 
mysterious vis vitalis.562 
 Methodological reductionism relates to scientific practice. The methodological 
reductionist claims that biological research should work ‘from the bottom up’. One 
should look to the lowest, most fundamental levels to understand the higher-level 
features. Biological systems, including organisms, are best investigated by looking for 
molecular and biochemical causes. This kind of strategy is described by Bechtel and 
Richardson as ‘decomposition and localization’,563 and is often articulated by reference 
to the use of the machine motif, ubiquitous since the seventeenth century, as the 
‘founding metaphor of modern science’.564 The methodological mechanist (described by 
Dupré, Grene, Depew, Toulmin and Goodfield),565 states that items in the biological 
realm should be understood in the same way that we understand human-engineered 
machines – that is by looking to the parts and working upwards. 
 Though gestural, this tripartite analysis provides a general framework for 
separating out, and assessing, the various reductionist claims. In his paper, Benson 
suggests that reductionist theses are in state of decline – and, with respect to epistemic 
and methodological types this seems to correspond to the current consensus among 
philosophers of biology.566 Over the past decades, there has been growing doubt about 
epistemic, ‘theory’ reductionism, motivated by issues with multiple realizability567 and the 
deductive-nomological model.568 Similarly, though most recognize the successes of a 
mechanistic methodology, it is now seen to be highly controversial, systematically 
blinding the enquirer to relevant high-level features in biological systems.569 
 Metaphysical reductionism, however, is still the subject of lively debate. Most 
philosophers deny the existence of vital sparks – but there remains significant resistance 
to the brand of materialist anti-reductionism proposed by ‘emergentists’. While many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 Cf. Normandin and Wolfe 2013. The relevance of this historical position is also discussed in chapter 4. 
563 Bechtel and Richardson 1993 
564 Dupré 1993: 2 
565 Dupré 1993, Grene and Depew 2004: 36, Toulmin and Goodfield 1962: 207–334 
566 Dupré 2010b/12: 129 
567 For example, in order for the psychological property pain to be reduced to physical properties all 
descriptions of being in pain, for any animal, will have to be worked out as descriptions of the possession 
of those physical properties – and it seems highly unlikely that there are such physical properties (see 
Putnam 1975: 436). 
568 The deductive-nomological model of explanation proposes that phenomena should be explained by 
deduction from initial conditions and genuine, general ‘laws of nature’ – and there are now well-known 
counter-examples to this proposal, which show that the ‘DN’ model provides neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions for scientific explanation (see Theurer forthcoming: 3, Rosenberg 2003: 3. See also, e.g. Scriven’s 
‘singular causal explanations’ which make no appeal to generalized laws (Scriven 1962) and Salmon’s 
examples of ‘defective explanation’ (1971: 34)). 
569 See, e.g. Wimsatt 1980 
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have abandoned the ‘epistemological dream of reductionism’,570 discussion continues 
about its metaphysical tenability, and about the ‘reality’ of biological items.571 This 
discussion is the focus here. Dupré characterizes the relevant disagreement as follows:572 
 
The reductionist believes that in the end there is nothing in the world 
but the stuff of which things are made – let me call this basic physical 
stuff. Of course, the reductionist does not say, bluntly and absurdly, that 
houses, for example, don’t exist. The claim is rather that a house is, 
ultimately, nothing but an aggregate of physical stuff, and all the 
properties of any house can, in principle, be fully explained by appeal to 
the properties and relations of basic physical stuff. So there is a 
possible, microphysically grounded, account of the world which would 
have no need to mention houses. I am insisting, on the contrary, that 
there is a whole hierarchy of increasingly complex things that really 
exist, and that have causal powers that are not reducible to the 
mechanical combination of the powers of their constituents.573 
 
As Dupré presents it, the reductionist sees organisms (and houses, and so on) to be 
nothing more than the physical entities (quarks, etc.) that make them up; they do not 
‘really exist’ in the way that the basic physical stuff does. Elsewhere, he puts this in 
terms of ‘ontological priority’574 and ‘ontological primacy’.575 The reductionist sees 
homogenous matter to be more ‘metaphysically robust’ than higher-level objects. 
 Dupré also presents the disagreement by reference to ‘reality’. The reductionist 
holds that physical stuff is real, while questioning the reality of higher-level items. The 
anti-reductionist says that higher-level items are just as real. Thus Dupré, positioning 
himself in the debate, writes in the first of his Spinoza Lectures as follows: 
 
According to [my] perspective there are many different kinds of thing in 
the world, from physically simple things like electrons or quarks, to very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Dupré 2008a/12: 70 
571 Wolfe 2010: 2 
572 This passage indicates certain points where the Brigandt and Love’s tripartite division fails to identify 
salient connections between epistemic and metaphysical reductionist claims. 
573 Dupré 2008a/12: 72 For the full import of ‘in principle’ see Dupré’s discussion of ‘practical’ versus 
‘theoretical’ reductionism in his 1993 (95–96). 
574 Dupré 1993: 89 
575 Ibid: 92 
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complex things such as planets, elephants or armies. Many or all of 
these things, in my view, have equal claims to reality.576 
 
What is it to be ‘real’ in this context? Unless the anti-reductionists and reductionists are 
to talk past each other they must agree on this. The passage continues, stating (as has 
already been intimated), that being real relates to having causal powers: 
 
At the basis of [my] position is the idea that many or all such entities 
have causal powers that are not simply consequences of the way their 
physical components are fitted together.577 
 
To be real is to have causal powers. This is the view formalized in Jaegwon Kim’s influential 
‘Alexander’s dictum’,578 and the assumption that shapes many of the current, 
metaphysically accented discussions of reductionism. Reductionists hold that biological 
entities are not real in the way the basic physical stuff is real because the properties of 
those higher-level systems are, in the end, simply the result of a linear causal chain 
reaching up from the material substrate. In contrast the ‘emergentists’579 claim that when 
physical systems reach certain levels of complexity novel causal properties emerge, non-
derivable (and not deducible)580 from the properties of their parts581 – and because 
organisms (among other things) have these novel causal properties, they are just as real. 
 We find a wide variety of interrelated reductionist and anti-reductionist theses. 
Attention here is focussed on one point of disagreement in particular. Do organisms exist? 
The reductionists and anti-reductionists disagree because they disagree about whether or 
not organisms have novel causal powers. 
Having now articulated the relevant exchange, Wiggins’ assessment of the 
metaphysical character of organisms will be discussed. There is a reading of his work 
that construes him as an emergentist – but a stronger interpretation attributes to him an 
alternative, neo-Aristotelian form of anti-reductionism, which is compatible with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Dupré 2008a/2012: 70 (my italics) 
577 Ibid: 70 
578 Samuel Alexander: one of the pivotal figures in ‘the Golden Age of British Emergentism’ (see 
Malaterrre 2013: 160). For a more precise statement of Kim’s dictum see Kim 1992 and 1993. 
579 Though n.b. ‘emergentism’ has numerous valences – see O’Connor 2012. See also Garrett (2013: 135) 
for further indication of the shortcomings of Brigandt and Love’s epistemic/metaphysical division, 
particularly with respect to how epistemological claims of emergence relate to metaphysical ones. 
580 See Garrett 2013 for a discussion of how non-derivability relates to non-decibility and inexplicability.  
581  Though, again, there are different types. Cf. Mark Bedau 2003 
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Dupré’s claims, but not committed to them. Attention will be turned first to the former 
emergentist reading. 
 
§3.2.b. An emergentist reading? 
 
There are certainly elements of Wiggins’ project that suggest he might be sympathetic to 
some version of the emergentist thesis. Notable here are his references to the biologist 
J.Z. Young in both Prefaces to SS and S&SR. He writes (in the latter): 
 
I shall recall from the 1980 Preface the keen pleasure that I felt at that 
time on discovering how, in response to all the facts that confront the 
biological scientist, Professor J.Z. Young had arrived, in chapters Five 
and Six of his Introduction to the Study of Man (Oxford, 1971), at a 
conception of identity and persistence through time that is strikingly 
similar, where living things are concerned, to the neo-Aristotelian 
conception that I defend: 
 
The essence of a living thing is that it consists of atoms of the 
ordinary chemical elements we have listed, caught up into the living 
system and made part of it for a while. The living activity takes them 
up and organizes them in its characteristic way. The life of a man 
consists essentially in the activity he imposes upon that stuff… it is 
only by virtue of this activity that the shape and organization of the 
whole is maintained.582 
 
‘The life of a man consists essentially in the activity he imposes upon that stuff’. It 
might be that ‘imposes’ here could be read to refer to some causal influence, which does 
not derive from the body’s constituent parts.  And Wiggins quotes Young again, in the 
Longer Notes of S&S – discussing the defensibility of concepts of organismic guarantee 
(discussed below in §4.1):583 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 Wiggins 2001: xi 
583 Wiggins 1980: 207. Note also, that this quotation appears alongside a quotation from another 20th 
century organicist – Joseph Needham (see the discussion of Needham in Haraway 1976). 
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Thus the activity which we hold to be characteristic is not expressed by 
describing DNA alone, since the interchanges between the organism and 
the environment are the factors that determine what sections of DNA are 
to be transcribed at a particular time and the rates of transcription.584 
 
This quotation alludes to a key challenge to the reductionist program, a problem 
characterized by Hull, as the ‘one–many’ objection.585 As Young indicates, the 
transcription of the DNA depends on the context in which it occurs – a view now widely 
held.586 The implication here is that the functions of the molecules can only be 
understood in terms of context. And the context is the organized whole in which they occur. 
This latter point is a criticism of practical ‘epistemic’ reductionism; but the 
passage can be read too as an endorsement of metaphysical anti-reductionism. Young 
can be interpreted as claiming that the activity of the whole exhibits properties that are 
not caused by properties at the genetic level. The activity of the organism is not causally 
down-stream from that of its parts. This reading can be supported, to an extent, by his 
analysis of homeostasis and ‘living activity’ in chapter 6 of his Introduction to the Study of 
Man,587 and is roughly captured by his comments at the start of chapter 3 (‘Living 
Organization’). Young states: 
 
Study of the outlines the elementary molecular composition of living 
things… has already shown some of the characteristic features of 
organisms. But analysis only at that level can never provide the full basis 
that we require for forecasting their behaviour. In every known organism 
the molecules are organized into systems of a higher order of complexity, 
the cells...588 
 
Although Young himself does not explicitly detail his anti-reductionist position, one 
may interpret these passages, alongside his criticisms of epistemic reductionism,589 as 
describing a form of biological emergentism. Having done so, one might read Wiggins’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 Young 1971: 88 
585 See Hull 1972 
586 Indeed, it is often pointed out that the same allele may lead to two different phenotypes occurring in 
two individuals with a different overall genotype. Brigandt and Love 2008 
587 Young 1971: chapter 6 – see particularly §1, §5, and §6 
588 Ibid: 37 
589 Boycott 1998 
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endorsement of Young as symptomatic of a general inclination towards emergentist 
thought. This, at least, is one line of interpretation. 
Emergentist sympathies might also be found in the combination of Wiggins’ 
emphasis on Bildung590 and his claim that languages (and other social items) are 
irreducible public objects. These elements of his work suggest that he finds novel causal 
properties at higher levels than the physico-chemical. 
As noted (in §2.3.b.), Wiggins’ thoughts about Bildung appear in his reply to 
David Bakhurst. For Wiggins – like Bakhurst – we have distinctive psychological 
capacities, including rationality and morality, which are the effect of cultural formation 
(this emphasis on our ‘encultured’ nature recurs frequently in his texts).591 Wiggins 
claims that our conception of ourselves should embrace ‘our capacities to assimilate 
culture [and] our achievement, such as it still is, of Bildung’.592 And stating this, he 
explicitly positions himself in opposition to the ‘reductive fixations of… present day 
biological science’.593 That is, he takes the process of enculturation to stand against the 
kind of genetic determinism that, for example, reduces morality to a product of genetic 
evolution. 
In the reductive picture – found e.g. in the work of E.O. Wilson594 – our 
psychological capacities (and their causal powers) are the result of an upwards causal 
flow from the interactions of the more fundamental parts.595 In contrast, Wiggins – 
following Bakhurst596 (who in turn follows the Russian psychologist, Lev Vygotsky)597 – 
specifically ties the development of our psychological traits to our assimilation of 
culture.598 That is (as Bakhurst puts it), it is ‘through participation in and internalization 
of social forms of activity that [a] child’s mind is created’.599 This thought runs throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 Wiggins 2005a: 475 
591 Wiggins 1991: Essay V and 2001: chapter 7 passim 
592 Wiggins 2005a: 475 
593 Ibid: 475 
594 Wilson 1975 
595 Consider an (extreme) reductive account of our psychological capacities (taking morality, and 
rationality as place-holders for the rest). A reductionist will describe these faculties and their properties as 
ultimately caused by, and exhaustively explicable in terms of, activity at the genetic level. We inherit a 
genetic ‘program’ (See Smith 2000, Griffiths 2001 and Avise 2001 for more on this metaphor.) from our 
parents, which has been honed over the millennia by natural selection; this ‘program’ causes a particular 
kind of production of RNA, which in turn produces certain proteins, which then organize the specific 
neurological structures that determine the psychological traits we enjoy. In the end, as Robert Wright has 
it, ‘everything boils down to the genes’ – including our psychological capacities (Robert Wright 1994: 9). 
See also Dawkins, e.g. 2006 (217), Rose et al 1984, Lewontin 1993, and Rosenberg 2005) 
596 Wiggins 2001: 195 n.3 
597 Specifically in Bakhurst 1991 
598 See Lovibond 1996 for an overview. 
599 Bakhurst 1991: 78 
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Wiggins’ essays on human value (in his collection Needs, Values, Truth).600 Our 
psychological capacities are not simply the mechanical run-off from some genetic 
blueprint. Rather, he contends, they depend on and feed into ‘a process of interpersonal 
education, instruction, and mutual enlightenment’.601 There are causal influences, other 
than our genetic make-up, that significantly shape the development of a human mind (if 
not its genesis):602 specifically, the systems into which it is initiated via language and 
culture.603 
Two points can be made here. Firstly, these comments by Wiggins – in 
particular, his worries about ‘present day biological science’ – account for his wariness 
(stated at the start of the chapter) about turning to biology to articulate the human being 
principle. Where biology is taken to examine only the effects of the lower-level causes, its 
focus is too narrow.604 
 Secondly, and more importantly here, Wiggins’ emphasis on the formative 
effects of culture suggests sympathy for the emergentist’s thesis. The connection is 
further strengthened when it is remembered that Wiggins endorses a libertarian account 
of free will.605 His suspicions about Dawkins-esque ‘reductive fixations’ are of a piece 
with his worries about determinism – and such worries often seen to be typical of 
emergentist positions.606 Yet the focus on Bildung is not in itself emergentist. It leaves 
open the theoretical possibility that these cultural systems, and everything else, can 
ultimately be understood in purely physico-chemical terms. It is important, then, that 
Wiggins appears to deny that these over-arching systems – of language and ‘culture’ 
(where culture is, i.e. ‘education in the broad sense’)607  – are reducible to the psychology 
of the individuals from which they arise. This claim about the irreducibility, of language, 
is found, e.g., in his comments in ‘Language as a Social Object’: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 It is what underpins what Lovibond denotes his ‘Bildung model of value-experience’ (in her 1996 (76)). 
601 Wiggins 1991: Essay V 
602 At points Wiggins denies that the human person is created through the process of socialization, 
enculturation, etc. He says instead that it is ‘a creature with a natural capacity, which may or may not be 
realized, for reason, morality… Adapting a dictum of Woodger's I have quoted before (see S&SR p. 64), 
would it not be better to say that the child is the primordium of the moral / rational being but not of the 
future person, because the child already is that person?’ Wiggins 2005a: 475 
603 Bakhurst 2005: 467 
604 Thus, replying to Bakhurst, he asks ‘how broadly ought the biological to be conceived’ Wiggins 2005a: 
476 
605 E.g. Wiggins 1987: Essay VIII 
606 See e.g. Malaterre 2013: 158 
607 See Lovibond 1996: 78 
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[A] language like English or Polish is a social object, a public thing with 
attributes irreducible to the individual psychology of its speakers…608 
 
And the irreducibility of culture – in this instance, of the human penchant for humour – 
is found in his ‘A Sensible Subjectivism’: 
 
What is improbable in the extreme is that, either singly or even in 
concert, further explanations will ever add up to a reduction of the funny 
or serve to characterize it in purely natural terms (terms that pull their 
weight in our theoretical-cum-explanatory account of the mechanisms of 
the natural world). If so, the predicate ‘funny’ is an irreducibly subjective 
predicate.609 
 
(Note that in this latter passage, Wiggins seems to be saying that it is, in principle, 
irreducible – not that its irreducibility is a contingent fact of our limited knowledge.) 
The combination of the causal power Wiggins attributes to language and culture, 
and their apparent theoretical irreducibility, invites a reading of emergentism in his 
work: language and culture have novel causal properties that emerge from, but are not 
reducible to, the psychology of their speakers and members, which play a significant role 
in the development of human minds. Read alongside the endorsement of Young, and 
Wiggins’ own libertarian commitments, and this interpretation is strengthened further. 
 
§3.2.c. Reasons for doubt 
 
There are, however, reasons to doubt this emergentist reading. Not least among these is 
that – despite growing popularity610 – emergentism remains deeply controversial. 
Wiggins will be wary about endorsing a thesis that seems to raise serious worries about 
e.g. causal exclusion and downwards causation.611 It is not the aim of the present work to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Wiggins 1997: 499. See also Charles Taylor’s discussion of Wiggins’ anti-reductive view of culture in 
his 2003 
609 Wiggins 1991: 195–6 (see also 197f, and 352f for like-minded comments on socio-biology: ‘…the thing 
we really need to try to describe is what morality has become, a question on which evolutionary theory casts 
no particular light.’) 
610 Malaterre 2013: 156–7 
611 Kim’s ‘exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism states that since there is only one 
sufficient cause for any effect, if all physical effects have physical causes all other causes are excluded – so 
emergent properties are epiphenomenal’ (Garrett 2013: 128). Conversely, if emergent properties are seen to 
effect physical change then we will have ‘downwards causation’ – a thesis which might be thought 
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examine such objections; it is sufficient here to point out that Wiggins – while critical of 
epistemic reduction612 – at points certainly seems to doubt the occurrence of novel 
causal properties at higher levels. His scepticism appears, for instance, in his comments 
about supervenience – the thesis that any change at a higher level corresponds to a change 
at the lower level (the higher supervenes on the lower).613 In S&SR he writes: 
 
[T]he kind-bound laws of coming to be, of distinctive activity, and of 
passing away are nomologically grounded. They are supervenient upon, or 
better (as Leibniz might put it) consentient with, the more basic laws that 
are immanent in all things.614 
 
And again, in ‘Identity, Individuation and Substance’, he talks of the organismic as 
 
…a (level or category) of being that the ultimate constituents of reality 
subvene/sustain/make possible.615 
 
While supervenience is sometimes conceived of as non-reductive,616 Dupré points out 
that it typically corresponds to a form of practical, but not theoretical, non-reductionism.617 
For the supervenience theorist, while we – humans – may fail to grasp the link between 
the lower levels and the higher, it is in principle possible for this link to be understood 
(by e.g. a divine mind). Wiggins’ endorsement of supervenience – alongside Dupré’s 
reading of that position – suggests he is both aware of the criticisms of emergentism 
and, to some extent, persuaded by them.618 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
problematic because of the ‘implication …that a scientist cannot do physics completely and adequately 
without doing biology and, ultimately, psychology!’ (Garrett 2013: 150). The severity of these objections is 
assumed here for the sake of argument. 
612 E.g. Wiggins 2005a: 476 
613 More broadly, talking of supervenience one need not talk of ‘levels’ – see McLaughlin and Bennett 
2014. 
614 Wiggins 2001: 143 
615 Wiggins 2012: 21. Even Dupré at times seems to express doubts about the existence of emergent 
properties. While in his Spinoza Lectures, he appears to be endorsing a form of causal emergence, 
elsewhere he notably assumes a more moderate view, closer to practical, rather than theoretical epistemic 
anti-reductionism. He writes (2010b/12: 142): 
Perhaps I should concede that everything in the universe supervenes on the total 
physical state of the universe? Perhaps. But, here, we are so deeply into the domain of 
speculative metaphysics that I am more than happy to remain agnostic. 
616 E.g. in R.M. Hare’s 1952 
617 Dupré 1993: 97 
618 The relations between emergentist, reductionist and supervenience theses are vexed. The point here is 
not to examine them in depth, but it should be noted that the confusion might be taken as a further 
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 There is a further reason to doubt the emergentist reading of Wiggins. 
Methodological concerns occur when one considers interpretative issues about the 
terms of the emergence debate. As noted, Dupré describes the controversy by talking of 
the metaphysical ‘primacy’ or ‘priority’ of some items over others. He also talks of 
claims to ‘reality’. Harking back to the distinction drawn in §1.3, between the 
Aristotelian and Quinean projects, one may wonder from which the emergentist’s thesis 
issues. ‘Primacy’ and ‘priority’ imply some notion of ontological ordering, a hierarchical 
approach typical of the Aristotelian view. Yet at the same time there is a distinctly 
Quinean tone to Dupré’s use of ‘reality’; it is easy to read questions about what is and 
what is not real as questions about what does and does not exist. Of course, one might 
talk about ‘degrees of reality’, but it is not clear that having novel causal properties is a 
matter of degree, and the disagreement does not seem to be about whether some items 
have more novel properties than others.619 It is not clear-cut, but emergentism seems to 
attach to a Quinean conception of a flat ontology: organisms have novel causal 
properties so should be included on the ontological call-sheet.620, 621 
 It is significant as well that emergentists like Dupré appeal to science to 
substantiate their position – as do the reductionists they contend with. Science will tell 
us where the causal buck stops,622 and is positioned as an arbiter of ontological 
questions. It is to science that they turn when settling metaphysical disputes.623 In this 
respect their position appears to correspond to the revisionary approach described above. 
Emergentists stand to be wrong about whether these ordinary, everyday objects are real, 
and engaging with the reductionists thus, run the risk of ontological revisions. 
 This Quinean-cum-revisionary framework, which the emergentist appears to 
inhabit, contrasts noticeably with Wiggins’ neo-Aristotelian, descriptive account. As was 
noted in §1.3, Wiggins is not interested in putting ticks or crosses in an existence 
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motivation for pursuing the neo-Aristotelian account offered below (which, insofar as it avoids the 
puzzles about causality, avoids these more general confusion). 
619 Dupré himself notes the influence of Quine’s conception of ontology in the debate, with respect to 
reductive materialism (1993: 94). 
620 Note that having causal properties correlates to ‘ontological commitment’ in the Quinean sense, since 
our best scientific theory must posit bearers of novel causal properties. 
621 There is another issue here worth mentioning. There is more than one type of causal theory, and it is 
not immediately clear which the emergentists are relying on when they defer to Alexander’s dictum, and 
whether their position is compatible with them all. For more on the different types of causal theory, see 
Schaffer 2013. 
622 See e.g. Benson 1989: 1067 
623 Dupré, for example, points to methylation, and to the susceptibility of lower ranking Macaque 
monkeys to cocaine addiction, to ground the claim that novel properties at the social level effect changes 
at the genetic level. 2008c/2012: 257 
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find around us. His project is guided, not by science, but by our everyday interaction 
with the world (though scientific theories – like Pradeu’s – can be used to gain a sharper 
focus on those pre-theoretical entities). On methodological grounds, then, we might 
doubt the emergentist reading assayed above.  
 Before presenting an alternative interpretation of Wiggins’ anti-reductionism it 
will be helpful to examine this methodological disagreement more closely: does Wiggins 
aim to discredit revisionary metaphysics entirely, or is his descriptivism less ambitious? 
Can he recognise the insights that emergentism offers without being committed to that 
thesis? In the next section it is suggested that his position might well complement the 
emergentist’s, while remaining independent from it. 
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§3.3. Descriptivism and pluralism 
 
How serious is the methodological disagreement between Wiggins and the 
emergentists? In this section it is argued that Wiggins’ descriptivist project has no 
ambitions to undermine science-led metaphysical programs and, further, that the entities 
picked out in those programs can be accommodated in the pluralistic picture implicit in 
his texts. 
 
§3.3.a. Ambitious descriptivism? 
 
Wiggins states that we should turn to our everyday experience of the world to guide our 
metaphysics. This is not because he thinks reality is dependent on human minds; his 
conceptualist-realism avoids the excesses of idealism. Our agreement about what kinds 
of things there are is not a matter of opinion – it is not relativistic, but relative to us being 
the kinds of being that we are (e.g. of a particular size, duration, and with particular 
perceptual abilities).624 There may be particular items (specifically organisms) that we 
cannot help picking out, but despite the revisionist’s worries, that we do so is not 
enough to prejudice us against their reality. 
 Furthermore, in responding to the revisionists’ worries, Wiggins may raise 
similar concerns about their methodological program. The revisionary metaphysician 
privileges science over everyday experience because it can – supposedly – reach beyond 
our limited anthropocentric concerns. However (Wiggins may say) since science is a 
human practice it will ultimately be grounded in our pre-theoretical scheme, and thus 
cannot displace it. 
Susan Haack finds this ‘ambitious descriptivism’ in Strawson,625 and a version of 
it is also present in the quotation from Kolakowski (given in §1.1). Kolakowski writes 
that ‘scientific thinking’ is a human creation, just as much as everyday perception; and 
he holds that both the linguistic and the scientific divisions of the world ‘arise from 
man’s practical need’. Of course, Wiggins’ modest conceptualism is quite different from 
Kolakowski’s, but there are indications in his texts of similar thoughts. They emerge, for 
instance, in his discussion of the ‘alien’ language of four dimensionalism. Wiggins writes: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624 As noted by Hull (in his 1992). For a (relatively) clear exposition of this rendering of relativity see 
Wiggins 1987: 204–5. 
625 See §1.1. 
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At one and the same time, how can we deny ordinary substances their 
status as proper continuants, insist that ordinary substances are really 
constructs, yet lean shamelessly upon our ordinary understanding of 
substances when we come to specify that from which these constructs are 
to be seen as constructed or assembled?626 
 
Again, in ‘Identity, Individuation and Substance’, he describes the centrality of our 
everyday concepts to scientific endeavors: 
 
Think what damage would result from expunging the distinction between 
substance and process/narrative/event from most ordinary scientific 
exposition…627  
 
This point is also helpfully drawn out by a reference he makes to J.H. Woodger, 
specifically in relation to biological items:628 
 
There is one more point to be mentioned in connexion with the doctrine of 
the reducibility of biology to physics and chemistry: people who hold the 
doctrine do not in fact believe it. If you want to reduce biology to physics 
and chemistry, you must construct bi-conditionals which are in effect 
definitions of biological functors with the help of those belonging only to 
physics and chemistry; you must then add these to the postulates of physics 
and chemistry and work out their consequences. Then and only then will it 
be time to go into your laboratories to discover whether these consequences 
are upheld there. From the fact that people do not do this, I venture the 
guess that they confuse reducibility of biology to physics and chemistry, with 
applicability of physics and chemistry to biological objects.629 
 
Wiggins accepts that science posits entities that do not register in our everyday 
experience – microphysical particles, say, or four-dimensional beings – but he also notes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 Wiggins 2012: 12 
627 Ibid: 24 n.30 See also Wiggins 1995: 231 
628 Originally this passage featured prominently at the start of chapter 6 in S&S, but has since been 
suppressed, and is now found in a footnote in S&SR, at the end of chapter 5. Wiggins will be gratified at 
the attention that Woodger (oft-neglected) is now getting in the philosophy of biology (see Nicholson and 
Gawne 2013). 
629 Woodger 1952: 336–8 
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that the practices that issue in their discovery depend on our pre-theoretical scheme. It 
is only by studying the organisms themselves that we come to find they are constituted 
exclusively by protons, and neutrons (and so on). Thus Wiggins has grounds to question 
the revisionist’s impulse to supplant the entities of the ‘older’ ontology with those found 
in the ‘newer’ one.630 
 Unlike Strawson, however, Wiggins does not take the descriptivist’s articulation of 
reality or the entities that it describes to be in any way ‘prior’ to those posited by 
science.631 Wiggins is not claiming that organisms are more real than the stuff from which 
they are made. The suggestion contained in the quotations above is simply that the 
converse claim should be resisted. Physics describes new entities – atoms, quarks, etc. – 
but they should not be taken to downgrade or discredit the entities of the older, pre-
theoretical ontology. Even when the older entities are discarded for certain explanatory 
purposes, it need not necessarily be the case that scientific revisions should legislate 
metaphysical ones. In a passage, which anticipates the pluralistic picture to follow, 
Wiggins writes: 
 
The older ontology may yet be cotenable with the more theoretical 
conception. Contrasting the actual discrediting of entities of some kind, 
palpable or impalpable, with the discovering of new entities at the atomic or 
subatomic level, let us not conceive the latter as determining the level to 
which everything else must be reduced (in the serious sense of ‘reduce’), 
even if this is the level at which macroscopic events are promised certain 
sorts of explanation.632 
 
The general point here is that Wiggins has grounds for questioning the viability of the 
revisionary use of science, with respect to our pre-theoretical scheme. And this 
encourages the thought that the items of everyday experience are at least as well 
grounded as those of the scientific scheme. That is, he can be interpreted as a pluralist. 
 On this interpretation his aim is not to challenge the metaphysical status of 
entities posited by science, nor the legitimacy of non-descriptive inquiry. There are, for 
Wiggins, different metaphysical frameworks, which defer to different schema – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 Wiggins may still abandon apparently everyday entities, given the necessary scientific encouragement – 
see Wiggins 2001: 155 – but this is (perhaps) because he sees some elements of our conceptual scheme to 
be less essential than others in our navigation of the world (e.g. animistic elements). 
631 Strawson 1959: 9f, and Haack 1978 
632 Wiggins 2001: 155–156 
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scientific, pre-theoretical – and so long as they do not lead to inconsistencies,633 and 
there is good reason for positing them, the entities captured by these different means 
may be ‘cotenable’. 
 
§3.3.b. A pluralistic picture 
 
For Wiggins, the entities one picks out depends on the framework one is working 
within. As the discussion above suggests there is no obvious reason for saying that one 
framework – one which defers to science – has priority over another – one which defers 
to our everyday interaction with the world. On this reading, Wiggins sees reality to be 
populated by metaphysically various entities, which are captured and analysed in 
different metaphysical frameworks. 
Some metaphysicians focus on the posits of scientific theories and, relatedly, 
analyse them in terms of causal dependence. Items are included in their ontological 
picture if those items have novel causal properties. Perhaps, in the end, the only entities 
that register will be the fundamental particles – quarks, or fields. At the same time, 
descriptivists like Wiggins structure their inquiry around the continuants of everyday 
experience – organisms not least – and examine how we interact with them to draw 
metaphysical conclusions. 
 There are others still. Attending to comments in S&SR, and in later papers, we 
find Wiggins acknowledging the four-dimensional objects of Lewisian ontology while 
seeing them to fall outside the metaphysical framework he is interested in. The four 
dimensionalist’s model of physics describes objects around us that are both spatially and 
temporally extended; as we have spatial parts (our hands, and feet, etc.) we also have 
temporal parts (our infancy, our dotage, and so on). David Lewis sees this model to 
provide clean and principled answers to puzzles of change, of how a single thing can 
have two intrinsic, and apparently incompatible properties (sitting and standing).634 And 
while these four-dimensional objects are clearly not the ones Wiggins is interested in, 
there is no attempt to discredit them. He writes, explicitly, that 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633 Like, for example, bare substrata: ‘What is this substance out there that can be conceptualized in 
radically different ways, which can be seized upon in thought by the anti-essentialist, but can have 
radically different principles of existence and persistence ascribed to it? This is surely an entity with 
inconsistent properties.’ Wiggins 2001: 148 
634 See e.g. Lewis 2002: 441 
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[I]t is not an option for philosophy to reject the four dimensional 
conception of the world urged upon us by some philosophers and 
metaphysicians of science. But in accepting it one is not committed to see 
things, people and organisms in perdurantist fashion as made up of 
instantaneous temporal parts.635 
 
On this reading, Wiggins is situated in a tradition of pluralist thinkers like Hilary 
Putnam636 (to which, indeed, Dupré might well be sympathetic).637 There are equally real 
beings, of different metaphysical characters, which are caught by different frameworks. 
Some catch three-dimensional substances, others fundamental particles, and others still 
catch four-dimensional beings with temporal parts. 
 Significantly, Wiggins is also immune to the objection that this pluralism 
describes materially coinciding objects, despite the ‘truism frequently called in evidence and 
confidently relied upon in philosophy that two things cannot be in the same place at the 
same time.’638 The possibility of material coincidence is (as discussed in §1.2.c.) 
something he has long defended (specifically with respect to constitution).639 Thus, on this 
model, there may be numerous entities, of different metaphysical character, situated, for 
instance, where you are currently situated. Different schemes will individuate different 
entities: four-dimensional beings, material ‘constructs’, concrete universals, and 
organisms. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635 Wiggins 2012: 12. Note, he also writes: ‘The answers that these questions [of individuation] require 
from philosophy ought to be given in a language that speaks as simply and directly as natural languages 
speak of proper three-dimensional continuants – things with spatial parts and no temporal parts, which 
are conceptualized in our experience as occupying space but not time, and as persisting whole through 
time.’ (Wiggins 2001: 31) 
636 See e.g. Putnam 2004: ‘[I]t is no accident that in everyday language we employ many different kinds of 
discourses, discourses subject to different standards and possessing different sorts of applications, with 
different logical and grammatical features—different “language games” in Wittgenstein’s sense—no 
accident because it is an illusion that there could be just one sort of language game which could be 
sufficient for the description of all of reality!’ (22) 
637 See, e.g. Dupré 2010a/2012: ‘[W]e should be pluralistic about how we divide the biological world into 
individuals: different purposes may dictate different ways of carving things up.’ (118). ‘[T]here will be no 
unequivocal way of …dividing reality’ (126). See also Dupré 1993 (and his ‘promiscuous realism’). Yet the 
kind of pluralism advanced by Dupré is not exactly the same as that under discussion here. Importantly, 
while Dupré states that many different things exist, he does not obviously distinguish between their 
metaphysical characters. Being able to do so is a distinct advantage of Wiggins’ approach. 
638 Wiggins 1968: 90 
639 Ibid: 93 
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§3.3.c. Implications of Wiggins’ pluralism 
 
This reading of Wiggins’ pluralism is significant in two respects. Firstly, it indicates how 
he will respond to the emergentist’s thesis. The emergentist is engaged in a different 
kind of metaphysical inquiry to Wiggins, turning to science to find out which objects 
have novel causal properties – and in this respect, Wiggins’ project is independent of 
theirs. However, the potential success of the emergentist’s arguments is not irrelevant to 
Wiggins. The emergentist is working within a different metaphysical framework and 
using science to focus their inquiry, but Wiggins can take the metaphysical emphasis he 
places on organisms to be substantiated, to some extent, if those same entities are found 
to register within a non-descriptive framework as well as his own. Similarly, the 
emergentist can take the fact that organisms are central to our everyday navigation of 
the world to lend indirect support and credence to their project. So the emergentist’s 
thesis, and Wiggins’ account may complement one another without being mutually 
committing. 
 Secondly, it is worth noting (if only in passing) that the failure to recognise 
Wiggins’ pluralism has led to undue criticism of his work. Samir Okasha deserves 
commendation as one of the few philosophers of biology to seriously engage with 
Wiggins’ texts. Unfortunately, in his ‘Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question 
of Essentialism’640 his critique of Wiggins’ essentialism misunderstands the pluralistic 
nature of his project. He assumes that Wiggins holds Kripke and Putnam’s view that 
biological kind essences – the ‘theoretical descriptions’ holding between exemplars – 
register at the genetic level.641 He writes: 
 
Wiggins, like Kripke and Putnam, assumes without argument that 
organisms belong to their species in virtue of their ‘hidden structures’ – 
their internal, presumably genetic properties.642 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 Okasha 2002 
641 Kripke talks of ‘internal structure’ and Okasha notes that there is an ambiguity here between genetic 
make-up or physiology. He denies the ambiguity will give Kripke leverage. (2002: 198) However, given 
the arguments above and below, one might think an anti-reductionist interpretation of ‘internal structure’ 
is still possible. 
642 Okasha 2002: 207. This reading is most likely based on claims in S&S about speciation (e.g. ‘If we are 
interested in evolution and speciation… then no doubt genetics (and ultimately molecular biology) must 
be at the root of what we inquire into.’ (Wiggins 1980: 203) Yet such claims are claims about ‘species, 
where ‘species’ is not equivocal with ‘natural kind’, and they do not commit Wiggins to an exclusively 
genetic construal of the principle of activity of a kind. Indeed, in S&SR he explicitly distances himself 
from the sort of reductionism Okasha attributes to him and Putnam. ‘It is fully compatible with Putnam’s 
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Okasha points out – plausibly643 – that the distinction between species might not, in the 
end, register at any ‘ultimate’ level.644 Yet, the previous sections will have made clear that 
this is not what Wiggins is claiming. In S&SR, he specifically draws a distinction 
between principles of activity and the more ‘scientifically basic laws’.645 For Wiggins, 
investigation into the biological realm can occur on different levels, and the examination 
of our – human being – mode of being will not correlate (or need not) to an examination 
of genetics. Okasha’s objection fails to register the pluralistic nature of Wiggins’ 
account, the multiple cotenable spheres, which the preceding sections have attempted to 
draw out. 
 Having shown that Wiggins’ metaphysical anti-reductionism is not emergentist 
(though it is compatible with that thesis), and having laid out the pluralistic nature of his 
project, the time has come to draw out the alternative, neo-Aristotelian reading of his 
analysis of organisms. For Wiggins, organisms are substances – and this is not a matter of 
their being causally novel, but of being, in some way, ontologically prior. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suggestion… that the theoretical description that comes into question in a given case should make 
reference to both the microphysical and the macrophysical…’ (Wiggins 2001: 80) 
643 Kripke and Putnam (if not Wiggins) do suggest that there is something like a genetic essence that 
underpins morphological similarities. Here, Okasha is right to upbraid analytic metaphysicians. Putnam 
states – of lemons – that the true criterion for membership in the kind lemon, is having the ‘genetic code’ 
of a lemon. (Putnam 1975: 240) And Kripke talks of a shared ‘internal structure’; to be a tiger, say, is a 
matter of having the right internal structure. (1980:121) Olson similarly errs (1997: 124ff). 
644 Okasha 2002: 196 Okasha denies the existence of essential phenotypic traits, but he claims that there 
are ‘phenetic clusters’, clusters of phenetic traits that tend to co-vary. One might wonder – as Michael 
Devitt does – whether this is just a more general form of essentialism (Devitt 2008: 371). Are the clusters 
not just the essences? Here the argument depends on how ‘neat and tidy’ one wants the essences to be – 
and I think there is something to be said for the essentialist’s defence that the notion of a strict essence 
(or ‘tiger gene’) is a caricature of their position by their detractors… but for the sake of the present 
discussion, I will assume the effectiveness of Okasha’s position here. 
645 Wiggins 2001: 143 
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§3.4. A neo-Aristotelian organism  concept 
 
What is the metaphysical character of organisms? How are we to understand them, in 
the descriptivist tradition, as substances? The following reading of Wiggins is neo-
Aristotelian, with Kantian notes. His claims about our experience of the natural world 
are seen to correspond to the Kantian thought that our conceptual scheme necessarily 
partitions the biological realm into genuine unities (this is brought out below, by reference 
to work by Charles T. Wolfe). Furthermore, the understanding of organisms as genuine 
unities is read to have implications for how their parts are conceived; our way of 
conceptualising the biological world involves understanding an organism’s parts by 
reference to the whole. That is, the organism concept is an intrinsically anti-reductive one. 
The final part of this section discusses how Wiggins understands this anti-reductionism. 
An interpretation of his neo-Aristotelianism is offered, which demonstrates how 
Wiggins disassociates metaphysical anti-reductionism from causal readings (and thus 
both from emergentism and Aristotle’s problematic final causality), and associates it, 
instead, with ontological dependence. Aristotle’s metaphysical anti-reductionism is 
comprised of two distinguishable but interrelated strands of argument – one relates to 
the causal power of organisms, the other relates to their ontological priority. Wiggins is 
interested in the latter. 
 
§3.4.a. Organic unities 
 
For Wiggins, human beings – human organisms – are things that we cannot avoid 
picking out in our day-to-day existence.646 This thought is found too – famously – in 
Kant’s discussion in his Critique of Judgement.647 In that work, Kant also emphasizes the 
way that we cannot avoid understanding these things in teleological terms. Teleological 
language is ineliminable from the life sciences. This is the substance of the following, 
oft-cited quotation: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646 They are ‘substances’ as described in chapter 1, above (Wiggins 1995: 217 and 2001: 90). 
647 Kant 1790/1987 
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[I]t is absurd for human beings… to hope that perhaps some day another 
Newton might arise who would explain to us, in terms of natural laws 
unordered by intention, how even a mere blade of grass is produced…648 
 
There can be no such Newton – he claims – because natural entities resist the 
explanations of mechanical principles exemplified by Newtonian physics. That is, the 
nature and behaviour of the entities found in the biological realm (organisms) cannot be 
accounted for by reference to the presence and behaviour of their constituents. They 
must be seen as more than the sum of their parts; we conceive of them as final ends to 
which the functioning of their parts are directed. For Kant (on the interpretation 
offered by Philippe Huneman (among others649)): 
 
These entities display a specific relationship between wholes and parts, 
in which the parts are seen to presuppose the whole in order to be 
accounted for.650 
 
The organism is conceptualized, in our pre-theoretical thinking, as ‘prior’ to its parts. 
Yet, for Kant, this is an epistemological fact with no ontological bite. It might be that 
we apprehend organisms as unities and conceive of their parts as parts (of the whole); 
yet, as Huneman notes, Kant repeals any theological – or, more broadly, metaphysical – 
commitments.651 Picking out organisms is something we do, but not ‘a statement of the 
real’.652 The organism is a heuristic fiction – a regulative principle, and not a constitutive 
one.653 
However, other uses have been made of the Kantian analysis. Of particular 
interest here is recent work by Charles Wolfe, who – following the neuropsychologist, 
Kurt Goldstein – uses Kant’s account for phenomenological ends. In his essay ‘Do 
organisms have an ontological status?’654 Wolfe draws an important connection between 
Kant’s view of the ineliminibility of teleological language and the more recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 Kant 1790/1987 §75: 282–283 Did Darwin, perhaps, fill this role? There is not the space to discuss 
this in the depth it deserves, but the profusion of teleological language in Darwin’s work suggests that, 
although he explained it differently, he still conceived the natural world in some way teleologically. 
649 See e.g. Wolfe 2010, and Ginsborg 2001 
650 Huneman 2007: 5–6 
651 Ibid: 5 
652 As Wolfe construes it (Wolfe 2010: 21) 
653 Wolfe 2010: 19 
654 Ibid 
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Darwinian musings of Daniel Dennett, and Goldstein.655 As Wolfe reads them, Dennett 
and Goldstein hold that our ability to predict the behaviour of others – on which our 
survival depends – relies on treating them as unities, and not, say, as a mass of 
molecules.656 Wolfe writes: 
 
[O]ur cognitive or perceptual make-up is necessarily ‘organismic’ [i.e. it is 
part of our conceptual framework that we pick out organic unities], and 
indeed, its being so contributes to our aptitude for survival.657 
 
He goes on: 
 
The projective view, which I have attributed to Kant, Goldstein (in one 
of his moods) and Dennett, holds that organism is something we project 
onto the world, a kind of construction of intelligibility… the organism 
must be treated as an individuality.658 
 
While building on Kant’s view, his conclusion is markedly distinct from it; he finds a 
metaphysical moral to draw from these analyses. The organism is a projection, yet ‘[t]hat 
we are, by dint of our nervous systems, ‘projectors’ does not mean we project any 
structure we choose onto the world: “To understand is always to construct a 
(meaningful) totality”.’659 
Without having to reconstruct the arguments that lead Wolfe to this point, it will 
be clear – in the light of the work in the previous chapters – that this is a trajectory 
Wiggins may well follow.660  Organic unities – as Kant, Leibniz,661 Goldstein, Claude 
Bernard,662 and Wolfe maintain – are a central part of our conceptual framework. For 
whatever (evolutionary) reason, we humans partition the natural world into beings that 
are seen to be more than their parts combined. This might not be how the biological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 Dennett 1987 
656 Wolfe 2010: 24 
657 Ibid: 21 
658 Ibid: 21 
659 Ibid: 29 
660 Here again we see the significant similarities between the descriptivist tradition, and the 
phenomenological. 
661 ‘Moreover, by means of the soul or form there is a true unity corresponding to what is called the SELF 
[moi] in us; such a unity could not occur in artificial machines or in a mere mass of matter, however 
organized it may be…’ Leibniz 1695/1978, 482 
662 ‘[T]he physiologist and the physician must never forget that the living being comprises an organism 
and an individuality.’ Bernard, 1865/1984, II, ii, §1, §137 
	   150	  
realm is articulated in other schemes, but this – as Wiggins points out – is not to say that 
this description lacks nomological foundation.663 (Indeed, our human ability to pick out 
these unities is a scientific fact that may well be accounted for in some ‘ultimate’ theory.) 
To refer back to Wiggins’ conceptualist-realist phrasing, just because we construe reality 
in a certain way does not mean that we construct it. 
Reading Wiggins along these lines suggests a particularly novel use of 
Aristotelian biology in his work. In the following section, it is proposed that he takes the 
picture described in the Metaphysics and De Anima to be a clear description of the 
structure of our thoughts about the kind of entities caught by our conceptual schemes. 
 
§3.4.b. Aristotelian organisms 
 
This section presents an overdue, and somewhat brief, overview of Aristotle’s 
metaphysical project – specifically his hylomorphism. For Aristotle (like the 
descriptivists664), the objects of our everyday experience – cats, flowers, human beings – 
are the primary focus of metaphysical inquiry. In the works collected in the Metaphysics, 
he delves into the underlying structure of these things,665 and it is in those texts that we 
find the hylomorphic distinction. 
Aristotle writes that, in the realm of being,666 the individuals we encounter in the 
world are not metaphysically simple but comprised of two distinct elements: matter 
(hulê) and form (morphê). All individual things are hylomorphic composites.667 He 
elaborates, in Metaphysics Z, using the example of a bronze statue (to which he repeatedly 
(and perhaps problematically) returns):668 The bronze statue has a material (hylic) aspect 
– it is made out of matter, in this case, bronze. It also has a formal (morphic) one – it is 
moulded into a certain shape, or ‘form’ (e.g. of Judith and Holofernes). The form 
cannot exist without being ‘enmattered’; that is, realized in matter; and the matter may 
exist without the form (the statue may be destroyed when the bronze survives). 
Uninformed matter is not a distinct particular, but some (relatively) undifferentiated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663 And this, maybe, is what underpins his comments about a ‘guarantee’ (discussed in chapter 4) – an 
indication of some law-determined activity that may or may not fully correspond to explanations at the 
‘ultimate’ level. 
664 See e.g. Strawson 1959: 9f 
665 Furth 1978, 629 
666 See Kosman 1987 for the distinction between the realm of being, becoming and change. 
667 Cf. Ackrill 1972 
668 Freeland 1987: 392 
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mass – it is the form that determines individuals, the form of a statue that makes it the 
kind of thing that we can individuate. 
The statue paradigm is slightly misleading; form is more than a particular shape 
into which something is moulded669 (the statue of Judith is not a human being). 
Consider slightly more complex artifacts, like hatchets, etc. Here, Aristotle associates 
‘form’ with a specific function, i.e. the chopping of wood.670 Form, in this instance, is not 
just the shape of a thing; it is taken to be how it works or functions in a particular way. It’s 
mode of being. So the form of a hatchet is to divide wood, by chopping through it, the 
form of a house is to shelter, by means of a roof, and the form of the roof is to prevent 
a deluge, by being an impermeable surface.671 
It is central to Aristotle’s picture that a substance’s matter must be of a specific sort, 
or of a certain material configuration, such that it can subserve the object’s function: 
 
[T]here is a necessity that the axe be hard, since one must cut with it, and 
if hard that it be of bronze or iron…672 
 
That is, the matter – which in this case constitutes the hatchet – must have the right 
dispositional properties for chopping.673 Or, to put it in the Aristotelian idiom, the matter 
must be potentially (dunamis), what the axe, spade, chisel, is in actuality (energeia, entelechia). 
(Thinking of uninformed matter as having dispositional properties might seem puzzling 
at first, since matter is supposed to lack any formal specification – this is addressed 
below.)  
What about organisms? To a degree, Aristotle treats natural things in the same 
sort of way as artefacts. The organic entities we find around us are matter ‘informed’ by 
specific morphe. An animal is matter informed by a specific mode of being,674 just as the 
hatchet is matter formed to serve a particular function. This natural form, or psuche, 
encapsulates the typical growth and development, the behaviour, of that kind of animal. 
As Furth and Kosman have put it, it encapsulates the animal’s ‘lifestyle’:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 Freeland 1987: 394 
670 Furth 1987, 39 
671 Note that the parts – in this case, the roof – also have forms. Kosman 1987: 372 
672 Aristotle Parts of Animals I.I 642a9–13, tr. Balme 
673 Freeland 1987: 396 
674 Wiggins 2001: 72 
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The specific form of an animal’s being is… as we might say, its lifestyle; 
what it eats, how it gets food, where it lives, the manner of its 
reproduction, sensation, movement, etc.: the entire complex of 
characteristic activities, in other words, that constitutes the manner of its 
bios.675  
 
Human beings are entities comprised of psuche and matter (matter that is suitable for the 
subservience of that form).676 Even from this cursory overview it should be clear that 
this conception of natural substances is the stem from which Wiggins’ metaphysics 
grows. There are certain issues about how his interpretations of Aristotle fluctuate,677 
but what should be evident from this analysis, and the sections of the previous chapters, 
is that psuche, as it is construed here, and its correlate phusis,678 are the conceptual 
ancestor of Wiggins’ ‘principle of activity’ as described by D(v).679 The connection is 
made explicit most recently in ‘Identity, Individuation, and Substance’,680 where he 
specifically presents his project in these Aristotelian terms, describing how natural kinds 
have a phusis or a nature: 
 
The phusis of a thing is its mode of being. It is the principle of activity of 
a kind whose members share and possess in themselves a distinctive 
source of development and change.681 
 
There is an etymological irony here that would be a shame to pass over. Wiggins is often 
contrasted with the ‘psychological’ approach to personal identity – but follow the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Kosman 1987: 379 
676 Aristotle, De Anima II.I. 412a19–27, 412b6 (Hamlyn tr.) I will ignore, for present purposes, the 
considerable controversy around Aristotle’s claim that psuche must be present in a body that has life 
potentially. See Wiggins 1967: 46, Ackrill 1997: 126, Williams 1978, and Rosenthal 2009 
677 For example, in his most explicitly Aristotelian piece, ISTC, he (controversially) parses ‘psuche’ as 
‘person’. Wiggins 1967: see particularly part 4. For a critique of his interpretation, see Ackrill 1997. (Cf. 
Wiggins 2012 and the footnote immediately below). 
678 What is the relation between psuche (form) and phusis (nature)? Wiggins, in his 2012, describes the 
principle of activity as the phusis, rather than the psuche (which figures much more prominently in his 
1967). From what I understand – and this is based on Gotthelf’s discussion of first principles (Gotthelf 
1987: 187) – the phusis is the general nature (e.g. the general nature of birds), and the psuche is the specific 
nature of individual. ‘[T]he explanation of beaks for example depends on the positing of a bird nature; 
this would not of course exist separately but only as a component of the natures of the individual bird-
forms. Nonetheless, explanation at the level of birds would require the positing specifically of that generic 
aspect of these individual forms.’ The general nature, or phusis, is the generic aspects of specific individual 
forms. 
679 One can see the original uptake of these ideas in ISTC, a work explicitly intended as a rehabilitation of 
the hylomorphic doctrine. 
680 See also Wiggins 2001: chapter 3 passim 
681 Wiggins 2012: 8f. See also, Wiggins 1995: 219, and 2001: 80–81, 89 
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derivation of that term, and one finds Aristotelian psuche and phusis. Wiggins is a 
psychological theorist in this ancient sense, seeing us to survive where our psuche 
continues. But the question now arises: how far down this Aristotelian path does 
Wiggins ultimately want to go? The next section deals with a pressing problem for those 
who whole-heartedly endorse the hylomorphic picture: its seemingly inextricable 
connection with final causality. 
 
§3.4.b.i. Teleology 
 
Central to the Aristotelian schema is the thought that the psuche, form, has causal powers 
over the material parts of the organism. It organizes them. As Marjorie Grene puts it, 
psuche is the ‘organizing’ principle, which arranges the material parts, the elemental 
compounds, into the organismic (that is, ‘organized’) structure.682 In Aristotle, this 
position is articulated in contrast to the framework outlined by Empedocles.683 Both 
Aristotle and Empedocles see matter, at the fundament, to be split between the four 
elements: water, wind, earth and fire – and both understand these elements to have their 
own elemental natures (which is why uninformed matter may have dispositional 
properties), and to be mixable into compounds. Where they differ, however, is in the 
causal power they attribute to these four fundamental stuffs. 
For Empedocles, everything in the earthly realm is borne from the interaction 
between the elements and their elemental natures: moved together by their 
environments,684 they mix, and through chance and necessity, form more ordered 
compounds – mud, bark, bronze, blood, etc. – which themselves mix and create even 
more complex higher level structures.685 The reductionist logic of this process is 
exemplified most strikingly in his rudimentary theory of evolution; he describes a stage 
in cosmic history where heads and trunks and limbs are formed from the elements, and 
roll about the ancient tundra, occasionally bumping into each other, and combining, to 
produce bizarre, chimerical, ‘scrambled animals’, like ox-headed men, and human-faced 
cows (some of which form viable combinations, which then survive).686 In the 
Empedoclean universe, one explains the organismic unities we find around us as having 
been originally caused by elements combining in certain conditions. Ultimately, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682 Grene 1972: 42 
683 Gotthelf 1987: 222  
684 And ‘love’ and ‘strife’ – see e.g. Schofield 2002 
685 Furth 1987 
686 Ibid: 44, see also Grene 1972: 403 
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organism is seen to be the product of a causal chain reaching up from these elements, the 
most fundamental constituents of reality. 
This conception of a uni-directional causal ascent stands in marked contrast to 
the Aristotelian model of biological systems. Aristotle’s biology is open to divergent 
interpretations, but whether credited with an anachronistic vitalism or not,687 he clearly 
opposes this kind of strict reductionist picture. Specifically, he views psuche, the living 
activity, as playing a causal role that is not an extension of the upwards-reaching causal 
chain.688 Indeed, he sees psuche as having causal influence over its parts: the causal chain 
does not just go upwards, emerging mechanically from the nature of the elemental 
constituents. Rather, as Furth puts it, it ‘reaches down’ into the elemental miasma, and 
thereby gives it structure.689 
The echoes of the debate between Empedocles and Aristotle are clearly still 
ringing – but Aristotle’s causal anti-reductionism is not exactly the emergentist’s one. 
For Aristotle, the organism is seen to cause the formation of the parts, as the end-
product, the telos, to which the organization of those parts is directed (unlike in the 
emergentist’s picture, where the novel causal powers are not seen to be the guiding, 
fixed end-point of a biological process). Which is to say that Aristotle’s hylomorphism is 
wedded to the doctrine of teleological causality.690 
For Aristotle, a teleological cause is a goal to be achieved. With respect to 
artefacts, a goal causes an activity to occur or an instrument to exist. Consider an 
intentional action – your desire to hammer some nails, for instance. Hammering nails is 
your goal. To achieve this goal you arrange a lump of wood and a sharp bit of iron into 
a hammer. In some sense, then, the goal has caused the organization of the wood and 
iron to be thus. 
Some will find this kind of description of a causal process inappropriate when 
applied to organic matter (especially if, like Aristotle, we do not posit any kind of 
purposive action by a creator God).691 Aristotle gives numerous examples where natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687 See D.M. Balme (1987: 279) for a discussion of this anachronism. 
688 There is an issue here about retrojecting. It is hard to adapt Aristotle’s account into modern terms, 
especially when talking about causality (Aristotle sees four types of causes: material, efficient, formal, and 
final). But if nothing else, he has been (retrospectively) co-opted by the organicists, like Woodger (see 
Haraway 1976: 33). It’s difficult to map lines of influence, but it is important to recognize that Aristotle is 
not necessarily influential for what he actually said, but for what he is taken to have said. 
689 Furth 1987: 30. See also D.M. Balme 1987: 283 ‘The production of an animal therefore requires two 
material processes, which are of course combined in nature: there must be the primary actions of the 
elements, and there must be a limiting movement.’ Here we see an upward and downward causal 
framework, similar to the one Dupré outlines in e.g. his 2008a/2012. 
690 See Gotthelf 1987 and Charles 2012 for an overview. 
691 See Falcon 2011 
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processes are construed as being caused by the organism’s ‘living well’; a plant’s roots 
push down for nutrition,692 or it’s leaves grow to protect its fruit.693 The life of the 
organism is seen to be the end that is the primary cause of organic development; the 
movements of the elements are all directed towards the growth and persistence of a living 
being. 
This is of a piece with his conception of dunamis and energeia, mentioned above. 
An organism is a hylomorphic substance, comprised of matter, and form (psuche).694 And 
for this form/lifestyle to be actualized the matter out of which it is constituted must be 
of the right sort to support the characteristic activity (energeia). In this case it must be 
potentially living. And for it to have the capacity (dunamis) to support a particular sort of 
bios, the matter must be structured as e.g. organs that perform the required functions of 
that type (for instance, if the individual is a bipedal thing then two legs are required for 
locomotion, lungs for breathing, etc.). And for those organs to function thus, they need 
in turn, to be made of certain matter (matter which has the potential to so function), 
and onwards, downwards to the Empedoclean elements. In short, the ‘lifestyle’ of the 
organism – how it gets food, where it lives, etc. – arranges matter into a structure that 
can realize it. 
How far will Wiggins want to go down this line? The talk of elemental miasmas 
obviously fails to cohere with modern science. Furthermore, to those living in a post-
Darwinian age, the idea that a plant, say, is organized in a certain way because being so 
organized is good for it,695 will seem both mysterious and obsolete,696 since we can much 
better explain e.g. organic arrangement as the outcome of random, non-purposive 
mutations that allow organisms (and, consequently, those particular traits) to survive. 
The idea that inanimate things ‘seek’ natural end-states sounds profoundly strange to 
modern ears. Additionally, and crucially, whatever we may say about the renewal of 
Aristotelianism hoped for by some, following Grene,697 Wiggins completely rejects the 
possibility of final causality. 
He writes, uncompromisingly: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 Aristotle Physics 199a29 
693 Aristotle Physics 199a28 
694 N.b. there is some ambiguity over whether form (eidos) is form of the individual or of the species (see 
Furth 1988: 146). 
695 Charles 2012: 255 
696 As David Charles points out, ‘mysterious’ is the perhaps the most prevalent criticism leveled at 
Aristotle’s concept of final causality. Charles 2012: 228f 
697 E.g. Jonas (1966) and Kass (1999) 
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‘The failure of Aristotelian science is final.’698 
 
Wiggins, like Aristotle, sees organisms to be substances par excellence. We understand 
them as real unities. But in what sense are they unified? The discussion above presents 
one strand of argument in Aristotle: living things are unified (and thus more clearly 
exemplify the category of substance) because they have causal power over their parts. In 
a way, this complements the emergentists’ picture, where causal relations are also taken 
to correspond to ‘metaphysical robustness’. Yet Wiggins’ use of Aristotle does not rest 
on the teleological power of the organic whole. In the next section it is argued that his 
interests lie with another element of Aristotle’s metaphysics: ontological dependence. 
 
§3.4.b.ii. Ontological dependence 
 
Wiggins wants to distance himself from final causality, but at the same time he sees 
something useful in Aristotle’s picture. He takes it to elucidate our everyday substance 
concept, and to describe the metaphysical make-up of the entities we pick out in our 
day-to-day lives: continuants (and not e.g. four-dimensional objects). It was described 
above how some philosophers – including Wiggins – hold that we cannot help seeing 
organisms as unities, and it is argued below that Wiggins appeals to Aristotle’s account 
because, in addition to these thoughts about causation, there is another strand of anti-
reductionist thought. Brutishly put, an organism is a genuine unity because the existence 
of the parts is seen to ontologically depend (in a non-causal way), on the whole. 
 ‘Ontological dependence’ was introduced, briefly, in §1.3. It is, as Fabrice 
Correia puts it, 
 
…a term of philosophical jargon which stands for a non-well delineated, 
rich family of properties and relations which are usually taken to be 
among the most fundamental ontological properties and relations… A 
dependent object, so the thought goes, is an object whose ontological 
profile, e.g. its existence or its being the object that it is, is somehow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 Wiggins 2001: 143 fn.5 (and, elsewhere, 2001: 80) It is important – in light of the ‘pluralistic’ reading 
above – that in the same passage he goes on to state: ‘Its failure does not entail, however, that science has 
shown that every explanation in any way worth having of anything worth knowing must eventually find 
expression at the level of the science that has displaced the human world view.’ 
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derivative upon facts of certain sorts – be they facts about particular 
objects or not.699 
 
It was shown above that, in discussing the metaphysical character (or ‘ontological 
profile’) of substances, Wiggins deploys notions of ontological dependence (or 
‘posteriority’) borne from the Aristotelian tradition. Properties depend on the substances 
in which they inhere (this is how Wiggins articulates the metaphysical relevance of the 
subject/predicate distinction). ‘Real unity’ was also mentioned above as an aspect of the 
pre-theoretical substance concept, and this too was seen to be explicable in terms of 
dependence. In cases of genuine or real unity, the parts of an item are understood to be 
ontologically dependent on, or posterior to, the whole. The time has come to present a more 
precise rendering of this Aristotelian claim – and in ISTC, Wiggins helpfully offers an 
introduction: 
 
Now the reason why the material parts of x, p, are accounted posterior 
to x by Aristotle seems to be something like this. Suppose we take the 
example of parts of the body. They have to be picked out or 
individuated in some way or other, and any correct way of picking them 
out will have to make clear what exactly we are picking out. But this 
involves making clear the existence and persistence conditions (for 
Aristotle slightly peculiar) of the bodily parts we do pick out… These 
can only be entirely correctly given if we pick these parts out as parts of 
this or that living body. (That anyway is Aristotle’s view of bodily parts. For 
him such are really living-bodily-parts. The generalizable point is that 
the picking out of p must somehow make clear what p are…) So Aristotle 
writes: 
 
 ‘And the finger is defined by the whole body. For a finger is 
a particular kind of part of a man. Thus such parts are 
material, and into which the whole is resolved as into matter, 
are posterior to the whole; but such as are the parts in the 
sense of parts of the formula and of the essence as expressed 
in the formula [tou logou kai tes ousias tes kata ton logon], are prior. 
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Either all or some of them.’ (Metaphysics 1035b following, trans. 
Tredennick.)700 
 
Wiggins is describing a form of essential dependence. It is part of the essence of a finger – 
hand, organ, etc… – to be a part of an organism. Put slightly differently, the statement 
of the essence (the ‘logos’ or ‘real definition’) of that thing will make reference to the 
whole of which it is a part (or, the whole is a ‘constituent’ of that real definition). Thus, 
as Kathrin Koslicki presents the Aristotelian model: 
 
An entity, Φ, ontologically depends on an entity (or entities), Ψ, just in 
case Ψ is a constituent (or are constituents) in a real definition of Φ.701 
 
An illustration may help here. Consider Aristotle’s various discussions of the essence of 
eyes. Where body-parts are concerned, Aristotle takes their essence to relate to their 
function – this is the thought captured in the Meteorology, where he writes: 
 
What a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is 
itself when it can perform its function; an eye, for instance, when it can 
see.702 
 
Aristotle, note, is not stating that the eye must be always performing its function to be 
an eye. Rather, it must be such that it can perform its function. For an eye to be an eye it 
must have the potential (dunamis) to see; our eyes do not cease to be eyes when we sleep, 
since they retain that potential to function (though it is not actualized). 
 The crucial point is that eyes cannot properly be said to see by themselves. 
People see. The function an eye performs is the function for the whole, so an eye must 
be integrated into an organized whole for it to have the capacity to perform its essential 
function. The eye, like the finger, is ‘defined by the whole body’; the real definition of an 
eye essentially refers to the organism of which it is a part. Eyes, then, cannot exist 
separated from the whole. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 Wiggins 1967: 77 
701 Koslicki 2012: 197 
702 Aristotle Meteorology 390a10–13 
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Evidently, even of the things that are thought to be substances, most 
are only potentialities – e.g. the parts of animals (for none of them 
exists separately, and when they are separated, then they too exist, all of 
them, merely as matter)…703 
 
For Aristotle, when an organ is separated from the organism, it is only an organ 
‘homonymously’.704 That is, though the word ‘eye’ is used equally to refer to the living 
eye in my head, and to the detached and decomposing eye on the surgical plate, ‘the 
definition of being which corresponds to the name is different’.705 One exists as a part 
of a whole, with a particular function – the other ‘merely as matter’. 
 
[W]hen seeing is removed the eye is no longer the eye, except in name – 
no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure.706 
 
On the reading presented here, there are two sides to Aristotle’s anti-reductionism. On 
the one hand he claims that organisms are genuine unities because of the causal power 
they have over their parts. On the other, he explains their substancehood in terms of 
priority and posteriority: organisms are real unities because their parts are ontologically 
dependent upon them. And while in Aristotle these strands interweave, the suggestion 
implicit in Wiggins – being drawn out here –  is that they need not necessarily. 
 Wiggins is reluctant to associate himself with Aristotelian final causality. Yet he 
finds in Aristotle a way of capturing our thoughts about organic unity without invoking 
that problematic principle. The causal story and the claims about dependence are 
separable. Thus Wiggins writes, in ‘Substance’: 
 
The extent that anything is not in other things… it enjoys a certain 
autonomy. Something that has this autonomy may be causally 
dependent on other things in the way in which the infant depends on 
the mother; but ontologically speaking, it is still independent.707 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
703 Aristotle Metaphysics 1040b5–10 
704 Munzer 1993: 112 
705 Aristotle Categories 1a–12 
706 Aristotle De Anima 412b2022 
707 Wiggins 1995: 216 
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The proposal here is that Wiggins takes Aristotle’s discussion of dependence to enrich 
our understanding of a central element of our conceptual scheme.708 In our everyday 
experience we treat some things – organisms not least – as possessing principles of 
activity, as being subjects of predication, and as being real unities. This latter aspect of 
substancehood – where an item is seen to be ‘more than the sum of its parts’ – is 
captured well by Aristotle’s thoughts about dependence. An item is a real unity when its 
parts are ontologically – but not necessarily causally – dependent upon it – i.e. when the 
capacity to perform their essential function depends on their being integrated into an 
organized whole.709 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
708 I have Alex Douglas to thank for helping me better my understanding of ontological dependence. 
709 Note that we need not have a refined idea of the essence – we can, as Wiggins points out, leave it for 
biologists to fill in. See also Wiggins 2001: 87 n.10 
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§3.5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to set out a particular dialectic between biological 
reductionists and anti-reductionists, and to show how Wiggins may provide a 
sophisticated alternative to the emergentists’ position. The standard discussion was seen 
to be characterized by the question Are organisms real? There was found to be a sound 
scientific basis for picking out these everyday living things – in Pradeu’s physiological-
immunological account – but that theory did not assay opinions either way as to their 
reality. Dupré, and other emergentists, were seen to hold that organisms are real, divining 
in them novel causal properties. Yet the focus on causation, and the appeals to science, 
were taken to be at odds with Wiggins’ general methodological approach. 
 Wiggins’ anti-reductionism is neo-Aristotelian, not in any causal sense, but because 
he takes the dependence relation found in the Metaphysics to illuminate our pre-
theoretical understanding of living things as genuine unities.710 This unity, which Kant 
considers to be an ineliminable phenomenological fact, can be theorized in terms of 
dependence: the parts of a genuine unity are ontologically dependent upon it. This, it has 
been suggested, stands a genuine, alternative anti-reductionism to the emergentist 
picture.711 
There are two consequences of this analysis that bear particularly in the chapter 
that follows. Firstly, we must take seriously the idea that we cannot conceive of organs 
(the parts of natural substances) as separate from the organized whole – a thought we 
find in Aristotle, but echoed also by Hegel (a philosopher who makes a notable, but 
over-looked, epigrammatic appearance in S&S):712 
 
The limbs and organs for instance, of an organic body are not merely 
parts of it: it is only in their unity that they are what they are…713 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710 Not only does this analysis offer a clearer picture of Wiggins’ use of Aristotle, but it provides an 
extrapolation of Wiggins’ view of organs, which – as he notes in S&SR – is summary at best. Wiggins 
2001: 86–87 
711 This is one instance where greater interdisciplinary discussion between philosophy of biology and 
metaphysics (and the history of metaphysics) is obviously valuable (see also Dupré 2008b/2012: 99). In 
addition, discussion between those spheres will guard against the confusions that arise in animalist 
accounts of personal identity. Olson, like van Inwagen, is avowedly ‘mechanistic’ when it comes to 
descriptions of biological processes (in the causal sense described in chapter 4), and yet, simultaneously, 
his animalist account is determinately ‘Aristotelian’. There is a tension here, drawn out in the work below, 
which Wiggins’ position can effectively combat. 
712 Wiggins 1980: 148 
713 Hegel 1817/1975: 191–2 See also Claude Bernard’s comment: ‘If we decompose the living organism 
into its various parts, it is only for the sake of experimental analysis, not for them to be understood 
separately.’ Bernard 1865/1984, II, ii, §1, §137 
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Secondly, if Wiggins elucidates our pre-theoretical substance concept along these lines 
then he will hold that organisms, as natural substances, cannot conceivably be 
dismantled. It is beyond our conceptual limits to think of organized wholes as suffering 
disassembly. Organisms – as natural substances, and exemplifying the elements of that 
category – are ontologically prior to their parts. They cannot, then, be separated into 
their parts, because their parts can only exist in the integrated unity. In the next chapter 
it is discussed how these thoughts about natural substances are disturbed by the logic of 
transplantation. 
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BRAIN TRANSPLANTATION 
 
The time has come to consider Sydney Shoemaker’s infamous ‘brain transplantation’ 
narrative. The story is one that Wiggins frequently revisits – yet despite prolonged 
discussion he fails to provide a satisfactorily clear ruling on whether or not a person 
could survive such a procedure. Brown’s peculiar adventures seem somehow to resist 
his analysis. The aim of this chapter is to investigate why they do so, whether he can 
give a principled response to the story, and what the implications for such a response 
might be. 
 In §4.1, Wiggins’ various (unsatisfactory) attempts to deal with the story are set 
out. Following this, the story is re-examined. Drawing on the work in chapter 3 it is 
argued (in §4.2) that the idea of a brain transplantation subtly shifts our metaphysical 
focus from an organism onto a biological item whose parts are ontologically independent of 
the whole. Shoemaker’s scenario is, in a relevant sense, mechanistic (the different senses 
of ‘mechanism’ are drawn out below). In §4.3 this mechanistic reading is supported by a 
historical review of the origins of the story in Locke; it is argued that the Lockean 
discussion of personal identity is a response to tensions between the doctrine of the 
resurrection, and corpuscularian forms of biological mechanism. 
Shoemaker’s narrative moves one’s focus from the organism onto a ‘living 
something-or-other’ or – to build on the discussions in chapter 1 – onto a biological 
artefact. Unaware of this shift, Wiggins’ analyses are confounded. The contention here, 
following the neo-Aristotelian treatment offered in §3.4, is that he has strong grounds 
for holding that the organism cannot suffer the sort of disassembly described by 
Shoemaker. Thus Brown does not survive. This assessment will lead to some concerns. 
More anodyne cases of transplantation – like heart transplantation – exhibit similar 
kinds of disassembly. Does the organism survive heart transplantation? And if not, does 
the person? These questions return us to the worries with the human being theory assayed in 
chapter 2, and in the conclusion a resolution to these concerns is proposed. 
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§4.1. Changing perspectives 
 
Sydney Shoemaker’s story about the unfortunate Brownson appeared in 1963 in his Self-
Knowledge and Self-Identity. The story, which describes the transplanting of Brown’s brain 
into Robinson’s body, is analysed in greater detail below (and the famous passage is 
reproduced); the aim of this section, meanwhile, is to present an overview of Wiggins’ 
response to this peculiar narrative. 
Wiggins’ initial reading is found in his Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (1967) 
and since then his view has fluctuated: at times he doubts Brown’s survival, at other 
times he seems drawn ineluctably to suppose it. This overview will mainly refer to eight 
of Wiggins’ texts, spanning his philosophical career: Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity 
(1967) ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness’ (1976), Sameness and Substance 
(1980), ‘The Person as Object of Science…’ (1987), ‘Reply to Snowdon’ (1996), Sameness 
and Substance Renewed (2001), ‘Reply to Shoemaker’ (2004), and ‘Identity, Individuation 
and Substance’ (2012). 
 In 1963, Shoemaker takes his story to support a neo-Lockean reading of 
personal identity; it seems to us that Brown survives the operation, and is Brownson, 
because of psychological continuity. Four years later, Wiggins agrees that Brown is 
Brownson, but not exclusively because of psychological continuity – the important 
point, made in ISTC, is that Brown’s life goes along with his brain: 
 
[W]hat matters… is the continuity of Brown’s life and vital functions as 
they are planted in one body and recognizably and traceably transposed in 
another body.714 
 
In Wiggins’ early texts the brain is the ‘seat’ of the vital and psychological functions – 
and it is because of both that brain transplantation yields survival. The brain is the 
‘individuating nucleus’ of the person or rather – to use the Aristotelian terminology of 
1967 – the psuche (the term ‘human being’ does not enter Wiggins’ technical vocabulary 
until 1976). Thus, reviewing his earlier work (in S&SR), Wiggins writes: 
 
[Brownson] was the functional inheritor and continuator of all of 
Brown’s vital faculties. This was the reason why Brownson counted as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 Wiggins 1967: 51 
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unique inheritor of the title to be Brown, the reason why Brownson was 
Brown, that very substance. Neither Brown nor Robinson nor Brownson 
was a brain. But the brain being the seat of memory and consciousness 
was not just any old part of the body among others. It was the essential 
nucleus of a person (of a human being)…715 
 
When Wiggins does present a positive reading of brain transplantation in his work, this is 
the general reason he gives: Brown survives because his life continues.716 
Even in 1967, however, Wiggins expresses doubts about the story. The most 
significant of these is his concern that transplantation, combined with the live possibility 
of ‘hemispherectomies’, will introduce fission. Mammalian brains are roughly symmetrical 
and can be separated ‘with only minimal disturbance of normal function’.717 If 
transplantation were possible, the two hemispheres could be separated and transplanted 
into two separate husks – resulting in splinters of the original Brown: Brownson (1) and 
Brownson (2). As was discussed in chapter 2, Wiggins’ adherence to Leibnizian identity 
means he cannot read both splinters to be identical with Brown – nor does he see a 
principled reason for privileging one over the other,718 so Brown cannot, on pain of 
logical transgression, survive fission.719 And since there is no relevant difference 
between the procedure that produces Brownson, and the one that produces the 
splinters, the worry is that Brown does not survive as Brownson.  
 Wiggins answers this worry, in 1967, with his ‘one parcel stipulation’ – intended 
to rule against cases of fission, but not (whole) brain transplantation. He writes: 
 
It would be better, after a conceptual analysis of the essential and 
characteristic vital functions, to analyse person in such a way that 
coincidence under the concept person logically required the continuance in 
one organized parcel of all that was causally sufficient and causally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
715 Wiggins 2001: 207 
716 See e.g. Wiggins 2001: 207 (n. 17) Rory Madden develops this line (in his ‘The Persistence of Animate 
Organisms’ (draft)). Madden similarly states that the brain carries with it a sufficient number of capacities 
for human animal characteristic activity (15) and thus holds that we would travel with it (in cases of brain 
extraction). In contrast, the claim in this chapter is that if a biological item survives transplantation, etc., it 
cannot be an organism.  
717 Wiggins 1967: 52 
718 Note however, that in ISTC he writes that the brain is not nearly so symmetrical as the thought 
experiment suggests, and that, ‘in the case of a man’s brain the two halves of it are not equal in status and 
that if a surgeon separated them one half would be clever and the other moronic’ (52). This point is 
reiterated and reinforced in an interesting footnote in his 2001 (208 n.21). 
719 Or, as Parfit pointed out (in his 1971), on pain of separating the concepts of survival from that of 
identity. 
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necessary to the continuance of essential and characteristic functioning, 
no autonomously sufficient part achieving autonomous and separate 
existence.720 
 
In his later work, this one parcel stipulation is seen to be an unstable resting point 
(though, following the reading of his work assayed below, it may begin to seem more 
robust).721 He claims (in S&SR) that more is required to show why this condition 
inevitably and naturally arises from the proper understanding of person and human being.722 
Without further philosophical analysis the stipulation seems arbitrary – and in 2001, he 
returns to this worry, and tries to flesh it out by reference to a ‘guarantee’ (discussed 
below). 
 Ultimately, the reading in 1967 is a positive one: Brown goes along with the 
brain because the brain contains – in some way – everything that is essential to the person 
(though the person is not the brain). However Wiggins’ initial account is saddled with 
doubts; in addition to being obscure how the brain ‘contains’ or ‘seats’ or ‘houses’ an 
individual’s life,723 there is the worry concerning fission. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 Wiggins 1967: 55 
721 Wiggins 2001: 208 
722 Ibid: 209 
723 How exactly, do the vital functions ‘sit’ in the brain? In 1967 this metaphor of the ‘seat’ is explained in 
distinctly Aristotelian terms. Indeed, Wiggins sees his response to transplantation to have been anticipated 
in the Metaphysics, and in a significant footnote he imagines Aristotle’s response to Shoemaker’s story. At 
Metaphysics 1035b14, Aristotle describes certain parts of organisms, ‘which are neither prior nor posterior 
but logically simultaneous with the psuche itself, such as are conceptually indispensible to its existence (kuria) and in 
which the whole formula itself, the essential substance, is immediately present… e.g. perhaps the heart or the brain.’ 
(quoted in Wiggins, 1967: 78) Wiggins applies this, by saying that the brain is not the psuche (person) but 
that it is ‘logically simultaneous’ with it. Its logos (formula) is the logos of the psuche (form), which is to say 
that ‘its functional mission embraces everything [that is, all the relevant human capacities] which is integral 
to the psuche itself.’ (Wiggins 1967: 77–78). The brain is the ‘seat’ of these various capacities because it is 
casually integral and indispensible to them (in a way that no other body part is). The formula that outlines 
its function incorporates all those vital functions essential to the psuche. And for this reason – because its 
‘formula’ is co-extensive with the ‘formula’ of the form, psuche (person) – Wiggins reads the brain as the 
individuative nucleus of Brown. (This line of argument seems to foreshadow that found in Madden 
(draft): 15ff.) 
 However, Wiggins’ interpretation of Aristotle is more than a little controversial, and his 
elucidation obscure (see Ackrill 1997). More will certainly be said by those with a surer grasp of Aristotle’s 
position – but of interest here is how the distinction between formula and form translates to the latter 
distinction in Wiggins’ work between ‘principle of activity’ and ‘activity’. The same line is being drawn, 
and it reveals an interesting ambiguity in Wiggins’ account. Does the activity itself need to continue 
uninterrupted for the individual to survive – or is it enough that the specific determination of the 
principle of activity (the logos) is preserved in some way, with the possibility of it being ‘re-activated’? The 
1967 text does not offer up an immediate answer. Nor is much gleaned from Wiggins’ comments in 2001 
that what is needed is the ‘inheritance’ of the ‘perfected epistemic and other capacities’ (2001: 226), and 
that the human being requires ‘the operation of the same principle of activity’ (2001: 207). On an 
optimistic interpretative note, there seem to be some grounds for saying that he does hold that the activity 
must be seamlessly continuous. When considering brain transplantation, for example, he writes that the 
recipient must ‘inherit’ the epistemic and other capacities ‘in the manner in which any ordinary person 
who has suffered no such adventures is constantly inheriting from himself’ (Wiggins 2001: 226). In the 
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It is likely because of these worries that Shoemaker’s story largely disappears 
from Wiggins’ work over the following decade. Indeed, in his 1976 paper, and in S&S, 
Wiggins’ main additions to his thoughts about brain transplantation are two further 
doubts. In an almost incidental footnote in ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of 
Consciousness’, Wiggins criticizes Shoemaker’s narrative along the following lines (and 
in this, as he notes, he follows Bernard Williams’ thoughts in ‘Personal Identity and 
Individuation’):724 
 
How do we fix the brain to the physiognomy of the new body which is to 
receive it? …How is the existing character expressed in the new body? 
We are deceived by the quality of the actors and mimics we see on the 
stage if with the help of greasepaint and props they have made us think 
this is as (relatively) simple as the transposition of music from one 
instrument to another.725 
 
This point about the relevance of physiognomy is reiterated in S&S726 along with a 
general complaint about the comprehensibility of brain transplantation: 
 
[W]e should take nothing for granted about how well we really 
understand brain transfers of the kind described by Shoemaker.727 
 
Wiggins entertains suspicions. And in both 1976 and 1980 texts he withholds judgment 
about the identity of Brown with Brownson. It is notable too, that while he discusses 
fission (which, as indicated, gave rise to earlier worries) he does not do so in relation to 
hemispherectomies and subsequent transplants, but rather Lamarckian inheritance and 
branching.728 The publication of Parfit’s ‘Personal Identity’ in 1971 – in which survival is 
read as an identity-free concept – put considerable pressure on Wiggins’ ‘one parcel 
stipulation’,729 and this, in addition to the issues outlined above, may well explain why in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
normal run of things we ‘inherit’ these faculties through their continued activity (not ‘exercise’ necessarily, 
but ‘actualization’). Further, he writes that a human being’s persistence requires ‘the participation of the 
same continued life’ (2001: 207, my emphasis) – though admittedly ‘participation’ is not wholly transparent 
here. 
724 Williams 1956 
725 Wiggins 1976: 158 
726 Wiggins 1980: 189 
727 Ibid: 188 
728 E.g. Wiggins 1980: 156 (see also Wiggins 1979) 
729 As Wiggins describes it, in his 2001: 209 
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his 1987 paper ‘The Person as Object of Science…’ there is no explicit mention of brain 
transplantation or Shoemaker at all, despite his review there of past works, and his 
discussion of neo-Lockeanism. 
  It is Paul Snowdon’s ‘Persons and Personal Identity’ that encourages Wiggins, 
in his ‘Reply’ (1996), to re-engage with Shoemaker’s story. And following the 
development of his ‘Animal Attribute Theory’ in his 1980 and 1987 texts, Wiggins has a 
new resource to draw on when dealing with the narrative. He reiterates past doubts, but 
writes that if the neo-Lockeans are right that the person goes with the brain, since the 
concept person is concordant with the human being concept, the human being will 
necessarily go as well: 
 
[I]f I must allow survival, I am not sure why I am committed to denying 
that the survivor who emerges from all these goings on is the same human 
being or the same animal as the one who entered them… I have insisted on 
the dependence of the concept person upon the concept human being… 
[O]nce you understand what a human being is and what the seat of 
consciousness is, surely you will not too readily assume that you know what 
it would be for a human being to be given a new seat of consciousness. If 
transplantation really were possible, then would not the person follow the 
seat of consciousness? In that case, does not the animal that the survivor 
is follow it too?730 
 
Of course, there is no clear ruling here; Wiggins does not state that Brown would 
actually be identical with Brownson. On reflection, it is probable that this reluctance is 
due to the previous doubts about the physiognomic differences between donor and 
recipient, and the problematic possibility of fission. It is notable that in S&SR – the first 
extended treatment of transplantation since 1967 – he specifically addresses these issues, 
and suggests how these obstacles to a positive reading of transplantation may be 
overcome. 
 In the final chapter of that 2001 text, Wiggins re-emphasizes Williams’ worry 
with physiognomy – writing, of his earlier self: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
730 Wiggins 2001: 246 
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I ought to have been much more troubled by the point that, even if 
Brownson could talk like Brown… he could scarcely have stood and 
walked and run and jumped and smiled and sulked and earnestly 
entreated and frowned and laughed like Brown.731 
 
However, here (and later, in discussion with Shoemaker in The Monist), he considers the 
possibility of brain transplantation between twins, from one identical twin to another 
(this is latterly supplemented by talk of transplantation between clones).732 Although 
reservations remain,733 they are shelved, and Wiggins takes transplantation between 
twins to overcome Williams’ physiognomic objection. 
 With respect to fission, Wiggins re-emphasizes, in S&SR, the need for a 
principled reason to distinguish the procedures that resulted in Brownson and in 
Brownson (1) and (2). He writes (of his analysis in 1967): 
 
 Further philosophical reflection was badly needed to explain, and 
explain on the basis of the sort of thing a person is or a human being is, 
what distinguished the relation Brownson bore to Brown, if that case 
was to be allowed as an identity and a true survival, from the relation 
that the splinters Brownson (1) and Browson (2) bore to Brown.734 
 
A considerable portion of the final chapter S&SR text is aimed at developing such an 
explanation. Following his discussion of Butler and Locke (see §2.1.), Wiggins attempts 
to provide a principled reason for distinguishing cases based on the Butlerian claim that 
memory presupposes (and thus cannot constitute) identity. Taking Butler’s line allows 
him to say that in fission cases, the splinters, while seemingly remembering Brown’s life, 
cannot actually be said to do so. The memories presuppose identity, and since the 
splinters are not identical with Brown, theirs cannot be real memories. (The particular 
emphasis on memory here may seem to sit awkwardly in relation to the human being theory 
– but Wiggins’ thought is that memory is a prominent faculty among our other vital 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 Wiggins 2001: 208 
732 Ibid: 234–5, Shoemaker 2004a, Wiggins 2004a. Wiggins should perhaps be more wary than he is about 
these clones. In line with the suggestions in the pages that follow, one might think the very idea of a clone 
has already shifted our thoughts away from the biological items we are pre-theoretically interested in. 
733 ‘My preliminary reply… will be to voice my doubt whether making Brownson’s face very like Brown’s 
face can fully overcome the disquiet that attaches to the very idea of ‘wearing’ a face. Off-stage, one does 
not simply wear a face, only an expression of the face.’ Wiggins 2001: 236 
734 Wiggins 2001: 209 
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faculties, and has the added and peculiar feature of being a self-recording faculty, in a way 
that our other vital faculties are not.735) Because Brownson genuinely remembers 
Brown’s life, and the fissioning procedure that produced the splinters prevents them 
from doing so, the two stories may be said to be relevantly different. 
 Insofar as Wiggins attempts to overcome these obstacles, it appears that he is 
leaning towards a favourable analysis of the transplantation case. As in 1967, a 
preliminary reading of S&SR suggests that he does take Brown to survive as Brownson. 
This, however, is not the end of the story. Having dismissed these objections, he 
immediately raises two further doubts in S&SR. The first was alluded to in 1980 and in 
1996, and concerns the conceivability of these kinds of narratives. In Shoemaker’s story (as 
will become clear in the next section), there is no real examination of the kinds of 
revolutionary technological advancements that would be required by the procedure. 
Thus, Wiggins points out: 
 
[P]hilosophers are still apt to underestimate the preternatural dexterity 
and knowledge that the imaginary surgeon and [their] equally imaginary 
team of anaesthetists, suturists, radiographers, laser-technicians, 
physiotherapists, psychotherapists, counsellors and the rest, would have 
to bring to bear…736 
 
Having outlined this general concern, he raises another, more specific point. It relates to 
the notion of a guarantee. Brain transplantation might seem, he suggests, to violate the 
lawful dependability of the natural biological process, and thus individuals like us cannot 
be said to survive such procedures: 
 
A genuine guarantee relating to this or that process must relate to the 
nature of the process itself rather than a mere description of it. 
Moreover, genuine guarantees exist. However you describe it, the 
process of jam-making can be guaranteed not to produce heavy-water 
out of ordinary water… Another process that comes with a certain 
guarantee is the natural process, sustained by the operation of numerous 
laws of biochemistry, physiology and the rest, by which a human being 
comes into existence and matures, and eventually ceases to be, by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 Wiggins 2001:199 
736 Ibid: 207 n.18 
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‘natural death’. That process is not of course guaranteed to save a human 
being from murder or from premature death by asbestosis, say, or 
irradiation. But it is certainly guaranteed not to produce multiples, not 
to transplant brains or half-brains, and not (if that were the better way 
to think of Brownson) to furnish new bodies to living, continuing 
brains. That is what makes this familiar process and the principle 
associated with it one part of the basis for the making of judgments of 
identity…737  
 
It is on the basis of the dependability of the process that we can distinguish between 
judgments of identity, and judgments ‘to the effect that the object b is the proper 
replacement/surrogate/proxy for object a’. The suggestion is that brain transplantation 
violates this guarantee, and that the process is thereby undermined.  
Yet even here, Wiggins’ position remains somewhat unclear. He himself points 
out that violations of the guarantee do not always stop the process, or imperil identity. 
For example, there are those small procedures – orthopaedic, osteopathic, etc – in 
which ‘the substance’s organic independence can still be conceived as undiminished.’738 
At the other end of the spectrum, interferences – like teletransportation – violate the 
guarantee to such an extent that we lose track of the original process. In such instances 
‘we have lost hold altogether of the notions we began with of what Brown is’;739 the 
natural substance has become ‘artefact-like’, ‘something not so much to be encountered 
in the world as putatively made or produced by us, something that it is really up to us 
(individually or collectively) not merely to heal or care for or protect but also to repair, 
to reshape, to reconstruct… even to reconceive.’740 
  
‘The thing that is so unsettling about the surgeon’s experiment as I see 
it is that it spans the divide between, on the one hand, natural 
substances (which have their own inherently orderly ways of enforcing 
some individuative decisions… while forbidding others), and, on the 
other hand, artifacts, where individuative thought is forced into an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Wiggins 2001: 238 
738 Ibid: 241 
739 Ibid: 241 
740 Ibid: 241 
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opportunism that it has to strive constantly (and retrospectively 
sometimes) to make principled.’741 
 
This denaturing of the natural substance is the topic of the sections that follow. Here, 
the point is that Wiggins raises a question he leaves unanswered: where exactly on the 
spectrum (of technological interference), does brain transplantation fit? He suggests that 
if we do think of Brownson as Brown, then the conceptual consilience between the 
person concept and the human being concept will have been undermined – that human 
person will converge more closely on the conception of an artefact. But again, he gives no 
definite ruling.  
 And reading the end of S&SR – where these passages figure – one gets the 
impression that Wiggins is just as dissatisfied with these equivocations as we may be. In 
the final few pages he performs a fascinating switch to a moral register; even if it were 
possible, we might think it shouldn’t be: 
 
If we cannot recognize our own given natures and the natural world as 
setting any limit at all upon the desires that we contemplate taking 
seriously; if we will not listen to the anticipations and suspicions of the 
artefactual conception of human beings that sound in half-forgotten 
moral denunciations of the impulse to see people or human beings as 
things, as tools, as bearers of military numerals, as cannon-fodder, or as 
fungibles… then what will befall us? Will a new disquiet assail our 
desires themselves, in a world no less denuded of meaning by our sense 
of own omnipotence than ravaged by our self-righteous insatiability? 
…I frame the question and, having framed it, I grave it here.742 
 
(This passage merits closer attention than it has received here. It is a warning – but of 
what? Of construing others as, in some sense, artefacts? As fungibles? A cursory glance 
at the feminist literature on the subject of objectification will show that these worries are 
occasioned by other things than technological advancements.743)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 Wiggins 2004a: 605 
742 Wiggins 2001: 242 
743 E.g. Langton 2009. Is the confusion between the natural and the artefactual necessarily a bad thing? 
Much more may be said about this – but it will suffice here to direct attention to Donna Haraway’s 
compelling thoughts about the political power of the notion of a cyborg. Disturbing the boundaries 
between natural and artefactual, the cyborg challenges problematic essentializing tendencies – see 
Haraway 1991. 
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Since giving his positive response in 1967, Wiggins has repeatedly iterated 
worries and doubts about Shoemaker’s story. As demonstrated, S&SR delivers a 
bumper crop. However it is only in 2004, in a fiery exchange with Shoemaker in The 
Monist, that Wiggins finally explicitly denies that Brown survives as Brownson. 
 
If Brownson isn’t Brown, then something peculiar must have happened. 
But it has. There has happened the intervention, as I am now imagining 
the case, of a mad surgeon. What shall we say the surgeon has done? 
…Let us say that out of rather unpromising natural materials – for 
Brownson has little or no resemblance to Brown – the surgeon has tried 
to make a working model of Brown… He has created a living 
something-or-other which, in addition to its other sufferings, is a 
repository or receptacle for mental events that are downwind of an 
ordinary human life...744 
 
A definite ruling… or so at first it seems. Even here there is ambiguity. The reasons 
Wiggins gives for this conclusion are those that in 2001 he explicitly disavowed. 
Specifically (and as is evident from the quotation), he cites the difference in 
physiognomy as a reason why Brown cannot survive in Robinson’s shell. There is no talk 
of fission cases, or conceivability or of guarantees. Has he rescinded these later 
objections? Can the earlier ones be somehow bolstered? It is not clear. 
 His latest analysis of the case, in his Mark Sack’s lecture in 2012, is again 
undecided. He reasserts his worry about guarantees,745 but his final considered opinion 
is… uncertainty: 
 
In discussion of Brown and Brownson it is often assumed that, if there 
were later mental events that were downwind from Brown before brain 
surgery, then the person Brown – or some person Brown – must have 
persisted somehow. But how strongly can a well-founded conception of 
person support that assumption? Again I am unsure…746 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 Wiggins 2004a: 604–605 
745 Wiggins 2012: 20 
746 Ibid: 20 
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Reviewing Wiggins’ texts one may fairly say that, despite the prolonged discussion, he is 
yet to state his position unambiguously.747 Perhaps this is as it should be. Yet, tying 
together strands from the previous chapters, one may also see a principled reason, not 
only for denying the identity of Brownson and Brown, but for reassessing Shoemaker’s 
story more generally. It is to the task of tying together these analyses, and reassessing 
the narrative, that attention will now be turned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747 This is a lack of clarity that Lowe also identifies (Lowe 2003: 819) 
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§4.2. Transplantation and mechanism 
 
Let us start with a partial summary and a prospectus of what is to follow: 
Wiggins holds that, in virtue of being the kinds of being we are, we carve up the 
biological realm in a particular way. We pick out ‘organisms’ – beings that are genuine 
unities. That is, when it comes to our everyday navigation of the world, we are anti-
reductionist (in the manner explained in §3.4.). In the remainder of this chapter, it is 
claimed that Shoemaker’s brain transplantation story implicitly shifts the metaphysical 
focus from organisms onto another type of entity: in virtue of an underlying mechanism it 
directs our attention onto the kind of being that can be disassembled and reassembled. 
Reading the story, we pick out something – but not a biological being as ordinarily 
conceived (and here, ‘ordinarily’ has the full force of Wiggins’ descriptivism). Following 
his comments in The Monist, we may say – for the time being – that our focus has been 
shifted onto a ‘living something-or-other’.748 
 Some general methodological issues with thought experiments are considered 
below. Following this, it is demonstrated how Shoemaker’s story smuggles certain 
conceptual assumptions into the personal identity debate. 
 
§4.2.a. Methodological concerns 
 
Science-fiction thought experiments like Shoemaker’s ‘brain transplantation case’ are 
used to draw out intuitions and to investigate what we mean exactly by certain terms. By 
those who deploy them, they are seen to be relatively innocent philosophical tools. 
However, a growing number of theorists – among others, Michèle le Doeuff, Susan 
James and Margaret La Caze749 – have subjected these narratives to closer scrutiny, and 
argue that rather than simply being illustrative, or pedagogically useful devices, stories 
like Shoemaker’s often play significant roles in the argument within which they are 
deployed.750 They are, says La Caze: ‘extremely important to the expression of 
philosophical thought, to the way debates are structured, and assumptions are shared; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 Wiggins 2004a: 605. Madden (in his 2011) focuses on a different kind of shift that occurs in 
Shoemaker’s scenario – a referential shift. The reference of ‘I’ shifts slowly and undetectably from Brown to 
Brownson – or, as he puts it, from the ‘Old Animal’ to the ‘New Animal’ (296). I am not sure what to say 
about this, but perhaps – given the arguments below – that shift might better be construed as one 
between an organism and an artefact. Madden’s discussion bears on the worries in footnotes 828 and 834. 
749 Le Doeuff 2000, James 2000, la Caze 2002 
750 Their approach can be contrasted with Kathleen Wilkes’ (1968) who dismisses thought experiments 
because she sees them to be little more than interesting diversions. 
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they can also work to persuade and provide support for a particular view and exclude 
alternative views and methods.’751 This should be borne in mind when considering the 
tale of Brown, Robinson, and the unfortunate Brownson (quoted here in the abridged 
form in which it appears in S&SR): 
 
Suppose that medical science developed a technique whereby a surgeon 
can completely remove a person’s brain from his head, examine or 
operate on it, and then put it back in his skull (regrafting the nerves, 
blood-vessels, and so forth) without causing death or permanent injury… 
One day a surgeon discovers that an assistant has made a horrible 
mistake. Two men, a Mr Brown and a Mr Robinson, had been operated 
on for brain tumours, and brain extractions had been performed on both 
of them. At the end of the operations, however, the assistant 
inadvertently put Brown’s brain in Robinson’s head, and Robinson’s 
brain in Brown’s head. One of these men immediately dies, but the other, 
the one with Robinson’s body and Brown’s brain, eventually regains 
consciousness. Let us call the latter ‘Brownson’… He recognizes Brown’s 
wife and family (whom Robinson had never met), and is able to describe 
in detail events in Brown’s life, always describing them as events in his 
own life. Of Robinson’s past life he evidences no knowledge at all. Over 
a period of time he is observed to display all of the personality traits, 
mannerisms, interests, likes and dislikes, and so on that had previously 
characterized Brown, and to act and talk in ways completely alien to the 
old Robinson. 
 What would we say if such a thing happened? There is little 
question that many of us would be inclined, and rather strongly inclined, 
to say that while Brownson has Robinson’s body he is actually Brown. 
But if we did say this we certainly would not be using bodily identity as 
our criterion of personal identity. To be sure, we are supposing 
Brownson to have part of Brown’s body, namely his brain. But it would 
be absurd to suggest that brain identity is our criterion of personal 
identity.752 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
751 La Caze 2002: 2. La Caze (and e.g. James 2000, 30–32) also point out that these thought experiments – 
and this naïve approach to them – are perhaps most common in analytic philosophy. 
752 Shoemaker 1968: 23–24 
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Since its debut in Shoemaker’s Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, this narrative has been the 
subject of considerable discussion, of numerous refinements, and varied critiques.753 
Not least among the latter is a strand of feminist criticism, which questions the binary 
distinction that underpins the story. In her study, ‘Feminism in philosophy of mind: The 
question of personal identity’,754 Susan James shows how such ‘character transplants’ 
implicitly enforce a worryingly thin notion of, all but disembodied, personhood.  
 
[T]he body is thought of as a container or receptacle for character. The 
brain figures as a container in which a person’s psychological states can 
be preserved, and the body figures as a more elaborate receptacle for the 
brain. 
…Properties which do not fit neatly into the category of the 
psychological are held to be marginal or irrelevant to character.755 
 
Shoemaker’s story reiterates the traditional division between the psychological and the 
bodily. Firstly, we see the marginalization of the body – historically, symbolically 
feminine – and the privileging of the mind – historically, symbolically masculine.756 
Secondly, and simultaneously, we see how the anonymising of the body affirms a 
particular view of character; expressly embodied character traits – like one’s dexterity, or 
sexuality – are held to be irrelevant.757 Shoemaker’s story misses out what we may well 
see to be central aspects of our personhood, our experience of ourselves as distinctively 
embodied beings. (And this last point – as will be clear from the discussion above – is one 
with which Wiggins is certainly sympathetic.)758 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 Including – as noted in §4.1. – Wiggins’; see e.g. 2001, ch.7 §7, 1996: 246, 1980: 188–9, 1967: 53 
754 James 2000 
755 Ibid: 33 
756 Ibid: 32ff (Nor is it irrelevant that the story’s protagonists are all male.) 
757 Ibid: 33 
758 These thoughts bear on the discussion, among personal identity theorists, about how best to deal with 
‘thinking parts’. Rory Madden points out that the thesis that we have human form – central to both 
animalism and constitutionalism – is threatened by the commonplace thought that our conscious 
perspective could, in theory, be had by beings much smaller (less humanoid) than ourselves. (Madden 
forthcoming: 2–3) As ‘phantom limbs’ demonstrate, the possession of body-parts is not necessary for us to 
experience possessing them. Thus the conscious experience of a human being might well be had by a 
thinking part – a brain, say (and we have no way of telling which one we are). Madden ultimately rejects 
the presupposition that ‘the local activity in parts significantly smaller than the whole humanoid is 
sufficient for the presence of a conscious perspective’ (7, 23). His conclusion is supported by the 
arguments above (and those in §2.2), which emphasize the extent to which our conscious experience is an 
experience of an embodied being with particular limbs, organs, etc. Amputees may feel things in now lost 
limbs (what exactly? an itch? a pain? a thrill of excitement? And which limbs? Philosophers tend not to 
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 These kinds of criticisms have resulted in various refinements to the story (as 
was seen in §4.1); now, rather than construing the donor and recipient’s physiology as 
marginal, philosophers (including Shoemaker and Wiggins) specify that the 
transplantation occurs between identical twins, or clones.759 Yet one may think that 
worries remain, and the aim here is to expose – in a similar vein – another suppressed 
assumption contained within the narrative. 
 
§4.2.b. A suppressed assumption 
 
Consider the story again. Better yet, consider the standard procedure – ‘brain extraction’ 
– the corruption of which produces ‘Brownson’. 
 
[It is] a technique whereby a surgeon can completely remove a person’s 
brain from his head, examine or operate on it, and then put it back in his 
skull (regrafting the nerves, blood-vessels, and so forth) without causing 
death or permanent injury…760 
 
The patient described here is the kind of thing that can be cut into pieces and then 
reassembled, and not die (or indeed suffer permanent injury). There is nothing but 
technical dexterity to stop Brown being split into still more pieces. The heart, the lungs, 
the kidneys, the stomach could be separated – and so long as they are reassembled, the 
story goes, the organism survives suffering neither ‘death or permanent injury’. 
 There is something strikingly reminiscent here of Wiggins’ discussion of clocks 
(mentioned in §1.3.b.). He writes: ‘the repair of a clock… permits both disassembly and 
replacement of parts. We do not look back to the time when a clock was being repaired 
and say that the clock’s existence was interrupted while it was in a dismantled 
condition.’761 In Shoemaker’s story we are invited to think of the patient in much the 
same way – as though Brown were a human-engineered machine, suffering disassembly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
elaborate) – but is a big step from this to the claim that a thinking part might think the things it thinks in a 
body when it is no longer part of that body. Relatedly, the problem of ‘remnant persons’ – animals pared 
down to e.g. cerebrums in vats – gains no purchase. Whatever such things might think, their thoughts will 
likely be nothing like our own conscious experience (see Wiggins 1996: 246, cf. Madden forthcoming: 31). 
759 E.g. Shoemaker 2004a: 574 
760 Shoemaker 1963: 23 
761 Wiggins 2001: 92 
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Bluntly put, Shoemaker’s story seems to encourage a mechanistic analysis of the biological 
being.762 
This thought is supported by Ian Hacking’s broader discussion of transplant 
surgery. In his paper ‘Our Neo-Cartesian Bodies in Parts’,763 Hacking argues that the 
technological advancements that allow us to separate and reintegrate organs tangibly 
reinforce a mechanistic conception of the biological world. To see ourselves as the 
potential subjects of transplantation is to see ourselves as in some way machinic. 
 
It is seldom noticed that we seem to be edging closer to fulfilling a 
simplistic version of a Cartesian dream, whereby bodies are just machines 
in space, composed of machine parts… Something like Descartes’s two 
categories may be forced on us again as the result of our technological 
prowess.764 
 
The bodily revolution may be a revolution in that sense – the 
reinstatement of a Cartesian attitude to the body as a machine. It has 
become a machine, subject to engineering projects large and small.765 
 
Mechanism was introduced in general terms in §3.2.a. as a particular methodological angle 
on biological inquiry; the mechanist was seen to hold that items in the biological realm 
should be understood in the same way that we understand human-engineered machines. 
Yet, as with ‘reductionism’, ‘mechanism’ captures a variety of interrelated theses; 
epistemic and metaphysical claims collect around the powerful guiding metaphor of the 
machine. In line with the discussions in chapter 3, two related theses supported by that 
metaphor might be drawn out. Both are metaphysical; one focuses on causation, the 
other, on ontological dependence. 
 Mechanisms – clocks and cars and so on – seem to exemplify the kind of causal 
reductionism described in §3.2. A mechanism, as a whole, exerts no relevant, novel 
causal influence over its parts. There is no emergent causal property at the higher level; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762 Note too that Brown exemplifies what Karl Deutsch sees to be the central features of the classical 
concept of a mechanism. A mechanism behaves ‘in an exactly identical fashion no matter how often [its] 
parts [are] disassembled and put together again (Deutsch 1951: 233–234). Madden describes a tendency 
among philosophers to visualize living organisms along the lines of ‘wooden block “anatomical toys”… a 
collection of interlocking wooden blocks, any one of which may be freely removed and returned’ 
(forthcoming: 32). This is the picture I think can be helpfully articulated by reference to mechanism. 
763 Hacking 2007 
764 Ibid: 80 
765 Ibid: 102–103 
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a clock (say) has its causal powers in virtue of the causal powers of its parts. This feature 
of mechanisms is commented on, in this connection, by Dupré (in his Spinoza lectures): 
 
A good machine starts with all its parts precisely constructed to interact 
together in the way that they will generate its intended functions. The 
technical manual for my car specifies exactly the ideal state of every single 
component… failing components can be replaced with replicas, close to 
the ideal types specified in the manual… Reductionism is almost precisely 
true of a car. We know exactly what its constituents are – they are listed 
in the manual – and we know how they interact: we designed them to 
interact that way.766 
 
How does this bear on the brain transplantation story? In Shoemaker’s narrative, a 
successful ‘brain extraction’ causes neither death nor permanent injury; the patient is 
assumed to ‘live through’ the procedure. Peering into the operating theatre an imagined 
bystander might plausibly say that the ‘dismantled’ patient is still alive (indeed, that they 
are undergoing the operation).767 And understanding the patient thus is to see him or 
her as an entity that can survive disassembly, in much the same way that a mechanism 
can. Extending this thought, one might further claim that the whole (the patient) does 
not exert any relevant causal influence over its parts because it persists while these parts 
are separated. The reintegration of the parts may make things quantitatively more 
complex, but there will be no relevant qualitative difference.768 
 How persuasive is this reading? There is clearly a point where the metaphor 
breaks down. A mechanism’s components – the springs of a clock, for instance – do 
not, when separated, deteriorate in the same way as do the bodily organs. A heart that 
has been extracted for transplantation does not survive for very long (even put on ice); a 
spring, by contrast, deteriorates in no qualitatively different a fashion to when it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 Dupré 2008a/2012: 71 
767 This interpretation can be helpfully brought out by a comparison with Lowe’s analysis of a dismantled 
watch, in ‘On the Identity of Artifacts’ (Lowe 1983: 222): 
When Jones’s watch goes to the watchmaker for repair and is taken to pieces by him, it 
doesn’t cease to exist, does it? Someone entering the workshop and seeing the pieces laid 
out carefully on the watchmaker’s bench would quite properly be told ‘That is Jones’s 
watch’; and if such a person were, say, to stamp on these delicate bits of machinery, he 
would clearly be guilty of destroying Jones’s watch, i.e. terminating its existence.  
Likewise, if someone was to go into the operating theatre and stamp on the relevant bits, one might also 
say it was at that point that they killed the patient. 
768 The difference between quantitative and qualitative difference is set out, in relation to anti-reductionism, 
by Garland Allen (1975: 106) 
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integrated into a clock. And unless Shoemaker is happy to abandon even the veneer of 
plausibility, his surgeon will not be able to simply place the patient’s brain on a 
sideboard to await reinsertion. It must be transfused with blood, or frozen (etc.). Given 
this, it remains open whether or not the biological whole exerts a relevant causal 
influence over its parts. It clearly sustains them. Perhaps it does so in virtue of a non-
derivative causal power. Perhaps this power can be simulated (in the brain extraction 
process) by the doctors performing the procedure. The fact that medics can transplant 
organs does not commit one outright to causal reductionism (a cause for relief, no doubt, 
among emergentists).769 
 There is another related, but separable, thesis that is encouraged when we 
understand biological items mechanistically. In contrast to the view just described, it 
makes no claims about causal powers; it connects instead to the discussion of ontological 
dependence (as it was presented in §3.4.). Conceiving of living things mechanistically 
invites a particular thought about the dependence relation between living wholes and 
their parts. 
 It has been argued that Wiggins construes ‘organisms’ as entities that we cannot 
help but see as genuine unities, as beings whose parts are ontologically dependent upon them. 
This form of ontological dependence was articulated by reference to Aristotle’s analysis 
of human eyes. For an eye to be an eye – Aristotle avers – it must have the capacity to 
perform a particular function (seeing). And it has this capacity only when it is integrated 
into a human organism (this claim was formulated, following Koslicki, in terms of 
essential dependence). This view of part-whole dependence noticeably contrasts with 
the way we typically understand the relation between a mechanism and its components. 
Thinking of a spring does not involve thinking of a clock; thinking of a screw does not 
involve thinking of a catapult or a computer (etc.). Screws and springs are parts that 
function in numerous, varying contexts – thus a statement of the essence of a screw 
does not have to make reference to a mechanism of which it is a part.770 Separated from 
a mechanism a spring does not lose its capacity to perform its essential function. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769 Looking through the theatre window is it plausible to say that patient has ceased to exist? Perhaps one is 
committed to the thought that biological life occurs only when the relevant parts are united? On this 
reading the unified whole might be seen to exert a relevant causal power over its parts, and one might still 
resist reductionism. This interpretation leads one down a hazardous path, however; the thesis that 
existence may be, as Lowe puts it, ‘intermittent’, or ‘interrupted’ (Lowe 1983: 222), is a deeply 
controversial one. It stands in marked contrast to the view, assayed in Locke’s Essay, that ‘one thing 
cannot have two beginnings of existence’ (Locke 1690: II.xxvii.1) – a compelling thought, and one which 
finds support, most notably, in Wiggins’ work, (‘a thing starts existing only once’ (Wiggins 2001: 92)). 
770 Of course, there are presumably some machinic parts that are particular to certain artefacts (e.g. watch 
batteries) – but not in nearly so fine-grained a way. 
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Aristotelian distinction between different part-whole dependence relations, is helpfully 
rendered by Robert Pasnau as follows: 
 
[I]n the case of genuine substances, the parts are radically dependent on 
the substance for their continued existence. Take away a piece of flesh 
and it becomes something else. This is not the same for non-substances. 
Take a brick away from a house, and it remains a brick. So the 
substance is unified not because it can exist without its parts, but 
because its parts cannot exist apart from it.771 
 
One notable feature of biological mechanism is that it dissolves this distinction. For the 
mechanist, biological parts are understood to stand in the same dependence relation to 
biological wholes as a mechanism’s components stand to the mechanism. That is, 
biological parts can be seen to exist even when separated from the organized whole. 
Consequently, biological items are conceived of – like mechanisms – as the kinds of 
things that can suffer disassembly. 
 The suggestion here is that in accepting that humans could, in principle, 
undergo the sort of disassembly described by Shoemaker, one is committed to this 
mechanistic view. In the transplantation narrative, the persistence of the brain does not 
depend on it being integrated into a biological unity, and this is tangibly at odds with the 
organismic, Aristotelian picture that was attributed to Wiggins in chapter 3. The 
intermediary conclusion then is this: Shoemaker’s story smuggles in a particular view of 
biological entities – one that conflicts with Wiggins’ – and the confusion described in 
§4.1 is the result.772 
 The metaphysical character of mechanisms – and thus, for the mechanist, of 
biological entities – is examined in greater depth in §4.4. There it is argued that 
Shoemaker’s narrative effects a shift in metaphysical focus from an organism to a ‘living 
something-or-other’. Before then, however, the extent of Shoemaker’s mechanism is 
investigated – and in the next section it is shown how the roots of this mechanistic 
picture are interwoven with those of Shoemaker’s neo-Lockean position. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
771 Pasnau 2004: 42–43 N.b. this is a more extreme, Aquinean interpretation of Aristotle, where artefacts 
are non-substances. But the point still stands. 
772 One result of the present work is to (hopefully) encourage other philosophers working within the 
personal identity debate (and beyond) to be similarly wary of this and comparable narratives. When ‘neo-
Aristotelians’ like van Inwagen and Olson describe cases of frozen cats and draw analogies between 
human bodies and lumps of clay, they need to work out fully the suppressed commitments these stories 
contain (see e.g. van Inwagen 1990: 146, Olson 2007: 220). 
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§4.3. A history of the brain transplantation story 
 
In this section it is argued that there is a non-accidental connection between 
Shoemaker’s neo-Lockeanism and the mechanistic notion of a disassemblable human 
body. To support this claim, a speculative history of the brain transplantation story is 
presented, focussing on how shifts in seventeenth-century biology may have influenced 
Locke’s development of his person concept. 
 There is a textual trail that connects Shoemaker to the mechanist debates of the 
seventeenth century. Shoemaker explicitly states that his story of Brown and Robinson 
is a modern retelling of Locke’s ‘Prince and Cobbler’ narrative.773 Locke, in turn, states 
that his story presents a resolution to a problem caused by the Christian doctrine of the 
resurrection.774 In §4.3.a. Locke’s endorsement of a causal form of biological mechanism 
– his corpuscularianism – is described. In §4.3.b. it is argued that the problem with 
resurrection is a problem for Locke because of his corpuscularianism (and his sidelining of 
immaterial substances). And in §4.3.c. it is suggested that Locke’s corpuscularianism 
intersects with the parallel mechanist thesis that biological parts are conceivable in 
isolation from whole bodies. Lastly, it is claimed that the brain transplantation story – 
like Locke’s story of the thinking finger – is mechanistic in this latter sense, since it is by 
thinking of situations where consciousness survives in separated body-parts that the 
person concept demonstrates its strengths. 
 
§4.3.a. Locke’s mechanistic/corpuscularian picture 
 
Although Locke believes in the existence of immaterial substances – God, and souls775 – 
his view of biological life fits fairly neatly with a materialist interpretation.776 He does not 
invoke immaterial substances in explaining the natural world, except (as noted below) by 
appealing to God as a primary mover of the mechanical system.777 The relatively 
uncontroversial reading adhered to here is that, when it comes to animals, Locke thinks 
of them in ‘corpuscularian’ terms, as the products of the interaction of textured, 
indivisible particles, or ‘corpuscules’. That is, in the Essay at least, he follows the 
mechanical view of nature advanced by Robert Boyle. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
773 Shoemaker 2004a: 573, 1963: 21 
774 Locke 1690: II.xxvii.15 (and Uzgalis 2012) 
775 E.g. Locke 1690: II.xxvii.2 
776 Thiel 1998 
777 Walmsley 2000: 377 
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 In the late seventeenth century, Boyle’s brand of corpuscularianism was one of 
the dominant physical theories in England.778 In his ‘Excellency and Grounds of the 
Mechanical or Corpuscular Hypothesis’, and Origin of Form and Qualities, he defends the 
view that the natures of material objects (including biological ones) arise solely from ‘the 
size, shape, motion (or want of it), texture and the resulting qualities of the small 
particles of matter’779 that make them up. For a corpuscularian, like Boyle, the world is 
composed of these basic units of matter – ‘minima naturalia’ – arranged in certain 
ways,780 which, in virtue of their textural and motive differences, impart the qualities and 
properties found in material objects. Thus, Jonathan Walmsley writes: 
 
Boyle’s view, as stated in the published works that we know Locke to 
have read, was that God had created the world as a uniform matter 
divided into variously shaped and textured particles. These pieces of 
matter interacted with each other according to mechanical laws. The only 
part of nature that Boyle held not to be mechanical was Man and his 
rational soul.781 
 
Locke, like Boyle, affirms the existence of God and rational souls – yet God is invoked 
only as a prime mover,782 and the soul adds nothing to the explanation of organic life, 
but is a special addition in the case of humans. The biological picture that Locke 
endorses is thus, on its face, similar to the kind of mechanistic one endorsed by the 
Cartesians (and Gassendians),783 with their bête-machine.784 (The only notable point on 
which both Locke and Boyle differ from Descartes, is the question of plenism: they 
posit indivisible atoms, and void, rather than the plenum of matter, which Descartes 
identifies with extension.)785 
 Boyle’s mechanistic materialist view of the natural world thus stands in 
opposition to the views of the Aristotelian scholastics and the vitalists.786 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 Kochiras 2009 
779 Boyle 1666 
780 Forstrom 2010: 104 
781 Walmsley 2000: 375 
782 Forstrom 2010: 104, Walmsley 2000: 377 
783 Ibid: 102 
784 E.g. Martin and Barresi 2000: 14. This is a rather simplistic reading of both Boyle and Descartes. It is, 
as Cottingham notes, not clear that Descartes himself ever really endorsed the thesis that animals are, 
metaphysically speaking, nothing more than clocks. Cottingham 1978 (Cf. Ferner 2008) 
785 Kochiras 2009 
786 It is, however, worth noting the blurriness of the boundaries between each of these groupings. At the 
start of chapter 3, the overlapping of the methodological, epistemic, and metaphysical was emphasized, 
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Aristotelians – who dominated Oxford at the time787 – advocated various forms of 
hylomorphism, and endorsed the kind of organicist picture described above in chapter 
3.788 The vitalists – like Henry More, Francis Glisson, and Joan Baptista van Helmont789 
– posited vital spirits to explain biological phenomena (van Helmont, for example, 
understood biological life by reference to ‘Archeus’, the active spiritual, or ‘seminal’ 
principle that guided the actions of organisms).790 
 Walmsley suggests that in Locke’s early work there are signs he may have 
subscribed to a form of vitalism – but he notes too, that by the time of writing of the 
Essay, Locke demonstrably endorses the Boylean brand of corpuscularianism.791 In the 
Essay – which is the focus of the present discussion – he eschews talk of substantial 
forms, and teleology, and vital spirits, and conceives the biological realm as the product 
of the interaction of minute, moving particles.792 There, at least, the organism is 
conceived of as ‘nothing more than the sum of its parts’: it is seen as a mechanism – 
exemplifying the causal thesis above, as something that derives its causal powers from 
its constituents. 
 
§4.3.b. The problem of resurrection 
 
It is in the second edition of the Essay that Locke presents the story of the prince and 
the cobbler. He does so in order to demonstrate how his position can combat a puzzle 
raised by the Christian doctrine of the resurrection.793 What is this puzzle, and why does 
it affect corpuscularians, but not their Scholastic, vitalist, or Cartesian contemporaries? 
 The worry with resurrection is raised in detail in Boyle’s ‘Some Physico-
Theological Considerations About the Possibility of the Resurrection’. Boyle writes: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and this is clear in the different kinds of ‘corpuscularianism’. Consider, e.g. Daniel Sennert’s avowedly 
Aristotelian corpuscularianism (Walmsley 2000: 369). 
787 Forstrom 2010: 6 
788 Martin and Barresi 2000: 14 
789 Walmsley 2000: 370 
790 Boyle too spoke of a ‘seminal’ principle – but Walmsley states this was purely mechanical: ‘Boyle did 
not suppose the seminal principles to be anything other than textured matter in special relationships with 
their surroundings by the laws of the nature and the circumstances in which they are placed. There is no 
evidence that he believed these agents to act in anything other than a mechanical way.’ (2000: 378) 
791 Walmsley 2000. Walmsley argues that in his early ‘Essay on Disease’, Locke advanced something like 
Helmont’s vitalism. (2000: 381) 
792 Martin and Barresi 2006: 123 
793 The account of the resurrection that Locke and his contemporaries focused on was that given in the 
epistles of St. Paul (Forstrom 2010: 2). 
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When a man is once really dead, divers of the parts of his body will, 
according to the course of nature, resolve themselves into multitudes of 
steams that wander to and fro in the air; and the remaining parts, that are 
either liquid or soft, undergo so great a corruption and change, that it is 
not possible so many scattered parts should be again brought together, 
and reunited after the same manner, wherein they existed in a human 
body whilst it was yet alive. And much more impossible it is to effect this 
reunion, if the body has been, as it often happens, devoured by wild 
beasts or fishes; since in this case… they are quite transmuted as being 
informed by the new form of the beast or fish that devoured them and of 
which they now make a substantial part.794 
 
He continues: 
 
And yet far more impossible will this reintegration be, if we put the case 
that the dead man was devoured by cannibals; for then, the same flesh 
belonging successively to two different persons, it is impossible that both 
should have it restored to them at once, or that any footsteps should 
remain of the relation it had to the first possessor.795 
 
It is significant that these worries about cannibals will not arise for the Aristotelian-
scholastics, or for the vitalists; both have some theoretical principle, over and above the 
material parts, by which humans can be individuated. The various parts of the body may 
well resolve into steams and disperse, but the Aristotelians will refer to the form, or 
psuche of living things,796 and the vitalists, like van Helmont, will refer to some vital spirit, 
to explain how an individual may be traced through the resurrection. The material 
mixing of parts will not result in the mixing or dissolution of Archei or seminal forces, or 
substantial forms.  
 The resurrection of the body becomes a problem once the emphasis, in 
individuation, is put exclusively on the material parts of which the body is made. And 
the difficulty of tracing human bodies through resurrection without endorsing these kinds 
of non-reductionist models is clear from Boyle’s own unsatisfying responses to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794 Boyle 1675: 198 
795 Ibid: 198 
796 Martin and Barresi 2000: 14 
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issue: His first recourse is to turn to the durability of certain body parts. While the body 
is in perpetual flux, he writes, there are some parts that are of a ‘stable and lasting 
texture’: specifically, the bones.797 Since bones can suffer fire and other assaults they 
may, Boyle suggests, provide a material basis for individuation.798 At other points he 
suggests that corpuscules can retain their original nature under various disguises, in the 
way that gold particles may be dissolved into solutions, and resolved at a later point into 
gold.799 As K. Joanna S. Forstrom notes, in her thorough study of the debate, all of 
these responses were seen to be largely unpersuasive. And Locke, while attending 
closely to Boyle’s discussion, pointedly takes a different route in accommodating the 
doctrine of the resurrection. 
 Locke diverges from Boyle in changing the focus of the question. He claims that 
what is at issue is the resurrection of the ‘dead’, and not necessarily of their bodies. This 
move is evident in his correspondence with Bishop Stillingfleet,800 and relies on the 
crucial distinction that Locke draws between man (human being) and person.801 In chapter 
27 of book II, Locke argues that ‘man’ and ‘person’, while sometimes used 
synonymously, do not refer to the same thing. On seeing a creature of our ‘own Shape 
and Make’, though it with ‘no more reason all its Life, than a Cat or a Parrot’ we would 
undoubtedly call it a ‘Man’ (human being), but (he says) not a ‘Person’. And finding a 
cat or a parrot, discoursing, reasoning and philosophizing, we would call them persons, 
though not men.802 And – in line with the now familiar sortalism – both ‘Man’ and 
‘Person’ have, according to Locke, distinct principles of individuation: 
 
Locke distinguishes between the identity of the self as man (or human 
being) and the identity of the self as person. The identity of the self as man 
consists in the identity of the same bodily organism; the identity of the 
self as person, by contrast, is constituted by the consciousness of our 
thoughts and actions (Essay II.xxvii.16).803 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 See Forstrom 2010: 110ff 
798 A second response, which refers to the original matter of the foetus, is along similar lines. Forstrom 
2010: 110–111 
799 Forstrom 2010: 111 
800 Thiel 2011: 134–135 
801 Forstrom 2010: 112ff 
802 Locke 1690: II.xxvii.8 
803 Thiel 1998: 61 
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This distinction allows Locke to bypass the questions about bodily continuity through 
the resurrection. He interprets the account in the Paul’s epistles as concerning the person 
– because it is the person, and not the living body, which is the object of reward or 
punishment. He writes (quoting from Corinthians): 
 
…the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one shall receive 
according to his doings, the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open. The Sentence 
shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they 
themselves in what Bodies soever they appear… are the same, that 
committed those Actions, and deserve Punishment for them.804 
 
And it is this move that is illustrated, explicitly, by the story of the Prince and the 
Cobbler, in section 15 of chapter 27: 
 
And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same 
Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts 
the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the 
Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, 
would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the Man, be 
enough to make the same Man. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying 
with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past Life, enter and inform the 
Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he 
would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the 
Prince’s Actions: But who would say it was the same Man?805 
 
There may be (insignificant) vestiges of scholasticism here – in the description of the 
Soul informing (that is, being the form of) the body – but more importantly, the story 
seems overtly Cartesian in tone: the emphasis is being put on an immaterial soul, which, 
it is implied, is the thinking substance, res cogitans. This, certainly, is a well-travelled route 
for circumnavigating the problem raised by the resurrection. As Udo Thiel puts it: 
 
For most of those thinkers who believe that the soul is an immaterial 
substance, there is no real problem of personal identity at all. They would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 Locke 1690: II.xxvii.26 
805 Ibid: II.xxvii.15 
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argue that personal identity consists in the identity of a mental substance 
or soul and that the identity of a mental substance is a direct consequence 
of its immaterial nature; it is because of its immateriality that the mind is 
not subject to change and remains the same through time.806 
 
Locke, however, crucially denies that personal identity consists in the identity of the soul, 
and argues specifically against the elision of the person and a mental substance. The 
story of the Prince and the Cobbler is not an illustration of a Cartesian response to the 
resurrection. Alongside the distinction between man and person, Locke distinguishes 
between person and soul. This is the focus of his discussion in chapter 27 of the 
‘rational Man’ who believed himself the reincarnation of Socrates, but could remember 
none of Socrates’ actions: 
 
Let him also suppose it to be the same Soul, that was in Nestor or 
Thersites… which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any 
other Man: But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions 
either of Nestor or Thersites, does, or can he conceive himself the same 
Person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their 
Actions? Attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the 
Actions of any other Man, that ever existed?807 
 
While Locke believes in the existence of the soul he also argues that its principle of 
continuity differs from the principle of continuity for persons. There is room for 
interpretation here, depending on whether or not Lockean ‘persons’ are understood as 
genuine substances, or modes of other substances (or virtual substances).808 But on one 
prominent reading, Locke takes consciousness to be a property of another substance 
while remaining determinately neutral as to whether it will be a material or immaterial 
one.809 Thus, though he holds it to be the ‘more probable Opinion’ that consciousness is 
‘annexed’ to the soul,810 he writes pointedly that it involves ‘no contradiction’ to think 
that matter might have been made by God fitly disposed to think.811 Despite its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 Thiel 1998: 62 See also Martin and Barresi 2000: 13–14 
807 Locke 1690: II.xxvii.14 
808 See Martin and Barresi 2000: 24–25 for an outline of the controversy. 
809 Thiel 2011: 144 
810 Locke 1690: II.xxvii.25 
811 Ibid: IV.iii.6 For the widespread influence of this suggestion, see Yolton 1983, and Thiel 1998 
	   190	  
description of soul transference, the Prince and the Cobbler story is not a Cartesian one. 
It is because of the transfer of consciousness that the prince wakes to find himself in the 
cobbler’s quarters.812 
 Locke’s response to resurrection is novel. Because of his advocacy of Boylean 
corpuscularianism he cannot explain the identity of the pre- and post-resurrection 
individual by reference to a common vital spark, or substantial form. And because he 
denies the soul is identical to the person, and sidelines the immaterial from his account, 
he will not explain it by reference to a common mental substance. His method – which 
has become one of the most influential in Anglophone philosophy813 – is to focus on 
the consciousness of persons.814 Resurrection involves the resurrection of persons, and the 
identity of persons is constituted by continued consciousness, rather than organic 
continuity, or continuity of an immaterial substance.  
 
§4.3.c. A connection 
 
Locke’s position is a subtle one and difficult to situate: he needs to highlight the 
distinctiveness of the person’s persistence conditions in contrast to those of the 
man/human being and the soul. Dialectically, then, he is moved to present a situation 
where the animal does not continue, and where the persistence of the immaterial soul 
can also be called into question. This is exactly the kind of situation he describes in 
section 17 of chapter 27: 
 
[E]very one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, 
the little Finger is as much a part of it self, as what is most so. Upon 
separation of this little Finger, should this consciousness go along with 
the little Finger, and leave the rest of the Body, ‘tis evident the little 
Finger would be the Person, the same Person; and self then would have 
nothing to do with the rest of the Body. As in this case it is the 
consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812 Thiel 1998: 61 
813 There will be multifarious reasons for this, but not least among them is the analytic canonization of 
Locke by Russell and Ryle. (See Akehurst 2010 – in which he quotes Russell’s comment to Ryle: ‘By 
God… I believe you are right. No one ever had Common Sense before John Locke – and no-one but 
Englishmen have ever had it since.’ Akehurst 2010: 1) 
814 Uzgalis 2012 
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separated from another, which makes the same Person, and constitutes 
this inseparable self…815 
 
The story of the thinking finger demonstrates the strengths of the person concept, and by 
linking personhood to a material part of the body it distinguishes continuity of 
consciousness from organic continuity, and from the continuity of an immaterial 
substance. Significantly, Locke’s ‘though experiment’ also demonstrates the interplay 
between a causal form of mechanism – corpuscularianism – and the mechanist thesis 
(described in §4.2), which relates to ontological dependence. For the causal mechanists, 
the biological whole exerts no novel causal influence over its parts. Holding this they are 
not necessarily committed to the view that body-parts are ontologically independent of the 
animal – but it is a view with which they may well be sympathetic. If one thinks that 
biological phenomena result from uni-directional causal chains reaching up from 
constituent corpuscules one can readily accept that animal parts may exist when 
separated from animal wholes. Indeed, taking the causal thesis to its extreme, one finds 
the kind of reductionist scenario described by Empedocles (discussed in §3.4.) – that 
peculiar stage in cosmic history where heads and trunks and limbs are produced 
independently, and roll around to produce bizarre, chimerical, ‘scrambled’ animals.816 
The point is simply that two forms of mechanism intersect, and both seem at play in 
Locke’s story of the thinking finger. His description of that body-part contrasts notably 
with Aristotle’s description of the same (also presented in §3.4.): 
 
[T]he finger cannot exist apart from a living animal…817 
 
Locke’s thinking finger is a somewhat forgotten item of the philosophical imaginary – but 
it points to an important way in which issues of personal identity are bound up with 
particular notions of biology. The Lockean concept of a person – developed to cope 
with puzzles encouraged by causal mechanism – demonstrates its strengths in a situation 
where the body is construed mechanistically. Such a situation involves the transmission of 
consciousness in a material body-part, like a thinking finger – or, equally, a brain.818	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 Locke 1690: II.xxvii.17 
816 Furth 1987: 44 
817 Aristotle Metaphysics 1036b. Also ‘…the finger is defined by the whole body. For a finger is a particular 
kind of part of a man.’ (Metaphysics 1035b) 
818 The aim here has been to highlight certain important disagreements between Aristotle’s picture and 
Locke’s. Yet there are important agreements too; the neo-Lockean account of personal identity is not so 
inimical to an Aristotelian framework as some suppose (for more on this see Whiting 2008). 
	   192	  
§4.4. Wiggins’ approach to brain transplantation 
 
In Shoemaker’s brain transplantation story, Brown is conceived of as a living thing that 
can be dismantled – i.e., as something with a different metaphysical character from an 
organism’s (a genuine unity in the neo-Aristotelian sense outlined above). The story thus 
subtly shifts our attention from one metaphysical entity onto another, and so our 
thoughts (and Wiggins’) about what persists and how are confounded. 
 Wiggins describes this kind of shift in metaphysical focus in another context – 
in relation to fission cases. In the following section the comparison between fission and 
transplantation is drawn out. The ontological profile of the biological entity found in 
Shoemaker’s story is elucidated alongside the maturation of the thoughts assayed in 
chapter 1, about the distinct metaphysical character of artefacts. Implications of the 
proposed reading are discussed. One consequence is that Wiggins might be read as 
denying that organisms can suffer heart transplantation. And if organisms cannot 
survive heart transplantation, as a human being theorist he will deny that we can survive 
heart transplantation. This counter-intuitive conclusion is discussed, and a response is 
outlined. 
 
§4.4.a. A shift in metaphysical focus: ‘human persons as artefacts?’ 
 
Wiggins sees fission cases as serving to shift our attention from one sort of metaphysical 
entity onto another. In S&SR he describes the shift thus: 
 
[After fission], one very easily falls into thinking of Brown as a thing that 
persists in Brownson (1) and Brownson (2). One conceives of Brown as a 
thing that persists in its/his instantiations, a thing that is wherever they are 
– just as the sail that lies over you, over me, and over a friend of ours, is 
where I am, where you are, and where he is… In short, one thinks of 
Brown as a concrete universal. Nothing need be wrong with that… 
Nevertheless, Brown reconceived as such a concrete universal is not the 
sort of thing whose survival was to have been described in the case of 
Brownsons (1) and (2). Nor is this how we conceive of subjects of 
experience when posing the questions of personal identity.819 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 Wiggins 2001: 229 
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As a result of technological interference our metaphysical focus drifts from the substance 
that we take Brown to be (and which we typically refer to when judging persistence) and 
onto a concrete universal. The shift is not a shift in our conception of the substance, 
Brown: we are not conceiving of the same thing in a new way. Rather, we have latched 
onto an entity of a different sort820 (which may, at a moment, inhabit exactly the same 
space as the substance, as is consistent with the pluralistic picture described in §3.3.b.). 
 The proposal here is that the brain transplantation story should be read along 
similar lines. It jogs our focus; our attention moves from a substance onto the sort of 
thing that can be disassembled and reassembled. This ‘living something-or-other’ has parts 
that are ontologically independent of the whole. In this respect it is like a mechanism. We 
might also say, returning to the discussion in chapter 1, that it is like an artefact. Consider 
again the short passage, from S&SR,821 where Wiggins discusses the effects of massive 
transplanting of organs. 
 
[T]he conception of a human person will diverge further and further from 
that of a self-moving, animate living being exercising its capacity to 
determine, within a framework not of its own choosing and replete with 
meanings that are larger than it is, its own direct and indirect ends. The 
conception will converge more and more closely upon the conception of 
something like an artefact – of something not so much to be encountered in 
the world as putatively made or produced by us, something that it is really 
up to us (individually or collectively) not merely to heal or care for or 
protect but also to repair, to reshape, to reconstruct… even to 
reconceive.822 
 
In this passage, Wiggins suggests that transplantation leads us to think of persons – and 
thus human beings – artefactually. And while there are various readings of his view of 
artefacts, one line, advanced above, is that he can construe them as having a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820 Wiggins, unfortunately, does not describe the metaphysical character of concrete universals in any real 
depth. He seems to suggest that the notion of a multiply-instantiated object is a part (though a less 
prominent part) of our conceptual scheme (1980: 166–7), so they appear to be entities that can be 
elucidated within his descriptivist framework. However, in line with the metaphysical pluralism described 
above, one might think that one’s metaphysical focus can be jogged onto entities described by e.g. 
Lewisian four-dimensionalism as well. 
821 Tellingly entitled: ‘One Last Variant – and the Philosophical Moral of the Same. Finally, Human Persons 
as Artefacts?’ Wiggins 2001: 236 (my emphasis) 
822 Wiggins 2001: 241 (my emphasis) 
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determinately different ontological profile from substances. At points he appears to 
shoehorn them into that metaphysical category, stating that they are definitionally 
unable to exemplify the central elements of our pre-theoretical substance concept – but it 
was suggested that the fecundity of his metaphysics allows him to go beyond this 
negative verdict. 
 Working within the descriptivist tradition, Wiggins turns to our everyday 
navigation of the world to guide his metaphysics. It is not unimportant, therefore, that 
we interact with, and think about, artefacts in unique and distinctive ways.823 We do not 
treat them in the same way that we treat living things (it is around our interaction with 
the latter that the substance concept crystallizes). It is no accident that there is such 
emphasis in the phenomenological tradition on our pre-theoretical engagement with 
tools, or ‘objects of use’. (Martin Heidegger is one who sees there to be something 
profoundly important about or interaction with zeug, as equipment.)824 Nor is it 
inconsequential that in the sphere of behavioural and brain sciences, tool-use and 
manufacture is classically positioned as a marker of cognitive discontinuity. Creatures 
that can use (and make) tools think about the world differently from those that 
cannot.825 
 Though vague, these considerations, and those assayed in the previous chapters, 
support the thought that another central element of our conceptual scheme – alongside 
our concept of a unified substance – is the idea of an artefact, an entity that is composed of 
ontologically independent parts.826, 827 This proposal will bear refinement.828 Yet even in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 See e.g. Simons 1987: 197 and, indeed, Wiggins 2001: 10, 87, 91, and his 2004a: 605 
824 ‘In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. 
The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. The clue for doing this lies in our first 
defining what makes an item of equipment – namely its equipmentality…’ Heidegger 1927/1962: I.3 (97) 
I have Charlotte Knowles to thank for making this aspect of Heidegger clear to me. 
825 Vaesen 2012 And of course, humans are not the only animals that use tools – higher primates and 
ravens do as well. 
826 These central concepts are clearly closely connected – but we treat artefacts and living things in 
sufficiently different ways for the descriptivist to find a metaphysical distinction between them. 
827 What is the relationship between having a principle of functioning and having ontologically 
independent parts? The following suggestion may be proffered: Wiggins states that one correlate of 
having a principle of functioning, is that when picking out artefacts, one need make no claims about their 
specific constitution (2001: 87) Having a nomologically shallow essence clock picks out items that work in 
radically different ways and are made of radically different things. There is thus no intimate connection 
between our understanding of the parts of a clock, and our understanding of what a clock is. 
828 One will immediately wonder at what point the living artefact comes into existence. Is it only after the 
technological interference? Or is the artefact’s birth the same as the organism’s? This question is just as 
pressing, for Wiggins, in the case of the concrete universal produced/revealed by fission, and bears too 
on his brief discussion of objet trouvé (contained in a footnote in chapter 4 of S&SR (2001: 134 fn.38). At 
what point does Duchamp’s Fountain – metaphysically distinct from the urinal – come into existence? The 
onus is on Wiggins to explain these cases. Perhaps he has strong grounds for stating that the surgeon has 
‘created a living something-or-other’ (and not unmasked one) but he has yet to explain them. He may be 
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its unpolished state it sheds light on the present discussion. Looking at the biological 
realm mechanistically – as the brain transplantation narrative invites us to – we pick out 
entities with the metaphysical character of artefacts and not organisms (substances). This 
explains why Wiggins finds Shoemaker’s story so difficult to interpret – and it tenders a 
principled response to it. The idea of brain transplantation is underwritten by a 
mechanistic logic whereby biological items can be disassembled and reassembled. Organisms 
– natural substances – cannot be dismantled in this way, and thus the human being theorist, 
who sees personhood to be intimately connected to the idea of a natural substance, 
cannot hold that Brown survives. This is not necessarily to deny that something survives. 
But here Wiggins might echo his response to the fission story and say that the biological 
artefact is not the sort of thing we are normally interested in when posing the questions 
of personal identity. This reading is fully consonant with Wiggins’ texts (indeed, at 
times, it seems almost to be implicit in his comments about the effects of 
transplantation),829 and it is explanatorily generative. 
 
§4.4.b. Final worries 
 
The proposed reading is not without its difficulties. Pursuing this neo-Aristotelian line, 
Wiggins may end up ruling against survival in more commonplace transplantation cases. 
If, for instance, heart transplantation constitutes the disassembly of an organism then, on 
the above interpretation, it will also mark its destruction. 
 There is a question here about what exactly constitutes ‘disassembly’. It cannot 
simply be the detaching of parts, since that happens routinely and unproblematically 
(e.g. skin cells, or hairs). Nor is it the separation of living body-parts; the organism is not 
disassembled when it loses an eye, for example, because such a loss does not critically 
undermine the living activity, though it impairs it. The human being can happily suffer 
minor dental, ortheopaedic or osteopathic procedures without any real effect on the 
distinctive living activity.830 ‘Disassembly’ might best be construed as the removal of vital 
organs (where what is ‘vital’ to the minimal success of the living activity can be refined 
by reference to, e.g. the physiological-immunological view described in §3.1.). 
The important point is that however ‘vital’ is finally cashed out, the heart is 
clearly among the vital organs. Consequently, heart transplantation may plausibly be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
helped here by Madden’s discussion of ‘creation and exposure’ in his forthcoming (32ff). See also footnotes 
748 and 834 
829 Wiggins 2001: 241, 1976: 154 
830 Ibid: 240–241 
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seen to constitute disassembly. And if one follows the line of interpretation suggested 
above, then it seems that Wiggins will have to rule against the survival of organisms that 
undergo this apparently ‘life-saving’ procedure. Moreover, taking Wiggins’ human being 
theory seriously, one will say that the person has ceased to exist as well. Despite powerful 
intuitions to the contrary, the claim will be that we cannot have our hearts removed and 
reinserted.831 
Wiggins’ texts suggest two lines of response to this worry. The first – which we 
might label the severe response – is radical with respect to our thoughts about transplant 
surgery. The second – the sensible response – is radical in relation to the interpretation of 
Wiggins’ work. As should be clear from the labels, it will be suggested here that it is the 
second of these that Wiggins should adopt. 
Let us start with the first, the severe response. There are textural grounds for 
thinking that Wiggins will accept the counter-intuitive claim that persons cannot survive 
heart transplantation. In ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness’,  he appears 
to prefigure this conclusion (and hints too, towards a similar metaphysical analysis of 
artefacts). He argues there that extensive technological manipulation of the natural 
substance will cause the person to go out of existence. Importantly, he states that this 
kind of technological manipulation may be realized in a science-fiction thought 
experiment, or ‘even a kind of practical experiment’:832 
 
[It] literally denatures the subject. In place of an animal or organism 
with a clear principle of individuation one finds an artefact whose 
identity may be a matter of convention or even caprice. Certainly we do 
not, at this limit, find a person, if my account of the concept person is 
correct.833 
 
Wiggins does not think we need go too far into the realms of science-fiction to find 
examples of this kind of technological interference. In this passage at least he seems 
open to the possibility that heart transplantation may stand as a limit to personhood. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831 Still, we can have our spleens and appendices, one (but not both) kidneys removed (and any number of 
teeth, hairs, and eyeballs…). 
832 Wiggins 1976: 154 
833 Ibid: 154 The term ‘denaturing’ is interesting – and nowhere replicated in his work. The idea of 
‘denaturing’, of one individual losing its distinctive mode of being and gaining another is inimical to 
Wiggins’ sortal thesis D – another reason why it the proposed reading of artefacts (whereby substances do 
not become them, but coincide with them) is an improvement. 
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 How might critics respond to this conclusion? Perhaps they will point to the 
first-person accounts of those who have undergone these procedures; we will find it 
hard [the critics will say] to persuade this or that patient that she is not the same person 
as the one who entered the operating theatre. Yet – pursuing the severe response – one 
might refer back to Wiggins’ analysis of fission. The Brownson splinters provide 
convincing, seemingly first-personal accounts of the fission process. Both think they 
survived the operation – but (as was shown in §4.1) Wiggins holds that testimony in 
these instances is contestable.834 
 One might find further support for this severe response in Wiggins’ broader 
critique of thought experiments (also described in §4.1). Throughout his texts he 
emphasizes the importance of taking technological interventions seriously, and 
recognising how intrusive such procedures can be. And while it may be surprising to 
suggest that persons cannot undergo heart transplantation, perhaps it is not that 
surprising. One of the problems with the kinds of science-fiction stories sold by 
Shoemaker is that they distract us from deeply peculiar realities. A heart transplant is a 
profoundly strange process. Is it any more surprising to think that a person goes out of 
existence when her heart is removed than when an individual’s brain is taken out and 
cut in half?835 Perhaps it is only a matter of degree. 
 So stands the severe response – what about the sensible one? It is less counter-
intuitive, but it marks a significant departure from Wiggins’ official position on personal 
identity. Persuaded by the argument above, Wiggins may concede that the organism – as 
a natural substance – ceases to exist when it is dismantled; yet disturbed by the harsh 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
834 Do we see the appearance here of something like Olson’s ‘thinking animal puzzle’ (2007: 29–39)? The 
patient who emerges from the operating room after a successful heart transplant has clear memories of 
entering the theatre – does this mean that prior to the operation there were two thinking things in the 
same place at the same time? The person (a natural substance, on the human being view) and some other 
one? Olson identifies two relevant worries with this kind of ‘cohabitation’ (35–36): the overcrowding problem 
– whereby the number of thinkers in the world is greater than we intuitively think – and the epistemic 
problem – where one cannot tell which entity one is. There is not the space to go into these issues in the 
requisite depth here, but some brief thoughts may be entered. (i) The worry depends on whether the 
biological artefact comes into existence after the transplant (this line is suggested by Wiggins’ comments 
in his 2004a, where he sees the surgeon to create a living something-or-other). Other comments suggest he 
seems open to the possibility that the artefact dates back to the genesis of the organism (this line is 
prompted by his analogous discussion of the concrete universal Brown in 1980 – which dates from Brown’s 
birth, not his fissioning). If one takes the first line there will be no problem. If the latter, then the onus is 
on Wiggins to answer the worry (to explain how a thinking concrete universal and a thinking substance 
may cohabit). (See also notes 748 and 828) (ii) One might offer a deflationary response on Wiggins’ 
behalf. The overcrowding problem is not a problem for pluralists of his ilk. The epistemic problem is a problem, 
but one that should be embraced as accurately capturing the unease we actually feel when faced, for 
example, with the prospect of extensive radiotherapy, gene therapy, drug therapy, transplantation, etc. We 
genuinely worry that we may not survive such procedures, that the thing that has suffered these intrusions 
will no longer be ‘me’. 
835 Or, e.g. when an individual is teletransported to Mars? (e.g. Parfit 1984: part 3) 
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rulings on heart transplant survivors, he may ultimately overrule the claims of the human 
being theory and hold that the person continues. 
 Notably, this response is also encouraged by the critique presented above in 
§2.3.b. It was argued there that the conceptual connection Wiggins traces between the 
pre-theoretical person concept and the concept human being (the concept of a natural 
substance) is weaker than he envisages. Person, it was suggested, need not be construed 
as a substance sortal. It may instead be seen to be a phase of a kind of biological being 
(putatively human beings). Person might thus encapsulate persistence conditions different 
from those of human being. 
 The considerations above put even greater strain on the supposed bond 
between the two concepts. We feel considerable discomfort at the thought that persons 
cannot undergo heart transplantation, yet there are strong reasons for denying that 
human beings – natural substances – survive them. Furthermore, reflecting on the 
Strawsonian argument, and the argument from interpretation (presented in §2.2.), one will 
wonder whether they really support the claim that the concept person must be tied to the 
notion of a genuinely unified substance. What stops us interpreting, and being interpreted 
by, entities whose parts do not ontologically depend upon them?836 The discussions 
above suggest that we already do so. 
 The thought here is that the conceptual connection, the heart-string of the 
human being theory, may be severed. And turning to Wiggins’ more recent work, it seems 
that he too has begun to doubt the concordance of person and human being. Recall the 
dark portents entered at the end of S&SR: ‘…the conception of a human person will 
diverge further and further from that of a self-moving, animate living being… The 
conception will converge more and more closely upon the conception of something like 
an artefact…’837 These comments certainly seem to suggest that he is no longer as sure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836 Wiggins may point to the necessary open-endedness of our pre-theoretical person concept. As discussed 
in chapter 2 he denies that we can list the psychological and physical features that are relevant to 
interpretation. Or rather, he holds that the list is necessarily ‘open-ended’. The sense of ‘person’, then, 
cannot be stipulated. It must, in some way, be attached to a natural kind, with a sufficiently nomologically 
profound principle of activity. If artefacts are items with principles of functioning – nominally stipulated – then 
they cannot be persons (understood by reference to the notion of a subject of interpretation) – or so the 
argument will go. Three brief points in response: Firstly, Wiggins’ association of aposiopesis and a notion of 
a subject of interpretation (discussed in §2.2.) is cursory at best; Secondly, as Wiggins himself points out 
(e.g. 2001: 242) the artefactual view of persons is open-ended anyway (though worryingly so); Thirdly, 
Wiggins frequently (though only implicitly) considers the possibility that our concept of person may attach 
to the concept of an artefact – so cannot himself be fully persuaded by this response. 
837 Wiggins 2001: 241. It is notable that Wiggins writes ‘conception’ here, and not ‘concept’. This is more 
than a little confusing. As discussed above, ‘conception’ relates to a particular construal of a concept 
(compare ‘equus’ and ‘horse’ – two conceptions of the same natural kind (putatively)). Whatever the 
conception, it still picks out the same concept, which picks out the same thing in nature. Is this what 
Wiggins is describing? Not according to the analysis presented above – artefacts are metaphysically 
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as he once was that the idea of a person – a subject of interpretation – is, or must be, the 
idea of a natural substance. 
 Yet, loosing these concepts from one another, Wiggins need not utterly disown 
his human being theory. Here, in closing, a tentative proposal may be entered. While human 
being and person are no longer concordant, they might once have been. We may think that 
conceptual schemes can change, and that following both biological and cultural evolution 
and fluctuation, different connections may be made between concepts.838 We might 
further think that our understanding of the world, and of ourselves, changes in response 
to technological advances.839 The possibility of organ transplantation makes us see the 
world differently; it makes us see ourselves artefactually.840 The human being theory then, 
which is built around the concordance of human being and person, may be seen to capture 
– and capture beautifully – a particular moment in the history of our conceptual scheme. 
But that moment has passed – new connections are being forged. Transplantation, 
grounded in a mechanistic logic, encourages us to connect the person concept with the 
concept of a biological artefact, and no longer the concept of an organism.841 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
distinct from natural substances. To see persons artefactually is to associate them with a different 
metaphysical kind. 
838 This is one way of interpreting Wiggins’ own comments in his 1976 paper, that ‘as human beings have 
come to the point where their powers of reason and analogy make it possible for some of them to 
transcend mere species loyalty, the sense of person has been very slightly modified.’ Wiggins 1976: 152 
839 This, indeed, seems to be suggested by Wiggins’ comments at the end of S&SR (quoted above). 
840 This thought is assayed again in his discussion with Shoemaker (2004a: 605) 
841 How does this tentative suggestion relate to the discussion of conceptual invariance (discussed in 
chapter 1 and 2)? Not only is there conceptual variation over time, one might say, but this analysis 
suggests there is conceptual variation over cultures (those that are exposed to transplantation surgery, 
perhaps, and those that are not). Nothing need be wrong with this. In addition to everything else, the 
chapters above have intended to emphasize the parochial nature of metaphysical projects. Given what has 
been said by Bakhurst (following Vygotsky), and Burtt and Mei, we might think that the human mind 
develops in different ways depending on the process of enculturation. And while we may doubt that 
different humans pick out entirely different entities, we might think that different links are made between 
the fundamental elements of the human conceptual scheme. Some minds may pre-theoretically construe 
persons as substances, others as artefacts. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I have got the subject into something of a mess… 
 
So wrote David Wiggins, in the conclusion to his first published paper, ‘The 
Individuation of Things and Places’ (1963). As the title suggests, the subject then was 
one that became a staple of his studies – and over the subsequent fifty years he has 
organized and reorganized his thoughts about identity, individuation and substance, in 
the hope of untangling the knotty problems contained within. In a way, perhaps, things 
remain just as messy; yet one cannot deny that his dealings with these matters enthral 
and enrich those who attend to them. His is a glorious mess – and to try and ensure that 
the present work has not rendered it ingloriously messy, an overview of the various 
conclusions reached above is now presented. 
 One aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate exactly why Wiggins’ work is so 
difficult to read. His investigations intersect and interrelate more closely than most – his 
account of personal identity is carefully developed alongside, and in conjunction with, 
his thoughts about the logic of identity, our individuative procedures, his pluralism, and 
his sober brand of conceptualist-realism. In this – his systematicity – he resists the 
dominant impulse in English-language philosophy, for Russellian piece-meal analysis; as 
a result, his work is hard to grasp… but hard to grasp for the right reasons. The fine-
spun links he draws between these different issues represent the real and important 
connections he sees to hold between our pre-theoretical concepts. That is, the 
complexity in his texts mirrors the complexity he divines in our minds. 
 It was the work of chapter 1 to demonstrate the close connections Wiggins finds 
between our thoughts about identity, individuation and substance. He holds that our 
everyday ability to navigate the world is underwritten by these concepts, and it was 
argued that his critics and commentators fail when they fail to appreciate how his 
analyses of these notions relate to one another. Corrections were duly entered. 
 Another central aim of chapter 1 was to assess his view, and the various 
interpretations of it, of the distinction between natural things and artefacts. 
Misinterpretations were identified, and a reading was offered whereby he was seen to 
hold that artefacts – stipulatively defined – are substances, but never paradigms of that 
category. The suggestion then offered, which has grown in importance, was that 
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Wiggins has the resources to better analyse the ontological profile of artefacts, such that 
they may be differentiated from natural substances. 
 This proposal was temporarily shelved, and in chapter 2, attention was turned to 
Wiggins’ human being theory. In line with his sortalism, he holds that to answer the puzzles 
of the personal identity debate we must turn to the sortals under which we fall, and 
interrogate the principle of activity they encapsulate. The ingenuity of his human being theory 
is to argue for a conceptual consilience of person (which, despite long-standing 
discussion, remains elusive) and human being (a notion with which we seem to be much 
more familiar). Having argued for this concordance, Wiggins claims that both concepts 
have the same underlying principle of activity, to which we should defer when ruling on 
persistence. 
 The conceptual connection is grounded in three lines of argument: the 
Strawsonian argument, the semantic argument, and the argument from interpretation. Following a 
genealogical critique, the semantic argument was rejected, and the other two arguments 
appeared to weaken as a result. In §2.4, it was argued that the conceptual consilience 
that Wiggins finds between person and human being is less substantial than he envisages.  
  Another concern that arose in chapter 2 was that the human being principle might 
be more difficult to explicate than one might suppose. In chapter 3 – following 
comments by Wiggins – it was suggested that one should turn to biology to investigate 
the living activity in greater depth. Yet biological individuation was found to be a 
controversial affair and it was argued that Wiggins must consult Thomas Pradeu’s 
immunological–physiological account to set the parameters for an investigation into the 
principle of activity for the human being. 
 These thoughts about principles of activity led onto broader questions about the 
metaphysical character of the natural substances that realize them. It was argued that, while 
not explicitly stated, Wiggins’ position rests on a distinctive neo-Aristotelian view of 
organisms. Organisms exemplify the category of substance because they are genuine 
unities. They are genuine unities because, when we latch on to them, we cannot but see 
them as ontologically prior to their parts. 
 Chapter 3 thus showed how Wiggins’ work could benefit from the insights of 
philosophers of biology, and – by presenting an alternative form of anti-reductionism to 
the emergentist mainstream – contribute to their discussions as well. Beneath the fields 
of biology and metaphysics are deep, living roots – roots that are no less strong for 
being hidden – and one thought this study has intended to promote is that inter-
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disciplinary discussion here can be mutually beneficial (a thought further encouraged by 
the connection, described in §4.3., between the neo-Lockean account of personal 
identity and seventeenth-century mechanism). 
 It was in chapter 4 that the various loose ends, and intermediary conclusions, 
were drawn together. The analysis of the metaphysical character of organisms assayed in 
chapter 3 was seen to bear on the distinction, discussed in chapter 1, between natural 
things and artefactual things. The tentative suggestion entered there – that one may 
draw a principled line between substances and artefacts – was revisited, and prompted a re-
examination of Shoemaker’s notorious brain transplantation story. Fleshing out the 
distinction between the ontological profile of artefacts and substances provided an 
explanation of why Shoemaker’s narrative has always seemed to unsettle Wiggins; the 
notion of brain transplantation shifts our metaphysical focus from a biological substance 
onto a biological artefact. 
 In turn, this thought was seen to connect to the conclusion in chapter 2, that the 
conceptual consilience of person and human being is not as strong as Wiggins supposes. 
The concordance of concepts that stands as the core of his human being theory was taken 
to be undermined. Yet rather than disavow his theory tout court, it was suggested that one 
should instead say that it marks a significant moment in the history of our conceptual 
scheme. The methods and framework that underpin his analysis are in no way 
challenged by the arguments above – but being sensitive to our everyday thoughts, and 
the fluctuations of our conceptual scheme, they now license a different conclusion to 
the one encapsulated by the human being theory. 
At the end of this study, I find I can echo another sentiment voiced by Wiggins 
in his first published paper. It is an expression of a dissatisfaction, verging on a hope – 
one that will resonate with all those who take as their subject rich and elusive works. It 
is a promise of the changes one could make, and the limitations of what one has written 
– a conditional too often disappointed, but one which Wiggins has thoughtfully fulfilled, 
and one which I will leave unfinished in the happy expectation of comments to come: 
 
If I had time to rewrite my contribution… 
	   203	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS REFERRED TO OR CONSULTED 
 
Ackrill, J.L. (1997) ‘Aristotle’s Definitions of Psuche’ in Essays on Plato and Aristotle 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Adeofe, L. (2004) ‘Personal Identity in African Metaphysics’ in African Philosophy: New 
and Traditional Perspectives (ed.) L. Brown (Oxford University Press) 
Akehurst, T. (2010) The Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy: Britishness and the Spectre of 
Europe (Continuum) 
Andersson, L. (1990) ‘The Driving Force: Species Concepts and Ecology’, Taxon 39: 
375–382 
Allen, G. (1975) Life Science in the Twentieth Century (New York: Wiley and Sons) 
Allen, N.J. (1985) ‘The Category of the Person: A Reading of Mauss’s Last Essay’, in The 
Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. 
Lukes (Cambridge University Press) 
Aristotle. Categories (ed. and trans.) H.P. Cooke, H. Tredennick (Harvard University 
Press, 1938) 
Aristotle. De Anima (ed. and trans.) W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 
Aristotle. Metaphysics (Books Z and H) (ed.) D. Bostock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
Aristotle. Meteorology (trans.) H.D.P. Lee (Harvard University Press, 1952) 
Aristotle. Physics (ed. and trans.) W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936) 
Avise J.C. (2001) ‘Evolving genomic metaphors: a new look at the language of DNA’, 
Science 294: 86–87. 
Ayers, M. (1991) Locke, vol.2 (London: Routledge) 
Bakhurst, D. (1991) Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to 
Evald Ilyenkov (Cambridge University Press) 
Bakhurst, D. (2005) ‘Wiggins on Persons and Human Nature’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 71(2): 462–469 
Ballie, J. (1990) ‘Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts’, The Philosophical Quarterly 40: 
183–194 
Baldwin, T. (1982) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance’, Philosophy 57(220): 269–272 
Bechtel, W. and R. Richardson (1993), Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization 
as Strategies in Scientific Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
Bedau, M. (2003) ‘Downward Causation and Autonomy in Weak Emergence’, Principia 
6: 5–50 
Benson, K.R. (1989) ‘Biology’s “Phoenix”: Historical Perspectives on the Importance of 
the Organism’, in American Zoologist, 19(3): 1067–1074 
Bernard, C. (1865/1984) Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale, preface de F. 
Dagognet (Paris: Flammarion) 
Blackburn, S. (1998) ‘Supervenience’ in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
London: Routledge. Retrieved May 30, 2013, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N057 
	   204	  
Bothwell, J.H.F. (2006) ‘The Long Past of Systems Biology’, New Phytologist 170(1): 6–10 
Boycott, B. (1998) ‘John Zachary Young: 18th March 1907 – 4th July 1997’, Biographical 
Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 44: 486–509 
Boyd, R.N., 1973, ‘Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence’, 
Noûs 7: 1–12. 
Boyd, R. (1999) ‘Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa’, in Species: New Interdisciplinary 
Essays (ed.) Robert Wilson (Cambridge MA: MIT Press): 141–186 
Boyle, M. (forthcoming) ‘Essentially Rational Animals’, Rethinking Epistemology (eds) Abel 
and Conant (DeGruyter) 
Brigandt, I. (2009) ‘Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: Metaphysical and 
Epistemological Considerations’, Acta Biotheoretica 57: 77–97 
Brigandt, I. and Love, A. ‘Reductionism in Biology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/reduction-biology/ 
Broad, C.D. (1925) The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
first edition) 
Broad, C.D. (1933) Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (Cambridge University Press) 
Butler, J. (1736) First Dissertation to the Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the 
Constitution of Nature 
Butler, J. The Whole Works of Joseph Butler (London: Tomas Tegg, 1839) 
Burtt, E.A. (1953) ‘Descriptive Metaphysics’, Mind LXXLL 
Buss, L. (1987) The Evolution of Individuality (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
Byrne, P.H. (2001) ‘Connective Analysis: Aristotle and Strawson’, British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy, 9(3): 405–423 
Carnap, R. (1934) The Unity of Science, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. 
Carnap, R. (1950) ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 4: 20–40 
Carrara, M. and Vermaas, P. (2009) ‘The fine-grained metaphysics of artefactual and 
biological functional kinds’, Synthese 169: 125–143 
Carter, W.R. (1989) ‘How to change your mind’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 91: 1–14 
Cartwright, H.M. (1965) ‘Heraclitus and the Bath Water’, Philosophical Review 74: 25–42 
Cartwright, H.M. (1970) ‘Quantities’, Philosophical Review 79: 25-42 
Cartwright, H.M. (1982) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance’, The Philosophical Review 
91(4): 597-603 
 
Cartwright, N., J. Cat, L. Fleck, and T. Uebel (1995) Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science 
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Cat, J., H. Chang, and N. Cartwright (1995) ‘Political Philosophy of Science: Otto 
Neurath, Unity of Science, and Socialism’, in The Disunity of Science (ed.) P. Galison and 
D. Stump (Stanford University Press) 
	   205	  
Charles, D. (2012) ‘Teleological Causation’ in The Oxford Handbook of Arsitotle (Oxford 
University Press) 
Chisholm, R. (1976) Person and Object (La Salle, IL.: Open Court) 
Clarke, E. (Forthcoming) ‘The multiple realizability of biological individuals’, in Journal of 
Philosophy. 
Cohen, S. M. (2009) ‘Aristotle's Metaphysics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>. 
Correia, F. (2008) ‘Ontological dependence’, in Philosophy Compass, 3(5): 1013–1032 
Cottingham, J. (1978) ‘“A Brute to the Brutes?”: Descartes’ Treatment of Animals’, 
Philosophy 53(206): 551–559 
Craig, E. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis (Oxford 
University Press) 
Craver, C., and Bechtel, W. (2006) ‘Top-down Causation without Top-down Causes’, 
Biology and Philosophy 
Davidson, D. (1970), ‘Mental events’, in L. Foster and J.W. Swanson (eds), Experience 
and theory (London: Duckworth), 79–101. 
Davidson, D. (1973) ‘Radical Interpretation’, Dialectica 27: 314–28 
Davidson, D. (1974) ‘On the very idea of a conceptual scheme’, reprinted in his Inquiries 
into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 
Davidson, D. (1989) ‘Meaning, Truth and Evidence’, in Perspectives on Quine (ed.) R. 
Gibson and R. Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 
Dawkins, R. (1982/9) The Extended Phenotype (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Dawkins, R. (2006) The God Delusion (Bantam Books) 
De la Cruz, F. and Davies, J. (2000) ‘Horizontal gene transfer and the origin of species: 
lessons from bacteria’, Trends Microbiol. 8: 128–33 
Delehanty, M. (2005) ‘Emergent properties and the context objection to reduction’, 
Biology and Philosophy 20: 715–734 
Delaney, D. (2001) ‘Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a site of cultural 
production’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91: 487–503 
Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained (The Penguin Press) 
Dennett, D. (1987) The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press) 
Deutsch, K.W. (1951) ‘Mechanism, Organism, and Society: Some Models in Natural and 
Social Science’, Philosophy of Science 18(3): 230–52 
Devitt, M. (2008) ‘Resurrecting Biological Essentialism’, Philosophy of Science 75(3): 344–
382 
Devitt, M. (2010) ‘Species Have (Partly) Intrinsic Essences’, Philosophy of Science 77(5): 
648–661 
Deutscher, M., and Martin, C. (1966) ‘Remembering’, Philosophical Review 75(April): 161–
196  
	   206	  
Doepke, F. (1996) The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental 
Argument (LaSalle, IL.: Open Court) 
Dorr, C. (2003) ‘Merricks on the existence of human organisms’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 67(3): 711–718 
Driesch, H. (1908), I, B, ‘The Foundations of the Physiology of Development’: 
‘Experiments on the Egg of the Sea-Urchin’, in Driesch (1908), The Science and Philosophy 
of the Organism, Gifford Lectures for 1907 (London: Adam & Charles Black) 
Dubnau, D. (1999) ‘DNA uptake in bacteria’, Annu. Rev. Microbiol. 53: 217–244 
Dupré, J. (1981) ‘Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa’, Philosophical Review 90: 66–90 
Dupré, J. (1993) The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science 
(Harvard University Press) 
Dupré, J. (1999) ‘On the Impossibility of a Monistic Account of Species’, in R.A. 
Wilson (ed.) Species (MIT Press, Cambridge): 3–22 
Dupré, J. (2001) Human Nature and the Limits of Science (Oxford University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2008a/2012) ‘The Constituents of Life 1: Species, Microbes, and Genes’ in 
Processes of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2008b/2012) ‘The Constituents of Life 2: Organisms and Systems’ in Processes 
of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2008c/2012) ‘Against Maladaptationism: Or, What’s Wrong with 
Evolutionary Psychology’ in Processes of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2009/2012) ‘Varieties of Living Things: Life at the Intersection of Lineage 
and Metabolism’ in Processes of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2010a/2012) ‘The Polygenomic Organism’ in Processes of Life (Oxford 
University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2010b/2012) ‘It is not Possible to Reduce Biological Explanations to 
Explanations in Chemistry and/or Physics’, in Processes of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2010c/2012) ‘Causality and Human Nature in the Social Sciences’ in Processes 
of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Dupré, J. (2012) Processes of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Dyer, B.D. (1989), ‘Symbiosis and Organismal Boundaries’, American Zoologist 29: 1085–
1093 
Eddington, A. (1958) The Philosophy of Physical Science (Ann Arbour Paperbacks) 
Elder, C.L. (2003) ‘Alexander’s dictum and the reality of familiar objects’, Topoi 22(2) 
Falcon, A. (2011) ‘Aristotle on Causality’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/aristotle-
causality/>. 
Ferner, A. (2008) ‘Review of Cottingham’s Cartesian Reflections’, Philosophy 85(4): 580–584 
Fine, K. (1995) ‘Ontological Dependence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 
95: 269–290 
Fine, K. (2001) ‘The Question of Realism’ Philosophers’ Imprint, 1(1): 1–30 
Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
	   207	  
Fodor, J. (1974) ‘Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis’, Synthese 28: 97-115. 
Forbes, G. (1985) The Metaphysics of Modality (New York: Oxford University Press) 
Forstrom, K.J.S. (2010) John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Continuum. 
Foucault, M. (1963) The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, Routledge 
Foucault, M. (1994) ‘Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire’ in Dits et Écrits, vol. I (Paris: 
Gallimard). 
Freeland, C. (1987) ‘Aristotle on bodies, matter, and potentiality’ in Gotthelf and 
Lennox (eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge University Press) 
Furth, M. (1978) ‘Transtemporal Stability in Aristotelian Substances’ The Journal of 
Philosophy, 75(11): 634–646 
Furth, M. (1987) ‘Aristotle’s Biological Universe: An Overview’ in Gotthelf and Lennox 
(eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge University Press, 1987) 
Furth, Montgomery (1988) Substance, Form and Psyche: an Aristotelian Metaphysics 
(Cambridge University Press) 
Gaiman, N. (2013) The Ocean at the End of the Lane (William Morrow and Company) 
Gale, R. (1984) ‘Wiggins’ Thesis D(x)’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for 
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 45(2): 239–245  
Ganeri, J. (2012) The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness and the First-Person Stance (Oxford 
University Press) 
Garrett, B. (2013) ‘Vitalism versus Emergent Materialism’, in C. Wolfe and S. 
Normandin (eds) Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post-Enlightenment Life Science, 1800–
2010 (Springer) 
Gaukroger, S. (2000) ‘The resources of a mechanist physiology and the problem of goal-
directed processes’, In Gaukroger, S., Schuster, J. & Sutton, J. (eds), Descartes’ Natural 
Philosophy (London: Routledge): 383-400. 
Geach, P. (1962) Reference and Generality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 
Geach, P. (1973) ‘Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity’, in Milton K. Munitz (ed.) 
Logic and Ontology (New York University Press) 
Geuss, R. (1999) Morality, Culture, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Geuss, R. (2001) Public Goods, Private Goods (Princeton University Press) 
Gibbard, A. (1975) ‘Contingent Identity’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 4: 187–221 
Gilbert, S.F. and Sarkar, S. (2000) ‘Embracing Complexity: Organicism for the 21st 
Century’, Developmental Dynamics 219: 1–9 
Gill, M. L. (1989) Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity (Princeton University Press) 
Gillett, G. (1987) ‘Reasoning about Persons’ in A. Peacocke and G. Gillett (eds) Persons 
and Personality (Oxford: Blackwell) 
Ginsborg, H. (2001) ‘Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes’, in Kant 
and the Sciences, ed. Eric Watkins (Oxford University Press) 
	   208	  
Ginsborg, H. (2008) ‘Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/kant-aesthetics/ 
Glock, H-J. (2008) What is Analytic Philosophy? (Cambridge University Press) 
Goldstein, K. (1934/1995) The Organism: a Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from 
Pathological Data in Man, (New York: Zone Books / MIT Press) 
Goodison, L. (1986) I am becoming my mother (New Beacon Books) 
Goodwin, B. (1994) How the Leopard Changed its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity (New 
York: Scribner’s) 
Gotthelf, A. (1987) ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality’ in Gotthelf and Lennox 
(eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge University Press) 
Gould, S.J. (1984) ‘A Most Ingenious Paradox’, Natural History (December): 20–28 
Gould, S.J. and Lloyd, E. (1999) ‘Individuality and adaptation across levels of selection: 
How shall we name and generalize the unit of Darwinianism?’, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science of the USA 96(21): 11904–11909 
Grandy, R. (2008) ‘Sortals’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), E.N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/sortals/> 
Green, J. (1929/1993) Léviathan (published in English as The Dark Journey) (Quartet 
Books) 
Grene, M. (1968), Approaches to a Philosophy of Biology (New York: Basic Books) 
Grene, M. (1972), ‘Aristotle and Modern Biology’, Journal of the History of Ideas 33: 395–
424 
Grene, M. (1987) ‘Hierarchies in Biology’, American Scientist 75(5): 504–510 
Grene, Marjorie, and David Depew (2004) The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Grice, H.P. (1941) ‘Personal Identity’, Mind 50: 330–350 
Griffith, J.S. (1966) ‘The Neural Basis of Conscious Decision’ (Inaugural Lecture, 
Bedford College, London) 
Griffiths, P.E. (1999) ‘Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences’, in 
Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Robert Wilson (Cambridge MA: MIT Press): 209–
28 
Griffiths, P.E. (2001) ‘Genetic Information: A Metaphor in Search of a Theory’, 
Philosophy of Science 68 (3): 394–412 
Griffiths, P. (2011) ‘Philosophy of Biology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/biology-philosophy/>. 
Haack, S. (1978) ‘Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics’, Philosophical Studies 35: 361–
371 
Hacking, I. (1968) ‘A language without particulars’ Mind LXXVII 
Hacking, I. (2007) ‘Our Neo-Cartesian Bodies in Parts’, Critical Inquiry 34(1): 78–105 
	   209	  
Hamlyn, D. W. (1993) (introduction) De Anima: Books II and III (with passages from Book I), 
translated with introduction and notes by D.W. Hamlyn (Clarendon Press: Oxford) 
Haraway, D. (1976) Crystals, Fabrics, and Fields: Metaphors of Organicism in Twentieth-Century 
Developmental Biology (Yale University Press) 
Haraway, D. (1991) ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism 
in the Late Twentieth Century’, in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature 
(Routledge) 
Hare, R.M. (1952) The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Haslanger, S. (2003) ‘Persistence Through Time’, in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook to Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Hawley, K. (2001) How Things Persist (Oxford: Clarendon) 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1817/1975) The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. In Hegel’s Logic: 
Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press) 
Heidegger, M. (1927/1962) Being and Time (trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson) (Basil: 
Blackwell) 
Hein, H. (1969) ‘Molecular Biology vs. Organicism: The Enduring Dispute between 
Mechanism and Vitalism’, Synthese 20(2): 238–253 
Hein, H. (1972), ‘The Endurance of the Mechanism : Vitalism Controversy’, Journal of the 
History of Biology 5(1): 159–188 
Heller, M. (1984) ‘Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects’, Philosophical Studies 46: 
323–334 
Heller, M. (1990) The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four Dimensional Hunks of Matter 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Hill, R. K. (1998) ‘Genealogy’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
London: Routledge. Retrieved April 16, 2013, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DE024SECT1 
Hilpinen, R. (1993) ‘Authors and Artifacts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 155–
178 
Hobbes, T. (1839–45) De Corpore, pt II, ch. 11 in W. Molesworth (ed.) The English Works 
of Thomas Hobbes (London: John Bohn), vol. 1 
Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G. (1997) Substance: Its Nature and Existence (London: 
Routledge) 
Hollis, M. (1985) ‘Of Masks and Men’ in The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, 
History, (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes (Cambridge University Press) 
Hull, D. (1972) ‘Reductionism in Genetics – Biology or Philosophy?’ Philosophy of Science 
39: 491–499 
Hull, D. (1974) Philosophy of Biological Sciences (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.) 
Hull, D. (1979) ‘Discussion: reduction in genetics’, Philosophy of Science 46, 316–320 
Hull, D.L. (1981) ‘Philosophy and biology’, in Fløistad, G. (ed.), Contemporary philosophy: a 
new survey, vol. 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff) 
	   210	  
Hull, D.L. (1992) ‘Individual’, in Fox Keller, E. & Lloyd, E. (eds) Keywords in Evolutionary 
Biology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press): 180–187 
Hull, D.L. (1994) ‘Contemporary Systematic Philosophies’, in E. Sober (ed.), Conceptual 
Issues in Evolutionary Biology (2nd Edition, MIT Press): 295–330 
Hull, D.L. and Ruse, M. (eds) (1998) The Philosophy of Biology (Oxford University Press) 
Ishiguro, H. (1980) ‘The Primitiveness of the Concept of a Person’, in Philosophical 
Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson, (ed.) Z. Van Straaten (Clarendon Press: Oxford) 
Jacob, F. (1973) The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity (Allen Lane) 
Jain, J., et al (2005) ‘Oocyte cryopreservation’, Fertility and Sterility 86: 1037–1046) 
James, S. (2000) ‘Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity’ 
in M. Fricker and J. Hornsby (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Janzen, D. (1977) ‘What are dandelions and aphids?’, The American Naturalist 111(979): 
596–589 
Jiang, S.C. and Paul, J.H. (1998) ‘Gene transfer by transduction in the marine 
environment’, Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 64: 2780–2787 
Johnston, M. (1987) ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83) 
Joll, N. (2010) ‘Contemporary Metaphilosophy’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/ 
Jonas, H. (1966) The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology (New York: Harper 
and Row/Dell) 
Jones, D. (1987) Manufacturing Humans: The Challenge of New Reproductive Technologies 
(Leicester: Intervasity Press) 
Jones, N. (forthcoming) ‘From Individuation to Essentialism’ 
Joseph, M.A. (2011) ‘Davidson’s Philosophy of Language’, Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/dav-lang/ 
Jubien, M. (1993) Ontology, Modality and the Fallacy of Reference (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
Kant, I. (1790/1987), Critique of Judgment, trans. W. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett) 
Kass, L.R. (1999), The Hungry Soul: Eating and the Perfecting of Our Nature (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press) 
Kauffman, S. (1971), ‘Articulation of Parts Explanations in Biology and the Rational 
Search for Them’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8: 257–272 
Khalidi, M.A. (1993) ‘Carving Nature at the Joints’, Philosophy of Science 60: 100–113 
Kim, J. (1992) ‘“Downward Causation” in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism’ 
in Beckermann, Flohr, Kim, (eds) Emergence or Reduction?  Essays on the Prospects of 
Nonreductive Physicalism (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.): 119–138  
Kim, J. (1993) ‘The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation’ in Heil and 
Mele (eds.) (Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press): 188–210 
Kim, J. (1998) Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press) 
	   211	  
Kitano, H. (2002) ‘Systems Biology: A Brief Overview’, Science 295: 1662–1664 
Kripke, S. (1972) ‘Naming and Necessity’, in G. Harman, and D. Davidson (eds) 
Semantics of Natural Languages (Dordrecht: Reidel) 
Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, revised edition) 
Kochiras, H. (2009) ‘Locke's Philosophy of Science’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/locke-philosophy-science/>. 
Kolakowski, L. (1968) Towards a Marxist Humanism (New York: Gove Press) 
Kornblith, H. (1980) ‘Referring to Artifacts’, Philosophical Review 89: 109–114 
Koopman, C. (2012) Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Fordham 
University Press) 
Koslicki, K. (2012a) ‘Essence, Necessity, and Explanation’, in Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.) 
Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press) 
Koslicki, K. (2012b) ‘Varieties of ontological dependence’, in Metaphysical Grounding: 
Understanding the Structure of Reality (eds) F. Correia and B. Schnieder (Cambridge 
University Press): 186–213 
Koslicki, K. (2013) ‘Substance, Independence, and Unity’, in Aristotle on Method and 
Metaphysics (ed.) E. Feser (Palgrave-MacMillan): 169–195 
Kosman, L.A. (1987) ‘Animals and other beings in Aristotle’ in Gotthelf and Lennox 
(eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge University Press) 
La Fontaine, J.S. (1985) ‘Person and individual: some anthropological reflections’ in The 
Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. 
Lukes (Cambridge University Press) 
Langton, R. (2009) Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification 
(Oxford University Press) 
LaPorte, J. (1997) ‘Essential Membership’, Philosophy of Science 64(1): 96–112 
Leibniz, G. (1765/1981) New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (trans.) P. Remnant 
and J. Bennett (Cambridge University Press) 
Leibniz, G. (1695/1978) Système Nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances 
aussi bien que de l’union de l’âme avec le corps, in Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften, (ed.) G.J. 
Gerhardt (vol. 4, reprint, Hidesheim: Georg Olms): 471–504 
Lewis, D. (1971) ‘Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies’, Journal of Philosophy 68: 
203–211 
Lewis, D. (1976) ‘Survival and Identity’ in A. Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: 
University of California Press) 
Lewis, D. (2002) ‘Tensing the Copula’, Mind 111: 1–14 
Lewontin, R. (1993) The Doctrine of DNA: Biology as Ideology (London: Penguin Books) 
Locke, J. (1690/1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
Loeb, L. (1937) ‘The Biological Basis of Individuality’, Science 86(2218): 1–5 
Losonsky, M. (1990) ‘The Nature of Artefacts’, Philosophy 65: 81–88 
	   212	  
Lovibond, S. (1996) ‘Ethical Upbringing: from Connivance to Cognition’ in Lovibond 
and Williams (eds) Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value (Blackwell 
Publishing) 
Lovibond, S., and Williams, S. (1996) Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value 
(Blackwell Publishing) 
Lowe, E.J. (2002) ‘Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response 
to Olson’ (Discussion), The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 369–372 
Lowe, E.J. (2003) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance Renewed’, Mind, New Series, 
112(October): 448 
Lowe, E.J. (2005) ‘Is Conceptualist Realism a Stable Position?’ in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research LXXI(2): 456–461 
Luarner, F. and Malagelada (2003) ‘Gut flora in health and disease’, Lancet 361 (9356): 
512–9 
Mach, E. (1905) Erkenntnis und Irrtum: Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung (J.A. Barth) 
Mackie, P. (2006) How Things Might have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Madden, R. (forthcoming) ‘Thinking Parts’ in Essays on Animalism (eds) S. Blatti and P. 
Snowdon (Oxford University Press) 
Madden, R. (draft) ‘The Persistence of Animate Organisms’ 
Malaterre, C. (2013) ‘Life as an Emergent Phenomenon: From an Alternative to 
Vitalism to an Alternative to Reductionism’, in C. Wolfe and S. Normandin (eds) 
Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post-Enlightenment Life Science, 1800–2010 (Springer) 
Malpas, J. (2013) ‘Donald Davidson’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/davidson/>. 
Mann, T. (1948/1999) Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkhün, As 
Told By A Friend (New York: AA Knopf) 
Margulis, L. (1993a) ‘Origins of Species: Acquired Genomes and Individuality’, 
Biosystems 31: 121–5 
Margulis, L. and Sagan, D. (1993b) The Garden of Microbial Delights: A Practical Guide to the 
Subvisible World (Kendal/Hunt) 
Margulis, L. and Sagan, D. (2001) ‘The Beast With Five Genomes’, Natural History 
Magazine, online at : 
www.naturalhistorymag.com/htmlsite/master.html?http://www.naturalhistorymag.com
/htmlsite/0601/0601_feature.html 
Martin, R., and Barresi, J. (2000) Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the 
Eighteenth Century (Routledge) 
Martin, R., and Barresi, J. (2006) The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of 
Personal Identity (Columbia University Press: New York) 
Mauss, M. (1938/1985) ‘A Category of the human mind: the notion of person; the 
notion of self’ in M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes (eds) The Category of the Person: 
Anthropology, Philosophy, History (Cambridge University Press) 
Mayr, E. (1942) Systematics and the Origin of Species (Columbia University Press) 
	   213	  
Mayr, E. (1969) Principles of Systematic Zoology (McGraw-Hill, New York) 
Mayr, E. (1982) The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 
Mayr, E. (2004) What Makes Biology Unique? Considerations on the Autonomy of a Scientific 
Discipline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 
McLaughlin, B., and Bennett, K. (2014) ‘Supervenience’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.) forthcoming URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/supervenience/>. 
McMichael, A. (1986) ‘The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims’, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 11: 35–52 
Mei, Tsu-Lin (1961) ‘Subject and Predicate: a Grammatical Preliminary’, Philosophical 
Review LXX 
Merricks, T. (2001a) ‘How to live forever without saving your soul: Physicalism and 
immortality’, in K. Corcoran (ed.) Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press) 
Merricks, T. (2001b) Objects and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Metchnikoff, E. (1907) Immunity in Infective Diseases (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 
Mill, J.S. (1843) A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (Harper and Brother: New 
York) 
Miller, J. (1978) The Body in Question (New York: Random House) 
Minic, Z. and Hervé, G. (2004) ‘Biochemical and enzymological aspects of the 
symbiosis between the deep-sea tubeworms Riftia Pachyptila and its bacterial 
endosymbionts’, Eur. J. Biochem. 271: 3093– 102 
Moore, A.W. (1996) ‘On There Being Nothing Else to Think, or Want, or Do’, in 
Lovibond, S., and Williams, S. (eds) Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value 
(Blackwell Publishing) 
Munzer, S. (1993) ‘Aristotle’s Biology and the Transplantation of Organs’, Journal of the 
History of Biology 26(1): 109–129 
Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World) 
Nagel, T. (1998) ‘Reductionism and Anti-reductionism’ in G.R. Bock and J.A. Goode 
(eds) The Limits of Reductionism in Biology (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons): 3–10 
Nicholson, D., and Gawne, R. (2013) ‘Rethinking Woodger’s Legacy in the Philosophy 
of Biology’ Journal of the History of Biology (Springer) 
Nietzsche, F. (1887/1996) On the Genealogy of Morality (Oxford: Oxford World Classics) 
Noonan, H. (1976) ‘Wiggins on Identity’, Mind 85 
Noonan, H. (1978) ‘Sortal Concepts and Identity’, Mind 87 
Noonan, H. (1981) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance in The Philosophical Quarterly, 31(124) 
Noonan, H. (1989) Personal Identity (London: Routledge) 
	   214	  
Noonan, H. (1998) ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 48: 302–318 
Normandin, S., and Wolfe, C.T. (eds) (2013) Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post-
Enlightenment Life Science, 1800–2010 (Springer) 
Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 
O’Brien, F. (1939) At Swim-Two-Birds (Longman Green and Co.) 
Ochman, H., Lawrence, J.G. and Groisman, E.A. (2000) ‘Lateral gene transfer and the 
nature of bacterial innovation’, Nature 45 
O’Connor, T. (1994) ‘Emergent Properties’, American Philosophical Quarterly 31: 91–104 
O'Connor, T. and Wong, Hong Yu (2012) ‘Emergent Properties’, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/properties-emergent/> 
Odegard, D. (1972) ‘Identity through Time’, The American Philosophical Quarterly 9 
O’Hara, A.M. and Shanahan, F. (2006) ‘The gut flora as forgotten organ’, EMBO Rep. 7: 
688–93. 
Okasha, S. (2002) ‘Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism’, 
Synthese 131(2): 191–213 
Olson, E. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
Olson, E. (2001) ‘Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 51: 337–355 
Olson, E. (2003a) ‘Lowe’s Defence of Constitutionalism’ (Discussion), The Philosophical 
Quarterly 53: 92–95 
Olson, E. (2003b) ‘Was Jekyll Hyde?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 328–348 
Olson, E. (2007) What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) 
O’Malley, M., and Dupré, J. (2005) ‘Fundamental Issues in Systems Biology’, Bioessays 
27(12): 1270–1276 
Owen, G.E.L. (1986). ‘Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology’, in Logic, Science, and Dialectic: 
Collected Paper in Greek Philosophy: 259–78. 
Paracer, S. and Ahmadjian, V. (2000) Symbiosis: An Introduction to Biological Associations, 2nd 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Parfit, D. (1971) ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review 80: 3–27 
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press) 
Pasnau, R. (2004) ‘Form, Substance, and Mechanism’, The Philosophical Review 113(1): 31–
88 
Paterson, H. (1985) ‘The Recognition Concept of Species’ in E. Vrba (ed.) Species and 
Speciation, Transvall Museum Monograph 4: 21–29 
Perry, J. (1972) ‘Can the self divide?’, Journal of Philosophy 69: 463–488 
Poplawski, N. and Gillett, G. (2009) ‘Ethics and Embryos’ in J.P. Lizza (ed.) Defining the 
Beginning and End of Life (John Hopkins University Press): 379–381 
	   215	  
Post, J. (1993) ‘Review of Jaegwon Kim’s Supervenience and Mind’, Philosophy of Science 62: 
338–340  
Powell, A. and Dupré, J. (2009) ‘From Molecules to Systems: The Importance of 
Looking Both Ways’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 40: 
54–64 
Pradeu, T. and Carosella, E. (2006) ‘The Self Model and the Definition of Biological 
Identity in Immunology’, Biology and Philosophy 21: 235–252 
Pradeu, T. (2010), ‘What is an organism? An immunological answer’, in History and 
Philosophy of the Life Sciences, special issue on The Concept of Organism: Historical, Philosophical, 
Scientific Perspectives, Huneman, P., Wolfe, C.T. (eds) 
Putnam, H. (1967) ‘Psychological Predicates’, Art, Mind, and Religion, Capitan and Merrill 
(eds) (University of Pittsburgh Press) 
Putnam, H. (1973) ‘Meaning and Reference’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 699–711 
Putnam, H. (1975) Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University 
Press) 
Putnam, H. (2004) Ethics Without Ontology (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.) 
Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press) 
Quine, W.V.O. (1963) ‘On What There Is’ in From a Logical Point of View: 1–19 (Harper 
and Row) 
Quine, W.V.O. (1971) ‘Speaking of Objects’ in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New 
York: Columbia University Press) 
Quine, W.V.O. (1980) From a Logical Point of View (Harper and Row) 
Quinton, A. (1975) ‘The Soul’, in J. Perry (ed.) Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press) 
Rea, M. (1997) ‘Supervenience and Co-Location’, American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 367–
375 
Reid, T. (1785) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell) 
Rescher, N. (1982) Empirical Inquiry (London) 
Ricchetti, M., Fairhead, C., and Dujon, B. (1999) ‘Mitochondria DNA repairs double-
strand breaks in yeast chromosomes’, Nature 402: 96–100 
Robinson, H. (2014) ‘Substance’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring Edition), 
E.N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/substance/> 
Roe, S. (1996) ‘The Life Sciences’ in The Cambridge History of Science: Volume 4: Eighteenth-
century Science, Roy Porter (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 397–4091 
Roll-Hansen, N. (1984) ‘E.S. Russell and J.H. Woodger: The Failure of Two Twentieth-
Century Opponents of Mechanistic Biology’, in Journal of the History of Biology, 17(3): 399–
428 
Rorty, A.O. (1990) ‘Persons and Personae’ in C. Gill (ed.) The Person and the Human Mind: 
Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Clarendon Press: Oxford) 
Rose, S., R.C. Lewontin, and L.J. Kamin, (1984), Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and 
Human Nature (London: Penguin Books) 
	   216	  
Rosenberg, A. (2006) Darwinian Reductionism: Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular 
Biology (University of Chicago Press) 
Rosenberg, A. (2003) ‘Reductionism in a Historical Science’, in van Regenmortel and 
Hull (eds) Reductionism in the Biomedical Sciences (Wiley-Blackwell) 
Rosenberg, A. (1985) The Structure of Biological Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 
Rosenthal, D. (2009) ‘Aristotle’s Hylomorphism’ (via Philpapers) 
Ross, D. (1923/1995) Aristotle (Routledge) 
Rudder Baker, L. (2000) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press) 
Rudder Baker, L. (2002) ‘On Making Things Up: Constitution and Its Critics’, 
Philosophical Topics 30: 31–52 
Rudder Baker, L. (2004) ‘The Ontology of Artifacts’, Philosophical Explorations 7: 99–112 
Rudder Baker, L. (2008), ‘The Shrinking Difference Between Artifacts and Natural 
Objects’, in Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, Piotr Boltuc (ed.), American Philosophical 
Association Newsletters 7:2: 1–10 
Ruse, M. (1973) The Philosophy of Biology (London: Hutchinson & Co.) 
Ruse, M. (1987/1992) ‘Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?’ British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38: 225–42, repr. in The Units of Evolution: Essays on the 
Nature of Species, ed. Marc Ereshefsky, 343–61. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 
Russell, B. (1925) Mysticism and Logic (London: Longman’s, Green & Co.) 
Rykwert, J. (1992) ‘Organic and Mechanical’, Anthropology and Aesthetics: 11–18 
Salmon, W. (1971) ‘Statistical Explanation’, in Statistical Explanation and Statistical 
Relevance, W. Salmon, (ed.), 29–87 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press) 
Salmon, W. (1989) Four Decades of Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press) 
Sarkar, S. (1992) ‘Models of Reduction and Categories of Reductionism’, Synthese 91, 
167–194 
Sarkar, S. (1998), Genetics and reductionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Schaffer, J. (2003) ‘Is there a fundamental level?’, Nôus 37(3): 498–517 
Schaffer, J. (2009) ‘On What Grounds What’, in Metametaphysics: 347–83 (eds) Chalmers, 
Manley and Wasserman (Oxford University Press) 
Schaffer, J. (2010) ‘Monism: The Priority of the Whole’, Philosophical Review 119(1): 31–76 
Schaffer, J. (2013) ‘The Metaphysics of Causation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2013 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.) 
URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/causation-metaphysics/>. 
Schaffner, K. (1969), ‘The Watson-Crick model and reductionism’, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 20, 325–348 
Schlanger, J. (1971), Les métaphores de l'organisme (Paris: Vrin) 
Schofield, M. (2002), Empedocles in E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Routledge – http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/A046SECT5 
	   217	  
Schwartz, S. (1978) ‘Putnam on Artifacts’, Philosophical Review 87: 566–574 
Scriven, M. (1962) ‘Explanations, Predictions, and Laws’, in Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, vol 3 Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time, H. Feigl and G. 
Maxwell (eds), 170–230. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 
Sears, C.L. (2005) ‘A dynamic partnership: celebrating our gut flora’, Anaerobe 11: 247–51 
Shapiro, R. (1986) Origins: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Creation of Life on Earth (New York: 
Bantam Books) 
Shoemaker, S. (1963) Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 
Shoemaker, S. (1970) ‘Persons and their pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7: 269–285 
Shoemaker, S. (1984) ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’ in S. Shoemaker and 
R. Swinburne (eds.) Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell): 69–132 
Shoemaker, S. (1999) ‘Self, body, and coincidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
supp. 73: 287–306 
Shoemaker, S. (2004a) ‘Brown-Brownson Revisited’, The Monist 87(4): 573–593 
Shoemaker, S. (2004b) ‘Reply to Wiggins’, The Monist 87(4): 610–613 
Sider, T (1993)  ‘Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk’ in Analysis 53: 285–289 
Sider, T. (2001) Four Dimensionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Sider, T. (2011) Writing the Book of the World (Oxford University Press) 
Simons, P. (1987) Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford University Press) 
Skinner, Q. (2002) Visions of Politics: Vol. 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge University 
Press) 
Smith, J.S. (2000) ‘The Concept of Information in Biology’, Philosophy of Science 67(2): 
177–194 
Snowdon, P. (1990) ‘Persons, animals and ourselves’ in C. Gill (ed.) The Person and the 
Human Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Snowdon, P. (1996) ‘Persons and Personal Identity’ in S. Lovibond and S. Williams 
(eds.), Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, (Blackwell Publishing) 
Snowdon, P. (1998) ‘Strawson, Peter Frederick’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved September 18, 2013, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD066SECT5 
Snowdon, P. (2009) ‘Peter Frederick Strawson’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/strawson/> 
Snowdon, P. (2009) ‘On the Sortal Dependency of Individuation Thesis’ in From Truth to 
Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics (ed.) H. Dyke (Routledge) 
Soames, S. (2003) Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol.1 (Princeton University 
Press) 
Sober, E. (2000) Philosophy of Biology (2nd Edition) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press) 
Sosa, E. (1987) ‘Subjects among other things’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophers’ 
Perspectives, I (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview) 
Sperry, R.W. (1966) Brain and Conscious Experience J.C. Eccles (ed.) (New York) 
	   218	  
Spinoza, B. (1883/1955) On the Improvement of the Understanding / The Ethics / 
Correspondence (vol. 2) R.H.M. Elwes (trans.) (Dover Publications) 
Sterelny, K., and Griffiths, P. (1999) Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology 
(University of Chicago Press) 
Steward, H. (2012) A Metaphysics for Freedom (Oxford University Press) 
Steward, H. (2013) ‘Processes, Continuants, and Individuals’, Mind 122 
Strathern, M. (1992) Reproducing the Future: Essays on Anthropology, Kinship, and the New 
Reproductive Technologies (London: Routledge) 
Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Methuen) 
Strawson, P.F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1–
25 
Strawson, P.F. (1974) Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (Oxford University Press) 
Strawson, P.F. (1981) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance’, Mind, New Series, 90(360): 603–
607 
Strawson, P.F. (1992) Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford 
University Press) 
Swinburne, R. (1984) ‘Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory’, in Sydney Shoemaker and 
Richard Swinburne (eds.) Personal Identity (Blackwell Publishing): 22–34 
Taylor, C. (2003) ‘Ethics and Ontology’, The Journal of Philosophy 100(6): 305–320 
Tamny, M. (1990) ‘Atomism and the Mechanical Philosophy’, in Companion to the History 
of Modern Science, R.C. Olby, G.N. Cantor, J.R.R. Christie, and M.J.S. Hodge (eds) 
(Routledge: London and New York): 597–609 
Theurer, K.L. (forthcoming) ‘Seventeenth-century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework 
for Reductionism’ 
Thiel, U. (1998) ‘Locke and Eighteenth-Century Materialist Conceptions of Personal 
Identity’, The Locke Newsletter 29: 59-83. 
Thiel, U. (2011) The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from 
Descartes to Hume (Oxford University Press) 
Thomas, L. (1974) The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books) 
Thomson, J.J. (1983) ‘Parthood and Identity Across Time’, Journal of Philosophy 80: 201–
220 
Thomson, J.J. (1997) ‘People and their Bodies’ in J. Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit (Blackwell 
Publishers): 202–229 
Thomson, J.J. (1998) ‘The Statue and the Clay’, Noûs 32: 149–173 
Toulmin, S. and Goodfield, J. (1962) The Architecture of Matter (University of Chicago 
Press) 
Tur, R. (1987) ‘The “Person” in Law’, in A. Peaocke and G. Gillett (eds) Persons and 
Personality (Oxford: Blackwell) 
Unger, P. (1979a) ‘I do not exist’ in G. Macdonald (ed.) Perception and Identity (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press) 
	   219	  
Unger, P. (1979b) ‘There are no ordinary things’, Synthese 41: 117–154 
Unger, P. (1990) Identity, Consciousness and Value (New York: Oxford University Press) 
Uzgalis, W. (2012) ‘John Locke’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/locke/>. 
Vaesen, K. (2012) ‘The cognitive bases of human tool use’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
35: 203–262 
Van Inwagen, P. (1981) ‘The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts’, The Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 62: 123–137 
Van Inwagen, P. (1990) Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 
Van Inwagen, P. (1997) ‘Materialism and the Psychological-continuity view of Personal 
Identity’, Noûs, supp. Philosophical Perspectives 11: 305 – 319 
Van Valen, L. (1976) ‘Ecological Species, Multispecies, and Oaks’, Taxon 25: 233–239 
Vutyavanich, T., Piromlertamorn, W., and Nunta, S. (2010) ‘Rapid freezing versus slow 
programmable freezing of human spermatozoa’, Fertility and Sterility 93: 1921–8 
Walmsley, J. (2000) ‘“Morbus” – Locke’s Early Essay on Disease’, Early Science and 
Medicine 5(4): 366–393 
Wasserman, R. (2004) ‘The Constitution Question’ Noûs 38: 693–710 
Waters, C.K (1990), ‘Why the antireductionist consensus won’t survive the case of 
classical Mendelian genetics’, in A. Fine, M. Forbes and L. Wessels (eds), Proceedings of the 
biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1 (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of 
Science Association), 125–139 
Whiting, J. (2008) ‘The Lockeanism of Aristotle’, Antiquorum Philosophia 
Wiggins, D. (1963) ‘The Individuation of Things and Places’ (a Symposium with M.J. 
Woods), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volumes, 37: 177–216 
Wiggins, D. (1967) Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Blackwell) 
Wiggins, D. (1968) ‘On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time’, Philosophical Review 
70: 90–95 
Wiggins, D. (1973) ‘Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism’ in Ted Honderich (ed.) 
Essays on Freedom of Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) 
Wiggins, D. (1976) ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as a 
Natural Kind’, Philosophy 51: 131–158 
Wiggins, D. (1978) ‘Are the Criteria of Identity that hold for a Work of Art in Different 
Arts Aesthetically Relevant? Reply to Richard Wollheim’, Ratio 20: 52-68 
Wiggins, D. (1979) ‘Mereological Essentialism: Asymmetrical Dependence and the 
Nature of Continuants’, in E. Sosa (ed.) Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm 
(Grazer Philosophische) 
Wiggins, D. (1980) Sameness and Substance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 
Wiggins, D. (1982) ‘Heraclitus’ conceptions of flux, fire and material persistence’ in M. 
Schofield and M. Nussbaum (eds) Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy 
presented to G.E.L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
	   220	  
Wiggins, D. (1987) ‘The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as 
Locus of Value’, in A. Peaocke and G. Gillett (eds) Persons and Personality (Oxford: 
Blackwell) 
Wiggins, D. (1987/1991) Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford, Blackwell) 
Wiggins, D. (1996) ‘Replies’ in S. Lovibond and S. Williams (eds), Essays for David 
Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value (Blackwell Publishing) 
Wiggins, D. (1997a) ‘Sortal Concepts: a Reply to Fei Xu’, Mind and Language 12: 413–21 
Wiggins, D. (1997b) ‘Languages as Social Objects’, Philosophy 72(282): 499–524 
Wiggins, D. (1998) Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford University Press) 
Wiggins, D. (1999) ‘Substance’ in A.C. Grayling (ed.) Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the 
Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Wiggins, D. (2000) ‘Sameness, substance and the human animal’, The Philosophers’ 
Magazine. 
Wiggins, D. (2001) Sameness and Substance Renewed (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 
Wiggins, D. (2004a) ‘Reply to Shoemaker’, The Monist 87(4): 594–609 
Wiggins, D. (2004b) ‘Reply to Shoemaker’s Reply’, The Monist 87(4): 614–615 
Wiggins, D. (2005a) ‘Reply to Bakhurst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17(2): 
442–448 
Wiggins, D. (2005a) ‘Précis of “Sameness and Substance Renewed”’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 17(2) 442–448 
Wiggins, D. (2012) ‘Identity, Individuation and Substance’, European Journal of Philosophy 
20(1): 1–25 
Williams, B. (1956–7) ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 57 
Williams, B. (1973) Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Williams, B. (1974) ‘The Truth in Relativism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New 
Series 75: 215–228 
Williams, B. (1978) ‘Hylomorphism’, Princeton Classical Philosophy Colloquium, 
December 7th 
Williams, B. (2002) Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton University 
Press) 
Williams, G.C. (1992) Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges (Oxford University 
Press) 
Wilson, J. (1999), Biological Individuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), and 
Dyer, B.D. (1989), ‘Symbiosis and Organismal Boundaries’, American Zoologist 29: 1085–
1093 
Williams, S.G. (2006) ‘David Wiggins’ in the Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, 
(eds) Goulder, N., Grayling, A.C., and Pyle, A. (London: Thoemmes Continuum). 
Wilson, E.O. (1975) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press) 
	   221	  
Wilson, R. (1999) ‘Realism, Essence, and Kind: Resuscitating Species Essentialism?’ in 
Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Robert Wilson (Cambridge MA: MIT Press): 187–
208 
Wilson, R., M. Barker, and I. Brigandt (2007) ‘When Traditional Essentialism Fails: 
Biological Natural Kinds’, Philosophical Topics 35: 189–215 
Wimsatt, W. (1976) ‘Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account’, in R.S. Cohen and 
A Michalos (eds) Proceedings of the 1974 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel): 671–710 
Wimsatt, W. (1980) ‘Reductionistic research strategies and their biases in the units of 
selection controversy’, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel): 213–259 
Wolfe, C.T. (2010) ‘Do Organisms have an Ontological Status’, History and Philosophy of 
the Life Sciences 32(2) 
Wollheim, R. (1989) The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Woodger, J.H. (1930–31) ‘The “concept of organism” and the relation between 
embryology and genetics.’ Quarterly Review of Biology 5:1–22 
Woodger, J.H. (1937) The Axiomatic Method in Biology (Cambridge University Press) 
Woodger, J.H. (1952) Biology and Language (Cambridge University Press) 
Wright, R. (1994) The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life (New York, 
Pantheon Books) 
Yablo, S. (2003) ‘Tables Shmables: Review of David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance 
Renewed’, in the Times Literary Supplement (July) 
Yolton, J. (1983) Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis). 
Young, J.Z. (1971) An Introduction to the Study of Man (Oxford: The Clarendon Press) 
Zemach, E.M. (1974) ‘In Defence of Relative Identity’ Philosophical Studies 26: 3–4 
 
